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In the 1890s the South developed its twentieth century political 
system, a system which the leadership of the region expected to last 
forever. Having repudiated the Republican party in the aftermath of the 
Civil War and Reconstruction, Southern conservative leaders in the 1890s 
faced a new challenge to their hegemony, a challenge based in class. 
Poor Southerners, black and white alike, attemp~ed to seize political 
control of state governments which were unresponsive to the problems of 
poverty. That struggle, the populist revolt, failed, especially after 
the conservatives raised the specter of black domination, a specter 
which had so effectively united whites during Reconstruction. Weakened 
already because their programs were too radical and because the conserv-
atives used all necessary means to keep radicalism suppressed, the popu-
lists split racially and insured the final defeat of their cause. In 
the aftermath the conservatives modified the political system to pre-
clude a renewed challenge. Claiming that they were working to create 
clean and efficient government, the conservatives disfranchised the 
rebels, black and white. By 1900 there existed in most of the South a 
system in which only one-fourth of the eligible voters decided in most 
elections only the ·question of which conservative Democrats were to 
govern. Rarely was a legitimate alternative provided to the voters. 
That was especially true in Arkansas. 
By the turn of the century, Arkansas politics had developed the 
pattern it would retain for more than 50 years. Jeff Davis was still 
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fighting his sham battles against trusts and the evils of the 
Northeastern-dominated industrial system, but his crusade brought few 
tangible benefits to the poor people of Arkansas. When Davis' rhetoric 
won him the opportunity to become a senatorial buffoon, the last illu-
sion of a politics of substance disappeared from Arkansas. From 
Jefferson David to Orval Faubus, Arkansas was governed primarily by a 
succession of conservatives who talked reform only in general terms and 
did nothing effective about Arkansas' poverty and backwardness. Arkan-
sas endured a period characterized, in the words of Boyce Drummond, by 
"fluid factionalism and issueless politics."l Writers such as V.O. Key, 
Numan Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, and Harry Ashmore, concur to a great 
extent that Arkansas was a state in which there was no developed oppo-
sition to the status quo. 
To gain success in Arkansas politics, the primary requirements were 
connections, an ability to shift as factions changed, and a rhetorical 
talent sufficient to convince the politically naive voters that one can-
didate was sufficiently different from the others to justify the nui-
sance and expense of voting. Other than "good" government and "good" 
roads, matters of virtually no controversy, the ambitious politician 
lacked issues. Thus, the tendency was to rely on wit, charm, and the 
other assets normally associated with a beauty queen. And it was no 
great liability if the candidate had friends in any of the political 
machines which dominated the state. 
Within such a system, one in which personal relationships were as 
important as personal qualifications, the easiest route to success was 
to remain faithful as a worker .for the group in power at any given time. 
Men such as Harvey Parnell, who served as governor from 1929 to 1933, 
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worked their way.through the ranks, holding local voters in the appro-
priate column, then serving as "yes men" in the legislature, and finally 
winning the right to an office from which to campaign for a worthwhile 
position, in Parnell's case the lieutenant governorship. An alternative 
model, one more suited to the less patient politician, was that of 
Charles H. Brough, governor from 1917 to 1921. 
Brough was representative of the "reform" element of Arkansas' pol-
itics, the Southern liberals. He achieved prominence initially in 1905 
when Jeff Davis att.empted to fire a politically unfriendly professor at 
the University of Arkansas. As one of those who resisted the intrusion 
of politics into the academic environment, Brough gained a reputation as 
a reformer, and as governor he did attempt to bring honest, efficient, 
progressive government to. the state. Brough also had the rhetorical 
skills to create the illusion that he was doing more than the record 
indicated. His final asset was a significant leadership on all levels 
in the Southern Baptist Convention.2 
Historically, religion was a vital element in American development. 
From the eary settlement of New England, faith provided a means of mak-
ing survival easier. Although traditional religion declined in the 
North due to urbanization, commercialization, industrialization, and 
immigration, the South remained largely untouched by those developments 
and their consequence, decline. As a result, Southern society remained 
in the early twentieth century much as it had been in colonial times. 
It was predominantly agricultural, a· region of small towns and small 
farms inhabited by minimally educated and economically struggling people 
who traced their ancestry in a direct line to the early colonists. 
Ideas such as Darwinism or religious liberalism, the social gospel, 
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failed to establish themselves with a significant percentage of the 
Southern people. The traditional ways remained strong, especially the 
fairly emotional, fundamental. religion of an area but recently removed 
from the frontier. 
Also, community pressure for orthodoxy promoted church membership. 
There was no urban anonymity to allow backsliding, apathy, or heretical 
tendencies. In a small town everyone knew everyone else, and the limits 
of acceptable behavior were sharply circumscribed. Much as in Puritan 
New England, in the rural South religious activity was a requirement. 
As a result of its traditionalism, the South remained an area of 
high religious involvement. Thus, it was no surprise that politicians 
trying to attract support in largely issueless one-party campaigns used 
their religious preferences as a means of creating distinctions from 
their rivals and as a method of identifying with the voters. The larg-
est denomination in the South was the Southern Baptist Convention. How-
ever, lest the method appear cynical, it is necessary to emphasize that 
men such as Brough and Hays were sincere in their beliefs. 
With those alternatives to choose from, Hays elected the route that 
best fit his personality and his ambitions. An active Southern Baptist 
and a joiner of virtually every available organization, Hays chose the 
image of reformer when he engaged in his first campaign in 1928. By 
predilection and by training, he was a Southern progressive at that 
stage of hi~ career, and the political reality in 1928 prohibited his 
working his way through the ranks. Had Hays had the patience to seek 
the attorney general's office in 1928, he might have developed the posi-
tion from which to win the governor's chair in 1932. But he was in a 
hurry and chose to run for governor in 1928 even though the lieutenant 
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governor was in the race. So Hays became another candidate who stood 
for honest government and good roads. He lost. He repeated his per-
formance in 1930 and almost had the opportunity to do so again in 1932. 
But he was fortunate enough that in that year he won a role in a faction 
consistent with his image and impulses. In a race against an unknown, 
he won a fairly minor post, Democratic National Committeeman from 
Arkansas. From 1932 on, Hays was a loyal and effective worker for the 
national Democratic party. As national committeeman, as employee of 
several New Deal agencies, as publicist and liaison with state govern-
ment for those agencies~ Hays acquired a reputation as a Southern 
liberal, a reputation which complicated his relationships with the con-
servative factions and forced Hays to develop skills in negotiation of 
truces and compromises, skills which proved invaluable in Hays' congres-
sional career after he finally won a seat in 1942. 
It was a difficult process, learning how to survive in the polit-
ical swamp that was Arkansas, and Hays suffered many defeats before he 
acquired the necessary tools. But finally Hays mastered the talent for 
compromise and negotation which made him an asset to his party on the 
national if not the state level. At the same time he provided the 
people of Arkansas with sufficient rewards to placate them and keep his 
position secure. And because it was done by a realist, not a cynic, who 
had a reasonably developed conscience to restrain the tendency toward 
excess, by the time the whole structure collapsed in the aftemath of 
Little Rock, a minor electoral reverse was perceived as a major calam-
ity. Moderation was dead. 
Thus, Brooks Hays has today a reputation as a legitimate liberal. 
In reality he tended to be a Southern liberal, a states rights liberal. 
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Not until the national administration showed by the civil rights legis-
lation of 1964 and 1965 that Southern liberalism was inadequate would 
Hays abandon his belief that radical alteration of the Southern social 
system, Jim Crow, had to occur, if at all, by means of state action and 
the education of the Southern people about the legitimacy and inevita-
bility of change. Hays' liberalism allowed federal involvement only 
when state and local solutions were clearly inadequate. As a Jeffer-
sonian liberal, Hays was willing to accept limited federal intrusion, 
but because of that acceptance, Hays came to be perceived by the truly 
conservative politicians of Arkansas, people such as Parnell, as a radi-
cal. True liberals and radicals, those who know the record, perceive 
Hays as a conservative, but they err in classifying him with men such as 
Parnell. Therefore, it is important to recreate the public career of 
Brooks Hays, a Southern moderate. Hopefully, such a task can provide a 
better understanding of an element of Southern politics and life which 
too of ten is overshadowed by the myth that modern American politics is 
dominated by a split between Southern conservatives and Northern lib-
erals. Because Hays was active into the 1970s, he can serve as an 
example of Southern liberalism, national conservatism. 
My heartfelt thanks go to those who have made this study possible. 
Foremost is Dr. James M. Smallwood who has consistently encouraged and 
guided my progress through the program. Also, Dr. W. David Baird merits 
my appreciation for directing me toward the man Hays. Dr. Joseph Stout 
first convinced me that I was a mediocre writer at best; then he showed 
me how to become however competent I am. Dr. George Jewsbury and Dr. J. 
Paul Bischoff have helped me ta see the larger view and to understand 
how a local topic can have broader implications. My committee has 
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worked as a team, and I appreciate the united effort they have put 
forth. 
Another team without which this project would be impossible is that 
group of archivists throughout the United States of whom I have asked so 
much. Wherever I went and whatever I requested, I received nothing but 
the best. The National Archives, the Library of Congress, The Southern 
Tenant Farmers Union Collection at the University of North Carolina, the 
facilities at the Johnson and Eisenhower presidential libraries--all are 
staffed by people who help in any possible way. Especially is that true 
of the three major repositories of the papers of Brooks Hays. Wake 
Forest was a joy, but the deepest gratitude must go to the personnel of 
the Historical Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, Ron Tonks 
especially, and to everyone who helped me with the Hays collection at 
the University of Arkansas, Sam Sizer and the rest. Also, I appreciate 
all those who interviewed Hays and Hays himself for being so easy to 
interview. 
Most important of all, I must express my gratitude to my wife, 
Barbara, for never losing faith. With the members of both sides of our 
family, she has provided the encouragement without which this under-
taking would have buried me. 
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System" (unpub. Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1957), p. 233. 
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THE ROOTS OF BROOKS HAYS 
In 1898 the South, including Arkansas, was wallowing in defeat and 
frustration. Having failed to become Henry Grady's New South of indu~­
try and enlightenment, the region had begun to reemphasize its tradi-
tional concerns--racism and poverty as the foundation of an agricultural 
empire. But at the same time as people such as Tom Watson and Ben 
Tillman sought to turn back the clock there.remained a group of Southern 
liberals who devoted their lives to eradicating the.racist and 
repressiv~ evils of the system. 
One man whose career was typical of the limited but sincere effort 
to bring as much as possible of the new south to Arkansas was Lawrence 
Brooks Hays of Russellville. Born on August 9, 1898, Hays lived through 
the painful process of leading his region into the twentieth century. 
And he did more than watch the process develop; he fought many of the 
battles. He defied the Ku Klux Klan, albeit hesitantly; he worked to 
improve the lot of his state's poor.· He struggled to make the New Deal 
a success. He served his state, then his nation, in varied capacities 
for more than 50 yeQrs. By the time of his semi-retirement in the 
1970s, his region had achieved some degree of economic modernization, 
the backwardness of his state was less pronounced, and tolerance in 
matters of race was at least superficially the norm. But in 1898 there 




In 1897 both the Ex-Slaves Association of Arkansas and the Confed-
erate veterans of the state held their annual celebrations at West End 
Park in Little Rock, Arkansas. The next year the Democratic party of 
Arkansas capped a decade of Jim Crow legislation by establishing a white 
primary. Having been segregated in railway cars by the Separate Coach 
Act of 1891 and having seen the populist attempt to reduce race as an 
issue die slowly as populist votes fell from 20 percent in 1892 to less 
than 3 percent by 1900, blacks faced a choice of becoming Republicans, a 
25 percent minority, or staying out of politics. Legislation requiring 
a poll tax certificate which identified the voter by race became law in 
1892 and convinced many that home was the place to be on election day; 
by 1894 the number of voters in Arkansas fell by one-third. By 1898 
blacks and many poor whites were effectively removed from the political 
process and fading from social and economic relevance.I Arkansas was a 
white state run by a Democratic party whose style followed the pattern 
set by Jeff Davis of Russellville. 
The man whom Rupert Vance labeled "A Karl Marx for Hill Billies" 
received an education in law at Arkansas and Vanderbilt universities, 
but he quickly recognized the value of populist rhetoric and a homespun 
approach as means to political success. Dressed customarily in a Prince 
Albert suit of appropriate Confederate gray, Davis sparred with trusts 
and gentlemen with no practical result save the election of Jeff Davis 
first as attorney general, then as governor three times, and finally as 
senator until his death in 1913.2 
Establishing a pattern for his successors, Davis ignored the 
problems of his constituents. His race-baiting and pseudo-populism 
distracted Arkansans from their problems. And the problems of Arkansas 
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were serious, so serious that they were not even to approach resolution 
for more than 50 years. As with most of the South in 1900, Arkansas was 
a backward place. Illiteracy handicapped 11.6 percent of the people, a 
number lower than the average for the six cotton states (Alabama, 
Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina) which was 
20 percent, but a figure well above the national average of only 4.6 
percent. Also, the state was economically backward. Of the 5.6 million 
new manufacturing jobs created between 1890 and 1910, only 381,000 
appeared in the cotton South, and most of them were in the textile 
industry and, thus, appeared elsewhere than in Arkansas. Textile manu-
facturing bypassed the state, and not until the 1920s did Arkansas 
diversify into the production of rice and other cereals and oil. 
Typical of the problems of Arkansas was the development of the bauxite 
industry. By 1900 the state became America's number one producer of the 
mineral, but by 1909 bauxite throughout the South was a monopoly of 
Andrew Mellon, the Northern banker and industrialist. Another source of 
income departed the state for the Northeast. All Arkansas had was cot-
ton, and that fiber was of little value. In 1900, 74.6 percent of the 
labor force of Arkansas worked in agriculture. Only Mississippi had a 
higher percentage of farm workers. Of the agricultural work force, 45.4 
percent were tenants or sharecroppers, people who averaged perhaps 
$100.00 a year in earnings, earnings which had to be divided with the 
owner. And that was in good years. During the 1890s cotton was a bad 
crop. Between 1889 and 1893 prices fell from 11.5 cents a pound to 7.5 
cents. In 1898, after marginal years in 1895 and 1896, the price 
reached a low of 4.9 cents a pound. To break even, a farmer had to make 
between seven and eight cents a pound. One-crop Arkansas was suffering 
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by 1900.3 
Thus Arkansas at the turn of the century was unconcerned with 
national conditions. Recovery from the Panic of 1893 bypassed the 
state, and wars in Cuba and the Philippines seemed to be irrelevant to 
people who had enough "coloreds" of their own. Poverty and 
discrimination were twin themes which overshadowed all else despite the 
stagnant politics of the twentieth .century. But by chance, just as 
Arkansas fixed its course for the century to come, there appeared a man 
who was to devote his life to altering that course. The man was Brooks 
Hays who worked as politician, social worker, and religious leader to 
eradicate the damages caused to his state and his people by the dual 
sins of poverty and racism. Hays' efforts were such that his religious 
brethren turned on him and his congressional constituents unseated him 
in 1958, but his pursuit of his dual objectives led even the president 
of the Baptist Convention of the State of Georgia, James P. Wesberry, to 
write Hays in 1958 that "you are the one layman more like Christ than 
any layman I know."4 
On August 9, 1898, Hays was born into a lower middle-class family 
in Atkins, Arkansas, a tiny town just south of the mountains in the 
northwestern part of the state. Nothing in the background of that small 
town family had been especially noteworthy. Hays' grandfather taught 
school after his graduation from Allegheny College in Meadville, 
Pennsylvania, until his death in 1890. Grandfather Hays had established 
the first real school system in the area of Ellsworth, Arkansas, after 
having moved there for his health in 1879. The other side of the 
family, the Butlers, had little. more prominence. Hays' maternal 
grandfather was a graduate of Vanderbilt Medical School who became a 
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country doctor in Ellsworth in the mid-1870s. His contributions to the 
family tradition came from his home in Henderson County, Tennessee, 
where he developed a devotion to antisecessionism, prohibition, the 
Republican party, and the Primitive Baptist Church. Butler was a lay 
preacher who ministered to bodies during the week and to souls on 
Sunday. The Panic of 1893 nearly destroyed him financially; his wife 
lived on penuriously after his death, and she provided a link with the 
past for Brooks Hays. 
Neither grandfather met Brooks Hays. But they met one another in 
Ellsworth. It was there that. Hays' parents became childhood sweethearts 
and later married. They moved to Atkins where Brooks was born.5 Hays' 
parents were well-educated for northwestern Arkansas although they were 
less well-educated than their parents. Hays' mother spent some time at 
Ouachita College in Arkadelphia, Arkansas, and at Peabody College in 
Nashville, Tennessee, two strong Southern Baptist institutions. His 
father, Steele, was self-educated beyond the eighth grade, an 
achievement sufficient to make him principle of Atkins High Shcool in 
the 1890s. Education was important to the Hays family. One of Brooks 
Hays' earliest recollections is of staying with his maternal grandmother 
while his father attended one semester of law classes at Washington and 
Lee University and while his. mother taught school to support the family. 
A progressive belief in education as the best means to effect change 
marked Hays' later career. As he said in 1959, "popular government 
cannot survive without popular education."6 
When Hays was five years of age, his family moved from Atkins, a 
small town whose existence was possible only because of the railroad, to 
the county seat of Pope County, Russellville, where Steele Hays had 
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earlier formed a law partnership with Tom Brooks for whom Brooks Hays 
was named. Pope County was 75 to 80 percent rural during Hays' 
formative years, but Russellville was growing. By the time Hays 
graduated from high school, the population was 3,500, and in the 1920s 
the town attained a population of 5,000. Russellville grew due to its 
location on the railroad and the attraction of that utility for the 
county seat and for the county's farmers and lumbermen. Lacking a town 
square, Russellville used the railroad to divide itself into the right 
and wrong sides of the tracks. Russellville had no Jews or Catholics, 
but it had both Northern and Southern Methodist churches, the result of 
an influx of Northerners into Arkansas in the 1880s and 1890s. And of 
course there was the Russellville Baptist Church which Brooks attended 
on a regular basis.7 
It was a peaceful life growing up in semi-rural Arkansas during the 
first decades of the twentieth century. From both his father and his 
mother, Hays developed the habit of attending church regularly although 
like many of this brethren he never underwent the conversion experience 
so important to southern Baptists. The small town environment and 
family interest kept Hays at church. He also read extensively in his 
father's library. For a time the elder Hays worked as a traveling 
salesman and, always a lover of books, spent his surplus money on good 
reading material. Available to Brooks Hays at home were Ridpaths' 
History, approximately twenty-five volumes of Mark Twain, Louisa Mae 
Alcott, Uncle Remus, assorted works of Southern literature, McGuffey's 
Readers, and Bible stories, including Safe Steps for Little Feet. In 
religion and education Hays fell strongly under the influence of his 
father. In fact Hays regarded himself as a submissive child who was 
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dominated by his father while his mother served most often as the 
mediator.8 However, there were other influences on Hays as he grew. 
His parents, while by no means wealthy, were financially secure. While 
growing up, Hays visited his grandmother Butler often. Her husband 
having lost virtually everything in the Panic, the widowed Mrs. Butler 
was poor, and her poverty made a strong and lasting impression on young 
Hays. Also, Hays had approximately 46 cousins in the area of 
Russellville. Like most farmers in the region, the cousins struggled 
for subsistence. From the time he was strong enough, Hays had the duty 
of providing Christmas baskets for his poor relations and the other 
poverty-stricken residents of the community. Hays learned from 
firsthand observation the difficulties of impoverishment. That 
exposure created in him a drive to ameliorate such conditons. Hays 
developed what he described as "a passion for straightening out things 
and ministering to people while things were being straightened out."9 
For Brooks Hays there was but one sure way to correct the problems 
he saw. He was going into politics. As early as 1904, when he was but 
six years old, Hays determined his future career. One campaign gimmick 
used in the presidential campaing of 1904 was painted Easter eggs. Hard 
boiled eggs bore pictures of the two major candidates, Alton B. Parker 
and Theodore Roosevelt. The six-yea·r-old child was fascinated with the 
eggs he received and determined that he would one day have his picture 
on a similar egg, even if he had to become president to do it. A firmer 
influence on Hays was, once again, his father. Steele Hays was active 
in Democratic politics, and he early developed the habit of taking young 
Brooks to political meetings on both the local and state levels. Brooks 
thus wanted to be a politician, and his father insured that the 
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politician would be a Democrat, not an automatic choice in northwestern 
Arkansas, the traditional stronghold of Unionism and Republicanism, but 
the only possible route to success in the rest of the state. 
As a town dweller Hays escaped the backbreaking drudgery of farm 
labor, but as he grew into manhood he learned the value of work of a 
more rewarding sort. From age 11 until he left for college, Hays 
delivered the local newspaper, the Russellville Courier-Democrat. For 
five days' work each week he earned $1.10. But that was not sufficient 
for such an ambitious and industrious young man. Between 1910 and 1913 
Hays also sold the Saturday Evening Post. Either on the back of his 
father's horse, Dolly, or riding behind her in the family buggy, young 
Brooks delivered his magazines and newspapers throughout Russellville, 
at one point selling 100 magazines a week in the town of 3,500 people. 
For his work Hays gained two cents of the five cents charged per copy of 
the Post. Also, he won prizes for his success as a salesman, the most 
treasured of which was the one-dollar Ingersoll pocket watch which he 
carried for the few years that it lasted.IO 
But the young man who read the Bible daily, worked like a demon, 
and studied hard was not simply a "workaholic." His high school experi-
ences were exceptionally fruitful but pleasant as well. Growing up, 
Hays enjoyed sandlot baseball, sacrificing his delicate body to the 
rigors of catching with primitive equipment. Weighing little more than 
100 pounds by the time he was in college, Hays did not play football or 
the more violent sports in high school. Rather, he and a few friends 
established a tennis club, bought their nets, and competed informally 
with one another. Hays allowed his competitive spirit to expend itself 
in more intellectual activites. 
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In 1911, even before he was in high school, Hays experienced his 
first formal debate. One of the debaters at the school was expelled, so 
young Hays filled the vacancy on the high school team. Still in short 
pants, Hays journeyed with the team to Conway, Arkansas, where the 
Russellville debaters won. From that time on, Hays was active in debate 
and declamation. In 1912 he became a member of the Ashley Literary 
Society as well. Despite all of that activity, Hays still maintained 
high enough grades to gain admission into the school honor society. If 
anything was sacrificed during his high school career, it was romance. 
Hays had an active social life but developed no emotional attachments 
while at Russellville High Schoo1.ll 
One of the three members of his high school graduating class of 15 
who went on to college, Hays continued at Arkansas the patterns he had 
established in youth. Despite aid from his father of $25.00 a month, 
Hays worked hard. His first summer he spent teaching school for $50.00 
a month. During the school year he worked at the library. Still dom-
inated by his father, Hays resisted the potential for corruption which 
life away from home provided. For instance, dancing was a popular pas-
time for the more liberal element at the University of Arkansas. Dances 
were well chaperoned, and Hays regarded them as good clean fun. How-
ever, papa Hays disapproved; Brooks did not dance. He continued to 
debate, making the university team in his sophomore year. Membership in 
the Periclean Liter~ry Society came naturally to Hays in 1915. Quickly 
he became chaplain of the society. More important than anything else 
was the meeting of December 4, 1915, Gingerbread Day. 
Gingerbread Day was an annual event for the Pericleans. It was a 
fairly innocuous social occasion at which the members played parlor 
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games and enjoyed sweets and non-intoxicating beverages. For Hays the 
highlight of the event was the spelling bee. The members paired off by 
drawing lots, and simply by chance Hays found himself partnered with 
Marion Prather, a rather demure but charming young lady. 
Marion had not enjoyed an especially easy life. When she was 
between the ages of five and seven, her father deserted her mother and 
his two daughters. Her mother, a dedicated churchwoman, kept boarders 
and sold magazine subscriptions to keep the family intact. Both 
daughters financed their educations by teaching school and winning 
scholarships. Marion appeared to be just the type for Brooks. He 
immediately fell -in love. As .he recalled many years later, "She just 
captivated me--just absolutely captivated me."12 
With romance flourishing, Brooks was happy at the university, and 
well he should have been. His life was going well. Among other honors 
he received, Hays became editor-in-chief of the Razorback, the univer-
sity annual, and assistant of the university weekly. Even in the 
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) he did well despite the fact that 
he was extremely thin, being five feet ten inches tall and weighing no 
more than 110 pounds. Hays served as second lieutenant in the ROTC. He 
learned the customary mundane things such as marching and Morse Code. 
Also, he learned where to place his socks, shoes, and other items at 
inspections. Guard duty and gas or grenade drills occupied his time in 
1916 as well. Occasionally the lectures bored him, but Hays entertained 
himself by doodling in his notebooks. Doodling was a lifetime habit for 
Hays. From high school yearbooks to congressional notepads, Hays used 
to advantage the skills he had learned from the lessons in the Landon 
School of Cartooning correspondence course. Of course, one of his most 
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doodled notebooks was the one for freshman American history.13 
ROTC also gave Hays the opportunity to leave Arkansas for awhile. 
In the summer of 1918, he attended training camp at Fort Sheridan, 
Illinois. His principle accomplishment while there was to write an art-
icle for the Fort Sheridan Reveille which dealt with the role of Univer-
sity of Arkansas president J.C. Futrell in the formation of the ROTC. 
Hays was in the Army only briefly, however. On November 14, 1918, 
Lawrence Brooks Hays, Private, Infantry Replacement and Training 
Troops, Unassigned, was demobilized and honorably discharged from the 
Army of the United States.14 
After attending the University of Arkansas, Hays entered law school 
in final preparation for his political career. His choice for an educ-
ation in the law was George Washington University in Washington, D.C. 
There he was a member of Phi Alpha Delta law fraternity, and he con-
tinued his career as a varsity debater. His initial exposure to 
Washington, D.C. was surprising. Being a small town boy who was fasci-
nated by politics, on arrival on July 19, 1919, Hays went quickly to the 
National Hotel, a well known resting place for prominent politicians. 
Hays stayed there only a short time after he discovered that he was pay-
ing three dollars a night for the thrill of walking such distinguished 
halls. Quickly, he moved into a boarding house which had a monthly rate 
of $30.00 including meals. After one month there, he moved into the 
apartment of a friend from the University of Arkansas, Bolan Turner. 
From the first, Hays enjoyed Washington, D.C. Even with the Red Scare 
and the race riot of 1919, the town was nevertheless sleepy in the 
glorious Southern manner. However, to stay there Hays needed employ-
ment. His means of getting a job was one he continued afterward. He 
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used the political ties formed in Arkansas to gain from his congressman 
a position with the United States Treasury. By spending his weeks 
counting newly printed bills, Hays earned enough that he was able to 
afford life in the national capital.15 
Being ambitious, Hays sought to improve his condition while in 
Washington, D.C. In the late summer of 1920, he received an offer of a 
position as corresponding clerk in the examining division of the United 
States Civil Service Commission. He accepted with the provision that 
his salary be $1,600 a year. That restriction created a problem; in 
October he learned that the maximum authorizied salary was less than 
$1,400 a year. He turned the job down and, as a consequence, lost his 
best opportunity to become merely another obscure element of the great 
American bureaucracy. Despite his failure to win for himself a lifetime 
of security, Hays attempted at the same time to get a pension for a 
Russellville acquaintance, Samuel Price. Hays continued his habit of 
helping others while also helping himself.16 
The next year Hays tried again to find a better job, calling that 
time on his experience as salesman. In September of 1921, he wrote to 
Charles E. Seiler of Findex Files pointing out that he had used the 
files for six months and had the connections to place orders in govern-
mental offices. After a series of missed appointments, finally Hays got 
the job after Thanksgiving. For the first half of 1922, he hustled 
through the bureaucracies of Washington, D.C., sending glowing reports 
to Findex about the large number of hot leads he was pursuing. But in 
June he quit, apparently having failed to land even one order.17 
Fortunately for Hays, he continued to work at the Treasury Department 
while failing elsewhere. So he was sufficiently secure to marry even 
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before finishing school. 
On February 3, 1922, Brooks Hays and Marion Prather were married in 
the First Methodist Episcopal Church, South, of Fort Smith, Arkansas. 
Marion had accepted Brooks' pin during his sophomore year at Arkansas, 
and from that time on she remained a devoted helpmate to him. She never 
joined his church, remaining a Methodist, and she never learned to enjoy 
the insincerity which was so much a part of politics, but she accom-
panied her husband wherever he went, always courteous, smiling, and 
tolerant of the thousands of insincere handshakes. After the wedding 
and a post-ceremony buffet, the newlyweds moved to Washington, D.C., 
where they lived on his $35.00 a week salary and her savings from her 
time teaching high school English in Fort Smith. After he graduated 
from law school in June, the couple returned to Russellville where 
Brooks joined his father, taking over what he called "the dregs of the 
law practice."18 
Even before Hays returned to Russellville, his father announced for 
Congress. Apparently Hays was the decisive factor in the decision of 
his father. He later expressed regret that he pressed his father too 
much, because the campaign of 1922 failed. Arksansas was similar to the 
rest of the South and much of the nation in that the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) 
was a major force in 1922. At the Russellville Baptist Church all of 
the deacons except Brooks and Steele Hays were members of the anti-
everything, violent organization. In the campaign there were a pro-Klan 
candidate, and anti-Klan candidate, and Steele Hays, who sought to 
address what he considered more important issues. His issues were 
irrelevant to the voters, so Hays lost and retired from politics. The 
Klan candidate won, indicating that Arkansas remained susceptible to the 
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influence of those who offered easy solutions to difficult problems. 
Brooks Hays learned from the experience. 
Having determined as early as 1904 that he would have his picture 
on an Easter egg, Brooks Hays was clearly a political creature by the 
time he managed his father's campaign in 1922. Exposure to local polit-
ical meetings at his father's side during his formative years made Hays 
aware of the need for flexibility in Arkansas politics. Having fallen 
victim to the Klan issue in the 1922 campaign, Hays took up the issue 
himself in 1923.19 
Hays objected to the "latent racism and religious bigotry" of the 
Ku Klux Klan.20 However, when Dr. J. Ellsworth "Daddy" Coombs chastized 
him for anti-Klan activity, Hays was less than firm in opposition. In 
August of 1923, Coombs wrote to Hays the following: 
• • • a young man of your rare ability and splendid christian 
(sic) character can go to the top in political life in 
Arkansas, but my honest opinion is, that witjout (sic) their 
[the Klan's] assistance,,_ no man will go very far along the 
line for years to come.LI 
Coombs made clear to Hays that success in Arkansas politics required 
accommodation of the KKK. Hays reply was conciliatory. First he 
reminded Coombs that he had declined membership in the Klan a year 
before he came out in open opposition to "a vast organization based upon 
religious and racial prejudice." Hays then acknowledged that Klan 
members were sincere and patriotic, but he warned softly that "If 
prolonged a masked organisation (sic) interfering with the administra-
tion of justice [would] in time weaken our judicial system." Hays 
noted then that he had no desire to stand in the way of any good that 
the Klan was doing; however, he.reminded Coombs that the churches and 
the Russellville Lions Club, of which Hays was president, were as 
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dedicated to Americanism as was the KKK. And they were less a threat.22 
So Hays took a "strong" stand of equivocal opposition to the KKK. 
Another pattern in the life of the moderate, Brooks Hays, was in place. 
By August of 1923, just past his twenty-fifth birthday, Hays was 
ready to leave rural Pope County for Little Rock, Washington, and the 
world. On that 50 year journey the temperate and clean habits developed 
in the Baptist Church and at home helped to provide the energy which 
dedication to hard word required. Biblical lessons on tolerance, love 
and help for his fellow human beings reinforced the concern for the poor 
and exploited which had come to Hays through contact with his maternal 
grandmother, 46 cousins, and the generally unprosperous dirt farmers of 
Arkansas. Hays had the training, the talent, and the desire. Moreover, 
Hays had the rudiments of .the skills needed for survival--perhaps 
success--in the murky world of Arkansas politics. He was an experienced 
public speaker who knew the effectiveness of wit as a means of con-
vincing his audience. Also, he was experienced in the techniques of 
salesmanship, especially those needed to sell himself. As well, he had 
political connections and no compunction about using those connections 
to advantage. He even had political experience, although it was limited 
to only one campaign and consisted primarily of behind-the-scenes rather 
than public activity. Apparently Hays had the needed talent. Certainly 
he had the desire. And he had a program. 
The moral lessons learned at the Russellville Baptist Church, the 
progressive politics learned from his father, the backwardness of 
Arkansas which was obvious from everyday observation of his 
surroundings--these elements combined with the ambition of Hays to make 
his political program one of reform. 
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So Hays was going out into the world to make a name for himself in 
politics, and he was determined to do so as another Brough rather than a 
Davis. That his ambition made him well known in his chosen field was a 
satisfaction to him. Because his political goals were achieved more 
often in accordance with his principles rather than in spite of them, he 
gained a reputation far beyond what mere political success could bring. 
A politician, he achieved his victories and his fame in making his state 
a better and more just place in which to live. Religion, social work, 
and the fight for human dignity were all areas in which the impact of 
Brooks Hays was felt in the years after 1923. Thus, an examination of 
the career of Brooks Hays will provide some indication of the changes 
which occurred during his 50 years of service. 
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CHAPTER II 
GROWTH THROUGH DEFEAT, 1922-1932 
Having proved unsuccessful in his first venture into the political 
arena, Hays settled down to life as a small town lawyer. He became 
junior member of the firm of Hays, Priddy, and Hays, where he earned his 
keep by handling cases which his partners regarded as unworthy of their 
superior experience. A typical example of the concerns of the younger 
Hays was a suit on behalf of the owner of a small dog which had been 
killed. Hays prepared an .elaborate, emotional plea on behalf of his 
client, planning even to bring tears by reciting the "Eulogy on the 
Dog," but his efforts were wasted because the judge dismissed the case 
for technical reasons. That case was the highlight of two and one half 
years' service to the firm. 
With such a practice, Hays had much time to spare. Also, personal 
preference and a desire for political visibility made him a joiner. 
Thus, he joined every organization available to him. He became a Mason; 
he joined the Lions. He spoke at meetings of the Womens Christian Tem-
perence Union. He became secretary of the state Democratic convention. 
As expected of a man such as he, Hays became a deacon in his church. 
Also, he was an active participant in the American Legion. Having spare 
time yet, he studied the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), even attending one meet-
ing.I Obviously he needed many outlets for his energy and ambition. 
Even the birth of his daughter in October of 1923 was not sufficient to 
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fill those needs in Hays. He had to involve himself in social concerns, 
religion, and politics on a broader scale and in a larger arena than 
Russellville allowed. The opportunity to broaden his sphere of activity 
came first in politics. 
During the summer of 1924, Hays received a telephone call from 
Judge Arthur B. Priddy, his law partner. The judge asked Hays to assume 
the role of campaign manager for H. w. Applegate, candidate for attorney 
general of Arkansas. Hays agreed to help even though Applegate was a 
member of the KKK. Hays believed that the KKK was a fading force in 
Arkansas. For him the primary campaign issue was prohibition and the 
Eighteenth Amendment. On that matter Hays and Applegate agreed. As 
with most Arkansas politicians of the time, they supported the elimina-
tion of alcohol as a means of solving attendant problems. Consequently, 
Hays backed the Klansman, even at one point presuming on his relation-
ship with Joseph Robinson to seek the senator's backing for Applegate. 
Nursing the wounds of an unsuccessful bid for the presidency, Robinson 
declined; Applegate won anyway. Hays gained as his reward for faithful 
service the position of assistant attorney general of Arkansas. 
Hays moved his family to Little Rock; there his wife gave birth to 
their son, Steele, in 1925. Life appeared to be getting better for 
Hays. The attorney general's office was more stimulating for Hays than 
was the small town practice of his father and the judge. In the off ice 
of the attorney gen~ral, Hays specialized in taxes, truck regulations, 
and minimum wage legislation. Notably, he prepared Arkansas' case in 
the progressive fight for a state minimum wage for women. Although the 
United States Supreme Court invalidated the law in 1927, the concept won 
vindication during the New Deal of the 1930s. More successful was the 
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drafting by Hays of the first public library law in Arkansas. Also, he 
spoke extensively on behalf of prison reform.2 In supporting those 
changes Hays was a typical progressive of the 1920s. But he was also an 
ambitious man who wanted more than a second-rate political position, 
even though he was effecting significant change from that office. He 
resigned from the government in late 1927, hoping to earn a greater 
income (a concern which continued to plague Hays throughout much of his 
pre-congressional career). For a short time Hays worked at the Pyramid 
Life Insurance company in Little Rock. But as always his first love was 
politics, and he hesitated not an instant when suddenly the gubernatorial 
chair became vacant. 
In 1928 Governor John E. Martineau resigned his office to become a 
federal judge. The gubernatorial vacancy attracted candidates from 
every area of the state political swamp. As usual the competitors 
relied on position or name recognition, not true issues. Among the top 
contenders were a former governor, Tom J. Terral, and the Klan candidate 
of 1924, Lee Cazort. The most strategically placed contender was 
Lieutenant Governor Harvey Parnell who was acting governor at the time. 
Also in the race was the 29 year old former assistant attorney general, 
Brooks Hays. 
Hays opened the campaign with a·strong statement from a prepared 
text. He blasted his opponents, alleging that one was inclined to shirt 
with the prevailing _breeze (probably Terral although Hays failed to 
specify), and describing the other, undoubtedly Parnell, as a tool of 
the special interests. He also established that he regarded the number 
one issue of the campaign to be the major special interest which backed 
Parnell, the road lobby. Hays addressed the matter in such a way that 
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he was able to indicate his commitment to good government without alien-
ating the former governor, a dangerous political foe. While indicating 
that he supported the highway legislation of Martineau, Hays stated that 
he objected to his primary opponent's playing politics with the matter. 
It was too vital an issue.3 Roads of adequate quality were in desper-
ately short supply in Arkansas in 1928. The problem was one for which 
solutions had been sought for decades. Consistently, the solutions com-
pounded the problem; naturally, therefore, Hays based his campaign on 
the issue. It had begun two decades earlier when the state had begun 
its first extensive campaign to build good roads, a phenomenon reflec-
tive of the national tendency to recognize the benefits of such action 
after the advent of the motor car. Unfortunately, the early efforts 
were less than successful;. in many instances they were disastrous. The 
problems began as early as 1907 when the legislature authorized road 
improvement districts on the local level. Because those districts had 
little money and no skills, a law of 1909 authorized county road 
improvement districts to finance themselves by means of a property 
assessment. Two years later, in 1911, each county received the author-
ity to hire a highway engineer. Four years after the process began, the 
state finally authorized the needed experts. Even better, to alleviate 
the problems of poor districts, the state authorized the levying of a 
vehicle licensing fee of $5.00 to help defray the costs of building 
roads. Not until 1913 did the Arkansas Highway Commission come into 
being. 
In 1915 the Alexander Road Law authorized any county to create a 
new district whenever a majority of the people, acreage, or land value 
within the county so voted. With county and local districts still in 
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existence, the law seemed pointless; but in accordance with the legisla-
tion nearly 120 new districts sprang quickly into existence. At the 
same time special legislation for the creation of individual road dis-
tricts became popular due to its profitability for both legislator and 
road commissioner of the district. In 1919 alone the legislature passed 
133 individual acts, all creating special districts to build roads with 
property tax and license monies. Although the courts overturned the 
laws of 1919, between 1913 and 1920 the legislature of Arkansas created 
504 other districts by special legislation. Most came into existence 
without the consent and some without the knowledge of those whose 
property paid for them. 
Special legislation to avoid the Alexander law was fashionable pri-
marily because road building was profitable. Uncontrolled by the state 
and safe from attack by their theoretical constituents, road commission-
ers in special districts revelled in unaccustomed prosperity. Recall 
procedures which excused stupidity and ignorance in mismanagement, lack 
of adequate requirements for record keeping, and the general slowness of 
investigative procedures were significant elements in the removal of 
commissioners from public accountability. Accidental fraud was no 
crime, and intent to defraud was nearly impossible to prove. So the 
state poured more and more money into the districts, more and more money 
went into roads which went from nothing to nowhere, and the roads of 
Arkansas became more and more a mess. 
By 1921 Arkansas was in a state of virtual insurrection. For more 
than a decade, road improvement districts had proliferated until there 
was an average of approximately nine for each county. No state body 
coordinated those districts, and the instances in which they coordinated 
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themselves were rare. Arkansas' roads were "Balkanized," being built of 
differing materials, of differing quality, of varying degrees of sophis-
tication and durability, and lacking even a common width. On occasion 
the property taxes of a district and the vehicle licensing fees of the 
state financed a private road for an influential citizen. Money for 
maintenance of existing roads tended to disappear into the vacuum of new 
construction. The people of Arkansas had an uncoordinated network of 
poorly built and over-priced trails and paths by 1921. Reform was 
essential. 
That reform began first on the local level. In one district irate 
citizens utilized shotguns to convince their commissioners that the dis-
trict should dissolve itself. State legislators got the message and 
terminated some of the wo~st and most unpopular districts. But nothing 
more happened, even after the United States secretary of agriculture 
threatened to end his department's subsidy to the state. In 1923 when 
the secretary fulfilled his threat, Governor Thomas C. McRae called a 
special session of the legislature to correct the scandalous abuses in 
the roads program. 
The special session produced several laws. For the first time, 
after that session, Arkansas had a state highway system, at least on 
paper. Legislation increased the vehicle licensing fee, and the gaso-
line tax rose from one cent to four cents a gallon. Also, the Harrelson 
Act of 1923 forced districts to use more than 50 percent of their reve-
nues for repayment of debts. A state highway fund paid $3 million a 
year to districts so that those districts might meet debts incurred dur-
ing the earlier era, debts which matured at a rate of approximately $6 
million a year. The state spent a further $1.5 million in 1926 and 
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again in 1927, but debts continued to come due, and property tax payers 
found themselves more and more burdened by the consequences of fifteen 
years of waste. 
In 1925, responding to pleas by both taxpayers and citizens yet 
without roads, the legislature attempted to enact a law allowing state 
assumption of all debts. By a narrow margin, the bill failed to pass, 
but it became law easily in 1927 as the Martineau Road Law, the issue 
chosen by Hays in 1928. The law authorized the state to pay all dis--
trict debts from the revenues it raised by the issuance of bonds. Dis-
tricts had accrued debts of $70.5 million, and the state committed 
itself to $42 million bonded indebtedness to meet both past obligations 
and the debts coming due within the next four years. Having decided to 
plunge so deeply, the legislature borrowed an additional $14 million for 
Confederate pensions and promised to guarantee all necessary indebted-
ness for municipal streets and toll bridges. All told, Arkansans went 
into debt for $126 million within a span of six years, a debt of $69.00 
a person at a time when the per capita income of Arkansans was only 
$279. Bills owed by the state were nearly nine times its average gross 
income for the years 1923 to 1927. In the euphoria of the 1920s, the 
poorest state in the union committed fiscal folly.4 
But in 1928 there was a general fe~ling that prosperity was perma-
nent and growing. No candidate in the race for governor had the least 
concern that the bill might come due before Arkansas was able to pay it. 
The issue to Hays was the potential for corruption and influence ped-
dling in such a massive program of expenditures. Especially was it 
important because his main opponent, Harvey Parnell, was the man in 
26 
control of the money. Late in the campaign Hays made his strongest 
attacks on Parnell's handling of the program. 
In a letter to a supporter, Hays stressed his continuing support 
for a roads program paid for by actual users, not by those whose 
property happened to be in the neighborhood. Hays emphasized as well 
that Parnell was playing politics by threatening to neglect or not build 
roads in areas which supported Hays and the other candidates. Publicly, 
Hays lambasted Parnell for non-cooperation in an investigation of fraud 
in the state's payment of gasoline tax revenues to the districts. Hays 
also accused highway department employees of trying to elect a governor. 
The charges attracted support to Hays, as exemplified in the letter D. 
L. Ford, a Hays man, wrote to his candidate after the primary. With a 
gift for prophecy, Ford tqld Hays the following: 
The Parnell forces in the Highway Department have promised 
the people everything and in two years the people of the 
state will find the program uncompleted, out of money, and 
practically no lateral highways built at all.s 
Other charges hurled by Hays at Parnell involved toadyism and corrup-
tion. Hays alleged that Parnell, while in the state senate in 1925, had 
voted "yes" 290 times, was absent about the same number of times, and 
voted with the opposition only 17 times. To Hays, that record indicated 
that Parnell displayed no mind of his own. Also Hays charged that the 
Parnell campaign was assessing businessmen contributions for a Parnell 
slush fund. 6 
Despite its emphasis on the negative elements of the Parnell can-
didacy, the Hays campaign had positive aspects as well. A reform candi-
date had to have a program, so Hays at least mentioned agricultural 
reform within an industrializing society, elimination of the state 
property tax, federal assistance for flood control, reform of charitable 
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institutions, and. improvement of public schools. Also, reflecting his 
awareness of the realities of Arkansas, Hays promised enforcement of 
prohibition laws and "no lawlessness in the Executive Department."7 
Issues in which there was interest but which Hays ignored included tick 
eradication and evolution. A query concerning Hays' position on 
evolution contained a pencil notation, "Letter of Thanks sent."8 
Hays was unwilling to jeopardize his career by taking a clear 
public stand on such a controversial issue as evolution. He knew the 
dangers involved because he necessarily noticed events around him, 
especially within his church. Southern Baptist fundamentalists had 
attacked the theory throughout the decade. Their leader, J. Frank 
Norris of the First Baptist Church of Fort Worth, Texas, precipitated a 
crisis in 1921 when he attacked the teaching of "evolution and infidel-
ity" at Baylor University, a Southern Baptist institution in Waco, 
Texas. The influence of Norris was apparent in Arkansas by 1924. In 
that year the Ministers' and Laymen's Conference called on the Arkansas 
Baptist Convention to take all necessary precautions to insure that evo-
lutionary teaching not gain access to church supported schools. The 
Baptists of the state resolved that the Biblical account of creation was 
the truth and must be the orthodoxy at all of their schools. Deviation 
earned the violator dismissal from his position if he was a faculty mem-
ber. Errant schools lost funds. Also, all teachers had to take an oath 
which, among other elements, repudiated Darwin. In 1926 the state con-
vention resolved that the state legislature should bar the teaching of 
evolution in state supported schools. 
Other denominations in Arkansas joined with the Southern Baptists 
in petitioning the legislature to ban what they perceived as heretical 
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teachings. In 1927 the house of representatives passed an anti-
evolution bill by the narrow margin of 50 to 47 and only after a bitter 
fight. However, the senate tabled the bill and voted 17 to 14 not to 
reconsider. That action led Baptists, American and Southern alike, to 
join with other fundamentalists and gain sufficient signatures for the 
issue to appear on the ballot in 1928. Such strength--the issue passed 
by a vote of 108,991 to 63,406--had· to be intimidating to all politi-
cians, especially to Hays because privately he opposed the action. Hays 
believed that the petition not only violated the Baptist belief in sepa-
ration of church and state but was also inconsistent with Baptist doc-
trine which called for individual interpretation of the scriptures. 
Rather than publicly opposing the anti-evolutionists and perhaps losing 
their votes, Hays took the safer course of running aginst "a very cor-
rupt state political machine that had a death hold on the highway con-
struction program," a machine which was abusing its power and a machine 
which no one else opposed actively.9 
Hays used every possible tactic to defeat the machine. He took 
the occasion of congratulating Joseph Robinson for winning the vice-
presidential nomination to seek Robinson's endorsement. Robinson 
declined, but Hays pressed on. His stationery featured his slogan, 
"More Progress, Less Politics," and his newspaper advertisements con-
tained a picture of the candidate in his sincerest pose as well as an 
excerpt from the Rogers Daily Times which referred to "A Career Without 
a Blot." Another theme was "Men Versus Money." The slogans were little 
changed from the rhetoric of Jeff Davis thirty years earlier. And the 
appeal succeeded with at least one man. Charles X. Williams wrote, "If 
Arkansas ever needed a Governor who can live above the fog of private 
interest and for the spiritual uplift of our people, we need it now--
Brooks Hayes (sic) is that man."10 
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Hays also used effectively a man who had no difficulty in spelling 
the name of the candidate correctly. Steele Hays called on old friends 
to support the young candidate. He asked those who had known Brooks 
from childhood to do more than just vote. Old friendships helped to 
create a network of activists for the Hays candidacy. Apparently the 
elder Hays was also willing to substitute for his son as a speaker. 
When Clinton High School sought Brooks Hays as speaker for its graduat-
ing class of five boys, Hays indicated that he was too busy and asked if 
Steele might suffice as a substitute. The record fails to indicate 
whether Steele Hays addressed the class, but he did work hard for his 
son, even trying to get h:Ls friends to bring crowds to Hays' speeches.11 
Hays must have spoken effectively whether his audience consisted of 
the honest citizens of Bee Branch and Quitman, the freshman class at the 
University of Arkansas, or the members of the Western Methodist Assembly 
atop Mount Sequoyah. As early as May 30, 1928, Steele Hays wrote 
optimistically that "it seems to be the general consensus of opinion 
that Brooks has the race won," should the trends of the first two months 
continue to the election.12 But complications set in, first at Clinton. 
Clinton was the hub of Van Buren County in the north central area 
of the state. In 1928 the county was under the domination of a machine 
which was non-supportive of the Hays candidacy. The hope of Hays' 
friends within the county was that the machine would ignore the guber-
natorial race rather than support one of the opposition candidates. But 
in July someone opposed to Hays began spreading a rumor that the Hays 
forces were guaranteeing $500.00 to anyone willing to work for their 
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man. Hays tried to refute the charge by reaffirming that his campaign 
rested on his opposition to the buying of offices. Also, Hays noted 
that his forces lacked the financial resources to pay the rumored 
prices. The rumor persisted, forcing a reiteration by the campaign 
manager two weeks later that Hays was not trying to buy votes or any-
thing else. By that time a worse rumor was current in the county. 
Workers for Hays had to waste valuable time fighting a rumor that their 
man was losing the contest.13 
Hays faced other problems as well. On at least one occasion he 
received an offer of assistance which might have substantiated the 
rumors in Van Buren County. A certain J. L. Crownover offered to 
increase Hays' vote total by paying the poll taxes of as many voters as 
Hays was able to afford. All Crownover required was that Hays provide 
the money. As Crownover noted, 46 new voters had gone to the opposition 
in that manner. As manager of the campaign, Judge Priddy declined for 
Hays even though the practice was common in Arkansas and much of the 
South at that time and for decades afterword, a situation which Hays 
devoted years to rectifying. 
Hays also received an offer from an old college friend. John 
Caughley, the self-proclaimed "Irish Evangelist," offered to sell his 
services to the Hays campaign. Despite Caughley's claims of previous 
success in the Martineau campaign, Hays decined to hire the minister, 
noting that he had no money to pay campaigners. He regarded himself as 
fortunate that enough people were willing to work without pay. Hays 
surely appreciated the efforts of George A. Cantrell who not only worked 
without remuneration but made the effort, as well, to campaign in 
Arkansas despite his residence in Tulsa, Oklahoma.14 
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The Hays forces remained optimistic, believing that their man was 
guaranteed victory if only he managed to erase concern by the voters 
about his youth. But the youth of Hays and the machine of Parnell 
proved too great in combination for the refo.rmers to overcome. Hays 
lost, placing second in a field of seven men. Of the 227,626 votes cast 
in the primary, Hays received 59,426, but Parnell garnered 94,396 and 
the nomination. All Hays received was praise. The Oklahoma City Daily 
Oklahoman editorialized that "for a young man of his limited years [Hays 
waged] one of the most brilliant races that has ever been run in 
Arkansas." Hays' hometown Russellville Daily Courier-Democrat charac-
terized his performance as "a great moral victory, more to be proud of 
than the actual victory of nomination under ordinary circumstances." 
The moral victory was so great, according to the newspaper, because 
Hays' second place finish came despite inexperience, youth, and lack of 
organization, and because the Hays forces had won Little Rock and 
Pulaski County against the odds, defeating the Parnell machine in its 
home territory. From southeast Arkansas, near the earliest settlement 
in the state, came the assessment of The Gould Advance that "There is no 
dishonor attached to his defeat. He made a clean race, fought a brave 
fight, led a gallant host • 
too young for the office.15 
" and destroyed any argument that he was 
In the aftermath of his defeat, Hays received letters from frus-
trated supporters who sought to explain the loss. From Fort Smith came 
word that opposition by the local newspapers to Hays, in combination 
with large amounts of money and effort by the forces of Parnell, caused 
the loss of the city. In Clint.on the story was equally simple. The 
predicted intrusion of the machine hurt Hays; his workers were "fighting 
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Parnell's money and old line politicians," according to Ernest D. 
Reeves, Hays' lieutenant in the area. The final word came in October 
from A. H. Henderson, who wrote to Hays that "I only wish that we had 
the run off like Texas. We would take them to a cleaning yet." 16 Hays 
thus had another Arkansas political issue, the lack of a runoff, and he 
had a reputation as a reformer, but his immediate concern was the 
finding of a job. 
After the political loss, Hays returned to his law practice, part-
nering with a long-time friend, Bolon Turner. Nevertheless, despite the 
fact that he had two small children to support, he still was unable to 
resist the lure of politics. Political ambition dominated his life. 
Hays determined to renew his struggle against Parnell in the gubernator-
ial primary of 1930. In retrospect, Hays stated innumerable times that 
he had no choice but to run. Indicative of the duality inherent in 
Christian politics, one of Hays' more detailed explanations began with 
the words, "I had to run if I meant to live with my conscience, or, from 
a practical standpoint, if I intended to stay in politics," because 
Parnell was a weak governor and his highway commission contained corrupt 
members. Another term for Parnell, according to Hays, meant a continua-
tion of excessive expenditures for highway bonds and a too-rapid con-
struction of roads which necessarily meant poor quality. In effect, to 
Hays, "if Parnell could be defeated, I was the person to do it. [Hays 
thought] that no one else could do it and that I possibly could not do 
it."17 
Hays was fully aware of the risks. The Atkins Chronicle of July 
26, 1929, cited the Conway News to the effect that 
Not even John E. Martineau had so powerful an organization 
as the one that will back Parnell for a 3rd term. He is a 
game fighter himself [,] and he has the state machinery in 
his hands as no former candidate ever had.18 
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Even worse, Parnell had a decent record, despite what Hays chose to say. 
With the 1929 legislature subservient to him, Parnell was able to enact 
income tax reform, and he vetoed a bill which would have allowed horse 
racing. So through 1929 Hays avoided committing himself to the race. 
In July he wrote to George Walter that he had not yet decided. Two 
weeks later the Blytheville Courier reported that Hays and John 
Sheffield, president of the Arkansas County Judges Association, both 
working for the American Legion convention, were also both expected to 
file for the same office. Into October, Hays he.si tated, but Tom Bullock 
made inquiries of several people as to the feasibility of a Hays can-
didacy. D. W. Gill reported that everyone he spoke to was for Hays. 
There was no way Hays could lose a one-on-one race. J. J. Doyne of 
Lonoke, however, indicated that his county was strongly for Parnell, but 
Doyne said also that an open commitment by Hays might induce his former 
backers to return. Finally, in January of 1930, in repsonse to a pledge 
of support, Hays wrote to Louis Tarlowski that "I am not ready to make a 
definite announcement, but today I feel sure I will run."19 
The decision was not by any means the inevitable one that Hays has 
since described. An undated pencil draft at the University of Arkansas 
describes the problems which Hays faced. In 1930 many people asked Hays 
not to run against a seemingly unbeatable machine, especially as 
Arkansas traditionaily awarded its governors two terms in their own 
right, and Parnell had done nothing to sacrifice his guaranteed second 
term. According to Hays, "Political expediency seemed to call for post-
ponement of another race," especially as two other candidates announced 
against Parnell, thus creating the real danger of splitting the 
opposition vote as.had been the case in 1928. The most difficult ele-
ment for Hays to overcome was his father's opposition to the race. 
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Aside from being old and tired, Steele Hays feared that another loss 
would destroy Brooks for a long time to come. Steele Hays was inflex-
ible once he had made a decision, so it was a great strain on Brooks 
Hays' mother when her son went against her husband for the first time on 
a matter of major importance. Steele Hays moped until the campaign 
started; then he became a convert to his son's decision when the cam-
paign revealed Brooks Hays as the leader of the forces who opposed the 
governing style of Harvey Parnell. 
Brooks Hays ran against Harvey Parnell again. There were no real 
issues in the campaign of 1930 except the men. Attempts to make income 
tax legislation an issue failed, revealing to Hays the insignificance of 
that matter. When Hays attempted to attack Parnell on the issues of the 
highway department or highway bonds, Parnell refused to defend himself. 
He preferred to speak of the non-issue of income taxes. So Hays concen-
trated his efforts on reluctant and impersonal attacks on the individ-
uals who managed the roads program.20 
Having failed on the issues in 1928, Hays engaged in an old-time 
Arkansas campaign of personal attacks in 1930. Once again Hays lost. 
Of 251,233 voters, 90,132 preferred Hays; unfortunately, 135,738 decided 
to give Parnell another chance. Not only did Parnell win a majority, 
making the runoff issue moot, but he received three votes for every two 
which went to Hays. Parnell's victory was sufficiently impressive that 
Hays' supporters began conceding defeat with only two-thirds of the vote 
counted. The race was largely futile, but the impact of the Hays can-
didacy lived on. Hays reaffirmed his image as a reformer. Also, in 
1930 and 1931 approximately a dozen babies were names for the defeated 
candidate; most received only the name "Brooks," but the Vinson baby, 
with whom Hays corresponded into 1940, bore the full name "Brooks Hays 
Vinson." Hays pursuit of fame was not totally without result.2 1 
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As after the first, after his second defeat Hays returned to his 
law practice. It was during that time that he engaged in a case which 
was a landmark for Arkansas. The issue was fairly minor. A teenaged 
black had lost a leg in a railroad accident, and the family sued the · 
railroad for negligence resulting in the loss of earning capacity. The 
victory netted a settlement of $2,000, of which Hays and Turner gained 
one-third to one-half, but the case was significant because it was the 
first tried in Arkansas before a woman juror. Thereby Hays and Turner 
earned a place in the footnotes of the history of the struggle by 
American women for equality. However, aside from the one case, clients 
tended to be scarce, and fees small. Need forced Hays to supplement his 
income in a variety of ways. 
He taught night classes in public speaking for $5.00 a session. He 
organized Lions Clubs in six surrounding towns and earned $150.00. He 
taught night classes in law and public speaking in Hot Springs and 
Conway. And his father contributed $15.00 a week to the struggling 
family. With groceries costing less· than $10.00 a week, the Hays family 
survived the depression virtually unscathed. Looking back from forty 
years later, Hays w~s able to say, "I think both Betty and Steele 
managed to get through that period without any awareness of depriva-
tion. "22 For Brooks Hays the personal impact of the depression was less 
important than political office. Thus, Hays tested the water again in 
1932. 
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By 1932 the Parnell regime was proving to be what Hays had indi-
cated it was four and two years earlier. The extravagance of the 
Martineau program, when combined with the corruption of the Parnell 
forces, placed Arkansas in a critical financial situation as the 
depression deepened. However, fully in line with the tradition estab-
lished by Jeff Davis, politics in Arkansas had nothing directly to do 
with such problems. The critical issue in 1932 was bossism in Yell 
County. That county belonged to the most powerful and corrupt machine 
in Arkansas, a situation which had aided Hays in his first race. In 
1928 the machine backed Hays; by 1930 the Parnell forces had given a 
sufficient number of favors to the machine that it lent its support to 
him. Even Sam Rorex, former law partner of Steele Hays, moved into the 
Parnell-machine camp. When Parnell decided to leave office, he gave the 
recently converted Rorex the commission to stop Hays. Rorex convinced 
Judge Arthur B. Priddy, Hays' one-time law partner and campaign manager, 
to enter the race for governor. Priddy was reluctant to run against 
Hays; he even drafted a letter of support for Hays for publication in 
the Arkansas Gazette. But Priddy owed the machine a favor. So Priddy 
announced his candidacy, and although his decision forced him into an 
alliance with machine politicians, Hays withdrew in favor of his long-
time friend. 
The campaign went badly. Hays' supporters refused to follow him 
into the arms of the Yell County machine, and Hays' speeches lacked the 
fire of the past. All Hays achieved was the alienation of J. C. 
Futrell, the man who opposed Priddy and the machine in the primary. 
Hays was in a difficult position because he disliked the conservative 
backers of Futrell but regarded Priddy as too week to use the machine 
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without having it swallow him. Then Priddy, having entered the race 
with the blessing of the outgoing governor, began to attack Parnell. 
Because he recognized that factional disloyalty was a fatal sin in 
Arkansas politics, Hays became disgusted. Believing that Priddy had no 
chance, Hays asked the judge to withdraw in favor of Futrell. Despite 
advice from Hays that support for Futrell might salvage some political 
future for the judge, Priddy refused to quit. He lost, collecting only 
37,134 of the 276,848 votes cast. Futrell won with 124,139.23 
Although his own political career continued to flounder, Hays had 
better success as a loyal worker for his party. His service to national 
candidates of the Democratic party in 1928 and 1932 was fairly minor. 
However, his willingness to remain faithful to the Democracy when many 
of his friends deserted that party's nominees was a virtue which the 
national Democrats recognized when they finally achieved power. By sup-
porting both Al Smith and Franklin Roosevelt, Brooks Hays gained entry 
into the preferred circle of the winners. Party loyalty won for him his 
first political triumph. 
In 1928 after his defeat in the gubernatorial primary, Hays engaged 
in a speaking tour on behalf of the Democratic presidential nominee, 
Alf red E. Smith. Such behavior was politically unwise in the rural South 
because Smith was a product of New York City, an anti-prohibitionist, 
and a Catholic. The region which rejected liberalism in all its forms 
(as it indicated by its support of the KKK, the passage of anti-
evolution legislation, and its advocacy of fundamental protestantism and 
prohibition), the South was clearly opposed to Al Smith, even if he was 
a Democrat. Hays was again on the unpopular side even though his 
advocacy of Smith endangered the political aspirations of the young 
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Arkansan. As Allen E. Freeze reminded Hays in the fall of 1928, Hays 
was in a solid position to win the office of governor in 1930, but his 
support for Smith was harmful at best to such aspirations. Hays' sup-
porters were hostile to Smith and might transfer their enmity to Hays. 
But Hays spoke on behalf of Smith, and his assistance to the campaign, 
even though the effort was futile in the ensuing landslide for Herbert 
Hoover, was noted with gratitude by party regulars such as w. J. 
Hutchinson, who wrote to Hays that even in a losing effort Hays' support 
for the national ticket was a great service to all Democratic voters and 
should be long remembered. 24 Party regularity was of potential benefit 
to those of its practitioners who remained consistent. The lesson was 
not lost on Hays. 
Obviously party loyalty proved important to Hays when he won the 
position of Democratic National Committeeman in 1932. With the farcical 
Priddy campaign destroying his political sanity, Hays leaped at the 
opportunity provided by friends who entered his name for committeeman 
from Arkansas. With the blessings of Priddy, Hays left the gubernator-
ial campaign to run its course and ran with much enthusiasm against "a 
rich Little Rock lawyer who wanted the honor of being National Commit-
teeman ••• one of their boys," as he assessed the situation.25 
Probably because of name recognition from his past campaigns and his 
active political life, Hays defeated the machine at last and found 
himself in the position which was to lead to greater triumphs as soon 
as the Democrats won the presidency. 
Being loyal to the party in 1932 was little easier than it was in 
1928. During the intervening period, of course, the nation had fallen 
into the depths of its worst depression ever, and many Americans 
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repudiated the policies of Herbert Hoover and the traditional parties, 
Democrats and Republicans alike. As Hays explained the disenchantment 
with the party in power, "Government has a responsibility for human wel-
fare aid. Republicans didn't take that position. They had a responsi-
bility for the welfare of the economy •••• "26 Democrats had shown 
little more sympathy for needy Americans, but Hays remained faithful 
to his party. Because the Republican candidate was more attuned to the 
prohibitionist and nativist inclinations of his region, Hays had a 
major difficulty in justifying his support for the anti-prohibitionism 
of the national Democrats and their nominee, Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
There was a clear problem with such a staunch prohibitionist as 
Hays supporting a candidate whose only clearly stated position on any 
matter was in opposition to prohibition. Hays justified his behavior by 
noting that repeal of prohibition was not the same as forcing drys to 
become wet. Repeal simply allowed those who chose to be wet to be so in 
accordance with majority rule. Besides, legislation without popular 
support inevitably failed. Therefore, to Hays the issue was one of edu-
cation. Drys should inform the public about the benefits of abstinence. 
An informed populace would then make a rational decision which would 
eliminate the need to enforce an unpopular law. Hays suggested that 
prohibitionists concede victory to the repealers; having done so, drys 
should then demonstrate to the wets that prohibition was preferable even 
if it were not law. Finally, Hays argued, the question was moot. 
Hoover was not really a prohibitionist, so drys had no candidate who 
shared their views. They should yield on the one issue of legal liquor 
and remain loyal to the Democracy on more important matters, including 
voting.27 
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Between August and November of 1932, Hays toured Arkansas with 
Senator Joe Robinson. He met Roosevelt in New York City after Priddy 
fell to Futrell, and he and the national nominee had a brief visit in 
St. Louis, Missouri. The two men had been slight acquaintances since 
Roosevelt spoke in Memphis, Tennessee, on behalf of the Crippled 
Children's Campaign in 1927. During the campaign of 1932, most contact 
between Roosevelt and Hays was handled by Jim Farley, the national cam-
paign manager. Despite the lack of closeness, Hays was a party loyal-
ist. Even after Roosevelt defeated Hoover, Hays continued to campaign 
for the man chosen by his party. Between the election and the inaugura-
tion, Hays tried to appease the dissatisfied of the South, as was the 
case when he spoke in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in December. 
In his role as natio~al committeeman, Hays went to Baton Rouge to 
attend a conference. While there he assessed the future under 
Roosevelt, saying, "With a change from re-actionary policies to the 
liberal policies which Governor Roosevelt has stood for, there is hope 
for the country and all its people." Hays continued that he expected 
the impact of FDR to have an influence "even in the communities where we 
have especially borne the brunt of graft, corruption, and ••• to a 
certain extent indifference." That was probably a reference to Yell 
County and the rest of the 21 controlled counties, but it was more 
another instance of Hays' emphasizing "the forgotten man, the forgotten, 
neglected children," an attitude which the committeeman and the 
president-elect shared.28 
Away from active campaigning Hays maintained his visibility. As 
early as 1926 he used his relationship with Joe Robinson to seek a job 
as attorney for the Board of Tax Appeals for his friend, Bolon Turner. 
Robinson merely promised to try, but Hays at least made the effort. 
Hays also crusaded for his causes; he loved to speak and rarely minced 
words if his cause seemed sufficiently vital. For instance, in 1926 
Hays addressed the American Federation of Womens Clubs and told a con-
servative audience about the basic rights of children--health, recrea-
tion, and so on. Then he startled the conservative ladies when he 
argued that those services must be provided by the state. 29 
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From the time he entered politics in 1928, Hays consistently had at 
least one crusade to occupy his time. In 1928 Hays was a member of a 
reform effort which included virtually every political power in 
Arkansas, Joseph Robinson among them. Having received a request from V. 
W. St. John, Hays promised to use his connections in Washington to get a 
favorable ruling in the matter of the Ouachita forest in the mountains 
northwest of Hot Springs. St. John and others wanted the park service 
to authorize the creation of a national park in the Ouachitas, and with 
such prominent political figures involved already, Hays had no hesita-
tion about taking up his part in the battle. He wrote not only to 
Congressman William J. Driver of Arknasas, but to Stephen T. Mather as 
well. Aside from being a friend and a fellow Baptist, Mather was direc-
tor of national parks.30 With Arkansas congressmen utilizing their 
positions of power and their legislative skills to the fullest in an 
attempt to force legal recognition of the park, the efforts of Hays were 
comparatively minor~ However, Hays did as much as he could, and eventu-
ally the park became a reality. On the other hand, Hays crusaded for 
several years for the World Court and in the end received nothing. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice, the World Court, was 
a legacy of the era of Woodrow Wilson. Established in part due to the 
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efforts of American legalists, the court served as a permanent agency 
for resolving international disagreements. Presidents Warren Harding 
and Calvin Coolidge both advocated American membership in the body, and 
as early as 1924 both major parties and the House of Representatives 
resolved that the United States should join. But the Senate, led by 
William Borah and Hiram Johnson, resisted, and the United States 
remained an interested observer and consultant, not a member, until in 
1936 foes of the court ended even that token American involvement. The 
effort to convince the intransigent senators was a major preoccupation 
of Hays from 1928 to 1933. 
Like many Americans in 1928, Hays was not an expert on the World 
Court. He probably knew something about how the United States was 
increasingly observing court proceedings on pornography or other impor-
tant but not vital issues. He probably even knew that prominent Ameri-
cans such as Elihu Root had served on the court. But he denied any 
special expertise when he received his initial solicitation from Esther 
Everatt Lape, one of the increasing number of Americans who wanted the 
Senate to support the Gillette World Court resolution in the foreign 
relations committee in October. Hays agreed to inform himself and then 
to talk with his personal friend, Joe Robinson. Hays wrote to Robinson 
six weeks later, telling the senator that it was "nothing less than a 
tragedy" not to find a means of American participation on the court.31 
Personal friend Robinson was unimpressed and refused to commit 
himself on the issue. So the matter rested there while Hays returned to 
the insurance business. But the issue reappeared in 1930. Lape asked 
Hays again to use his influence with Robinson, and Hays again said that 
he could only hope that Robinson might want to lead the fight. Again 
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nothing happened. In 1931 Lape and Hays designed a different approach 
to the matter. Hays won a resolution of support from the Arkansas Bap-
tist Convention. It was not especially difficult. After all, the court 
had support from the Arkansas Legion, the bar association, and the Asso-
ciation of Womens Clubs. Hays had simply to indicate to the Baptists 
that an agency for the peaceful settlement of disputes was "in line with 
our general opposition to war."3 2 Baptists had little direct input into 
the decision making process on Capitol Hill; so, the advancement of the 
cause was halting at best. In 1932 Hays gained a resolution from his 
Bible class in Little Rock and prepared to submit it to the Baptist gen-
eral Convention of Arkansas. Finally, In November, the Arkansas Baptist 
Convention resolved without opposition that the senators from Arkansas 
should work for passage of a world co\].rt resolution in the current ses-
sion. By then, Hays had had enough. When Lape asked him in January of 
1933 to use his influence to win a resolution from the Arkansas legisla-
ture, Hays suggested that she contact Representative Ben Carter and 
Senator Sam Levine as sponsors.33 Hays had other things to do. 
Another facet of Hays' career, equally important with politics and 
reform movements, was an active participation in religion. For many 
politicians, especially in the South where religion was traditionally a 
stronger influence than in the rest of the United States, the rhetoric 
if not the reality of their profession incorporated the trappings of 
old-fashioned religion. A political career necessarily incorporated a 
religious element. Even Jeff Davis, the old-time populist from 
Arkansas, used the Bible vigorously as he waged his various campaigns 
against the sinful corporations.and other dragons. But there was 
another type of Southern politician, less common although by no means 
scarce, and it was within that tradition of sincere profession of 
religion within a political context that Brooks Hays belonged. 
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Hays' career, that of a Christian politician, strongly resembled 
that of the Southern Baptist governor of Arkansas, Charles H. Brough. 
Brough was born in Mississippi in 1876. After an education at 
Mississippi College and Johns Hopkins, he taught at Mississippi for two 
years. Then he earned a law degree at Mississippi, taught a year at 
Hillman College, and accepted a chair in economics and sociology at the 
University of Arkansas. There he remained until his election to the 
governor's office in 1916. Both in Fayetteville and in Little Rock he 
served as a deacon, and he taught a Sunday School class in Fayetteville. 
In 1918 his service to the Southern Baptist Convention won him election 
to its vice-presidency. It was during Brough's governorship that the 
Baptists won the fight for a state prohibition law, a fight which they 
had waged for two decades.34 An educated Baptist who was successful 
both in politics and in the Southern Baptist Convention, Brough was a 
model for the young Hays, a balance to the other Baptist politician, 
Jeff Davis. 
Hays had a more direct tie to the political Baptist in his father. 
Steele Hays of course was a Bible scholar. He also taught a class at 
the Russellville Baptist Church. Hfs dominance of his son was such that 
the younger Hays early acquired the habit of attendance. Thus Brooks 
Hays was familiar with the subject of religion even though he failed 
to experience the fervent conversion so desired by many of his 
co-religionists. And Hays also had experience teaching Sunday School 
while at Fayetteville. It was no great miracle that Brooks Hays became 
a religious teacher once again when he moved to Little Rock in 1925. 
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While the Hays family was contemplating the decision as to which 
Little Rock church they should join, Hays received invitations from two 
churches to speak. One offered an assistant lectureship in its Bible 
class, while the Second Baptist Church offered only a guest speakership, 
a less permanent commitment. Hays agreed to address the class and chose 
as his subject matter temperence, prohibition, and the potential for a 
double standard by those who had both a spiritual and a secular life. 
Attendance was nearly perfect, and the message of the method proved 
appealing. The class members asked Hays to become ·their full-time 
teacher. During the twelve years that Hays taught, the class membership 
grew, and, as early as 1930, the class became officially the Brooks Hays 
Bible Class, a phenomenon which led Hays on numerous occasions there-
after to present his audiences with the humorous news that he was the 
only member of congress to be named for a Bible class.35 
Like Hays, the class transcended the tendency toward narrowness 
common to socially conservative groups such as the SBC. During his ten-
ure and later, the lessons attracted blacks, Jews, Catholics, and others 
not normally encountered in a Southern Baptist church. Class membership 
also stretched across class lines, and it incorporated reformed alcohol-
ics with the socially prominent men of Little Rock. And, of course, the 
class was generous in its contributions to the SBC fund drives and to 
charities such as the Pulaski County Chapter of the Arkansas Tuberculo-
sis Association, halfway houses, orphanages, and many other benevolent 
causes over the years.36 As Hays himself put it in 1954, "our class 
teachers activated Christianity. It is not just a storm cellar from 
sin."37 The association of Hays and the Hays class continued, although 
opportunity became less and less frequent as Hays moved on to 
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Washington, D.C., and national activity. But the experience of creating 
more than just a storm cellar was more important than the conjuction of 
the two forces. 
Although his political career was less than spectacular in the 
years prior to 1933, Hays was not a loser. While failing with the 
electorate, he developed his image as a progressive party loyalist. He 
won a position of influence in his party, and he developed a reputation 
as a good friend, effective speaker, and useful man in any crusade. He 
even made a successful venture into leadership within his church, 
although leading a Bibl~ class was not comparable to leading the mil-
lions of Southern Baptists. Small triumphs provided some compensation 
for the two unsuccessful races for governor. But there was a continuing 
need in Hays for money and success, and politics remained his chosen 
profession. As a means of employment and as a way to remain politically 
active, Hays leaped unhesitatingly into the New Deal when the opportu-
nity arose. In the first New Deal Hays achieved the first true 
political successes of his career. 
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CHAPTER III 
NEW DEAL, NEW OPPORTUNITY, 1933-1937 
When the bottom fell out of the American economy in late 1929, 
among the worst hit areas were those which had been at the bottom for so 
many years before, areas such as agriculturally-dependent Arkansas. 
Already excessively burdened by debts acquired in the euphoria of the 
1920s, Arkansans suffered as their principal source of income, cotton, 
fell from nearly 17 cents a pound to less than 6, a price below the 
costs of production. Even in 1929 Arkansans' per capita income was only 
43 percent of the national ~verage, and the drought of 1930 further hurt 
the economy. A year earlier the state had suffered record-shattering 
floods along the Mississippi River system; then in 1930 the summer rain-
fall in the state totaled only 35 percent of normal. Crops failed, money 
disappeared, and the crisis intensified. In January of 1931, the Red 
Cross reported that of 44 households examined in one area of Arkansas, 
60 percent had food for no more than 48 hours, and five had no food at 
all. But the state was unable to deal with the problem, or with any 
other for that matter, Arkansas was poor, and in 1932 Arkansas became 
the only state to default on its obligations during the depression.I 
The depression was an extremely painful experience for many 
Arkansans, suffering as they were from decades of neglect if not deteri-
oration. But not all residents of the state suffered equally. For 
people such as Hays who had skills, connections, or luck, the depression 
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proved to be little different from the prosperous years of the 1920s. 
Lawyers and politicians tended to prosper as agents of the New Deal 
bureaucracies. Hays was no exception. 
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When Franklin Roosevelt became President in early 1933, he brought 
to the nation his commitment to finding solutions to its problems. Once 
again reform was on the national agenda. Given the magnitude of the 
crisis, the New Deal necessarily began with the recruitment of personnel 
to manage its programs. With an image as a reform politician and his 
service as Democratic National Committeeman, Hays was a natural choice 
for one of the new positions with the New Deal in Arkansas. Initially 
Hays hoped for more than just a bureaucratic position, but when his 
aspirations for political office proved futile once again, he accepted 
with eagerness the opportunity to. serve the New Deal. During the four 
years of the first New Deal, Brooks Hays maintained his visibility as a 
reformer, created strong ties with the national and state reform Demo-
crats, and made himself sufficiently important to both groups that he 
could venture into radical causes with impunity. Between 1933 and 1937, 
Brooks Hays established himself as a major figure in liberal Arkansas 
politics. 
Appropriately, Hays' first action of the New Deal era was another 
unsuccessful political campaign. In 1933 there occurred a vacancy in 
the Fifth Congressional District of Arkansas. Congressman Heartsell 
Ragon resigned to become a Federal Judge, and with the virtually unbeat-
able incumbent removed from consideration, "many ambitious Arkansas 
politicians, who never would have considered running against Ragon, now 
weighed their chances".2 Even before the campaign got underway, another 
vacancy altered the shape it was to take. State Supreme Court Justice 
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Jesse C. Hart died, and Governor J. C. Futrell appointed Chancery Court 
Judge C. E. Johnson to fill the vacancy temporarily. When several other 
judges indicated their intentions to run for the position, Futrell 
determined to insure Johnson's seat. The Arkansas governor called the 
state's Democrats together in May and asked them to forego a primary. 
Despite Futrell's argument that appointment of Johnson would save time 
and money which a primary would waste, the liberals, including Brooks 
Hays and Carl Bailey, fought for a primary. Although the convention 
voted for Futrell and Johnson's position, it provided by a margin of 326 
to 241 that the primary. was to determine the person to fill the seat of 
Ragon. 
The controversy had an impact because it reaffirmed the primary 
system. But of more significance was that it complicated the race for 
congressman, both immediately and in the long run. Shortly after the 
convention, Sam Rorex entered the race, claiming that Futrell had 
endorsed him in return for his aid in winning votes for Johnson. 
Futrell denied that he had made such a commitment; so, David Terry 
joined Hays and Rorex in a three-man race with no man having the edge of 
the governor's endorsement and influence. 
By the time of the primary in September, Futrell had decided to 
back Rorex. From Washington, D.C., Joe Robinson only observed, but he 
allowed his subordinate, the collector of internal revenue for Arkansas, 
Homer Adkins, to support Rorex openly. Terry held a strong base in 
Little Rock, and Hays had a loose alliance with Carl Bailey, prosecuting 
attorney for Pulaski County. In the primary voting Hays sprang to an 
early lead, Terry ran second, and Rorex lagged behind a distant third. 
Twenty years later the Arkansas Recorder described what happened next. 
In the recollection of a machine veteran, the election was decided as 
follows: 
Two of us decided to take the returns over a special phone at 
a club east of North Little Rock. It was not long until we 
saw what was happening. Hays was running neck and neck with 
Rorex outside of Pulaski County where Hays and Terry were both 
leaving him far behind. I looked at my friend and he looked 
at me--he sais (sic), "Are you thinking what I'm thinking? I 
replied that if he was thinking Sam could not make it in the 
run-off, I was right behind him. 'Let's go and see Homer 
(Adkins), he said. We did. Finally it was agreed that we 
should make a deal that would put Terry in the run-off with 
Hays. That involved dispatching several runners to other 
counties and one of them always gets a laugh by quoting a 
veteran politician as complaining about dawn: 'I've been 
stealing votes from Brooks all night and giving them to Sam, 
and now I've got to take them from Sam and give them to 
Dave.'3 
With all of the votes in, neither Hays nor Terry had a majority of 
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the total vote. Thus they faced a run-off in accordance with the double 
primary law which had replaced the old system under which Hays lost to 
Parnell in 1928. With the situation reversed, Hays protested that he 
had won outright, but the two weeks between the primary and the run-off 
were insufficient time to present the matter before a court. Therefore, 
Hays faced Terry in the final confrontation to determine who was to be 
the automatic winner in the regular congressional election. 
Having lost Rorex, the federal and Futrell factions united in 
opposition to Hays by backing Terry.. With support from such sources, 
Terry won by 9,776 votes to 9,151. His margin of victory came from the 
voters of Yell County. In one.extreme instance a township in the county 
with fifteen paid poll taxes recorded 122 votes, all for Terry. 
Obviously, something was unsavory in Yell County. Hays got the Pulaski 
County Circuit Court to impound the ballots and election records from 
Yell County. The court also accepted a petition from Hays which asked 
that the Democrats refrain from certifying Terry as the winner. That 
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action led Terry to appeal. After Hays filed a supplemental motion 
challenging 3,000 votes for Terry, Terry retaliated by challenging 5,000 
votes for Hays, arguing that those votes were not cast by legitimate 
Democrats. 
Terry gained his inspiration from the special election for supreme 
court justice, the Johnson case. In that contest Johnson faced opposi-
tion despite being handpicked by the Democrats. Johnson bested his 
opponent by a margin of two to one, but the issue went beyond the race. 
For both sides claimed to be Democrats, even the backers of the losing 
and non-sanctioned candidate. Many local Democratic committees decided 
that voters who opposed the Democratic nominee, Johnson, were either 
independents, Republicans, or worse. They were no longer in the 
Democratic fold. Not being Democrats, they were ineligible to partici-
pate in the Democratic primary to select the new fifth district con-
gressman. However, many opponents of Johnson voted in the congressional 
race; it was those voters whom Terry challenged. Unfortunately for 
Hays, a tactical error on his part made the question moot in 1933. 
In presenting his second petition, Hays made the mistake of with-
drawing his first. That action allowed the court to rule not on the 
merits of the second petition but on procedure. The court determined 
not to rule on the first petition because it was withdrawn and not to 
rule on the second because it was not filed within twenty days of the 
election. The issues of who was truly a Democrat and to what extent 
ballot box stuffing was a problem fell by the wayside. Believing the 
victory rightfully his, Hays lost again. As always, his defeat had 
results beyond simply keeping Hays from office. The double primary law 
was repealed in 1934; in the future the person with the most votes 
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became the nominee. Also, the election of 1933 established two factions 
in Arkansas for the next ten years. Hays and Bailey were to oppose 
Adkins and Futrell again and again.14 
Thus, in 1935 Brooks Hays had achieved a remarkable record. Three 
times he had sought elective office, and three times he had failed. The 
only break in his pattern of defeat came in his race for the compara-
tively minor position as national committeeman, a position which brought 
little prestige and no money to the thrice-failed politician. But Hays 
used that base to overcome his image as a loser and a no longer relevant 
politician. From the committee, he reached out and grabbed the New 
Deal, and service to that phenomenon made him again politically viable 
by the time it yielded to World War II. 
Under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), industries were 
to establish codes of conduct for their members and their employees. In 
each state the faithful observance of those codes was the responsibility 
of the labor compliance officer. Hays gained the position of labor com-
pliance officer for Arkansas in early 1934. Even that position went to 
Hays only after opposition. 
Elmer Grant, President of the Executive Board of the Arkansas 
Federation of Labor, sent a telegram to Joe Robinson on February 12, 
1934, in which Grant indicated that the federation opposed Hays, prefer-
ring that the position go to a true labor man, specifically Horace M. 
Thackrey, secretary-treasurer of the Arkansas Federation of Labor. 
Robinson told Grant that the complaint was too late. Hays won the 
appointment before the protest of labor arrived at its destination. 
Beyond that item, Robinson told Grant that Hays was sympathetic to 
labor. As evidence, Robinson cited the fact that Hays had earned the 
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endorsement of several labor organizations for a position as assistant 
secretary of labor. A newspaper report of the controversy noted that 
Hays won recommendations from Frances Perkins, Roosevelt's secretary of 
labor, and from the National Labor Board, the agency which supervised 
compliance officers. And Hays reacted to the protest from labor by 
indicating that he looked forward to an interesting job and hoped to 
protect the interests of labor in accordance with the National Recovery 
Administration (NRA) codes. Also, he gained the job in part because· 
neither of Arkansas' senators, Joe Robinson and Hattie Caraway, chose to 
intervene against him in the matter. Thus, Hays had a federal job and 
an income of $4,500 a year.5 
Hays' first task as labor compliance officer was to explain to 
office seekers why he had no jobs for them. In the spring of 1934, jobs 
were scarce in Arkansas as well as the rest of the country. Everyone who 
had the slightest claim tried to get one of the new positions rumored 
to be available from the labor compliance officer. Guy Williams asked 
a job for his wife's brother; Hays had nothing. George B. Welch needed 
a job because his work in the Civilian Works Administration (CWA) was 
ending; he asked Hays for employment first with the National Emergency 
Council, then as a field adjustor for the NRA, but Hays had nothing, 
only a dim hope for a later opening. E·. F. Simmons, pastor of the 
Second Baptist Church in Conway, had nine children and a monthly salary 
of $40.00 which his flock had not paid to him in two months. He still 
had his car, but he needed a job; Hays had nothing. Even Joe G. Walker 
who had not worked in a couple of years was unable to get a job from 
Hays. Hundreds more of the depression-damaged citizens of Arkansas--
from virtual illiterates to super-salesmen--wrote in their desperation 
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to Hays, hoping that the rumors of new jobs might be true. The rumors 
were without substance.6 
But Hays' job itself was rewarding, even though the NRA codes 
failed to protect all workers sufficiently or equally. In some cases 
Hays used his old political connections to advantage, as in the case of 
a complaint from William E. Terry. According to the complaint, a 
certain Mayme Louise had taken a test for mimeo operators in November of 
1933. Late in January of 1934, she had received no word of her score, 
and Terry asked asked Hays to find out why. To expedite the matter, 
Hays asked Caraway to check into it. Apparently Terry was satisfied, 
but the record fails to indicate whether Mayme Lousie passed the test or 
got a job. In instances such as that of the Maid-Well Garment Company 
of Forrest City, Hays used his own power to its limits. Receiving 
complaints against Maid-Well, Hays ordered the company to pay the 
minimum wage ordered by code number 118, the Cotton Garment Industry 
Code of the NRA. He forced the company to pay back wages when he 
expressed a willingness to sue if compliance were delayed; however, he 
was unable to get back the jobs of fired black workers because his 
powers did not extend that far.7 
The NRA died at the hands of an unfriendly United States Supreme 
Court, and Hays was once again unemployed in 1935. But a new agency was 
coming into existence, an agency which Hays was to serve with distinc-
tion and an agency which was to prove of much more significance to agri-
cultural Arkansas than was the NRA. The agency was the Resettlement 
Administration (RA), and its mission was to improve conditions for 
America's tenant farmers. As early as 1880, as the census of that year 
indicated, a nation of small farmers was disappearing. But most 
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Americans failed to recognize the situation in which an increasing num-
ber of their compatriots were being dispossessed of their birthright. 
While most benefitted from the urbanization and industrialization of the 
nation, more and more people in the agricultural sector found themselves 
becoming servants rather than masters of the land. Tenancy, share-
cropping, and other forms of peonage became the fate of an increasing 
number of farmers. For example, in 1880 tenancy was the lot of 36.2 
percent of the farmers in the South. By 1930 the percentage had grown 
to 55.5 for the entire South and an estimate of more than 60 percent in 
the Cotton Belt.8 
By themselves percentages are meaningless, but 60 percent trans-
lated to more than one million white and almost 700,000 black tenant 
farmers. Based on averag·e family sizes, five and one half million white 
and three million black men, women, and children suffered the ill 
effects of tenancy. Among those ill effects were "large families of 
tenants or croppers or hired farm laborers ••• living in houses of two or 
three rooms," houses which were commonly poorly built, "weather-beaten," 
with leaky.roofs and unscreened windows, and often with not even an 
outdoor privy, much less indoor facilities.9 Within those hovels 
resided persons who were "chronically undernourished" and barely 
clothed.10 Then came the Great Depression. 
Already suffering greatly, Southern tenants had little to maintain 
themselves when cotton prices became meaningless. They had nothing to 
soften the blow when the acreage reduction measures of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration (AAA) forced the plowing under of their 
cotton. They had no recourse when they were forced to become part-time 
wage workers or forced to become transients after the landlords ended 
their tenancy. After the onset of the depression, most tenants had 
nothing. 
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According to Rupert Vance of the University of North Carolina, one 
of the most knowledgeable men of the period about the problems of ten-
ancy, "One obvious reason for the wholesale neglect of the tenant [lay] 
in the fact that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration organized 
its program under the direction of the planters themselves."1 1 But the 
New Deal was intended to help all who were in need. Thus, the adminis-
tration established programs to deal with the plight of tenants. While 
the AAA and other programs attempted to deal with the problem of chron-
ically low agricultural prices, more radical programs came into 
existance to deal with the poverty, disease, and backwardness of 
tenancy. Experimental, the New Deal at first attempted to resolve the 
problems on an ad hoc basis. In 1933 a provision of the NIRA authorized 
money for subsistence homesteads. The Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration (FERA) created new communities for relocated farmers and 
gave emergency payments to distressed agricultural workers to keep them 
off of relief. But those and other programs lacked central direction. 
On April 30, 1934, by executive order, Franklin D. Roosevelt created the 
Resettlement Administration with responsibility for "rural rehabilita-
tion, land use planning and the retirement of submarginal lands, and 
rural and suburban resettlement communities." 12 
The new agency required personnel. Hays thus became one of the 
young humanitarian politicians who served the tenant programs and helped 
to publicize them both in Little Rock, Arkansas, and in Washington, D.C. 
Although his father prospered as a lawyer in the small farming community 
of Russellville, Hays learned early that not all were so fortunate. As 
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me~tioned earlier, summer visits to his penuriously living grandmother 
exposed Hays to a more difficult style of life. Reinforcement came to 
him when he visited the many relatives who had not been so fortunate as 
his father. Most of Hays' cousins were simple farmers eking out an 
existence without frills. Hays' exposure to poverty was one source for 
his concern for the poor. Other considerations, which translated that 
concern into activity, were a humanitarian father and an active 
involvement in the local Baptist church. Poverty, parents, and religion 
formed in Hays that compassion for the less fortunate which dominated 
his life. To Hays, it was not charity; it was necessity.13 Indicative 
of his continuing interest in the poor was his service for two terms in 
the early 1930s as president of the Arkansas Conference of Social 
Workers.14 
In 1934 Hays was in Washington, D.C., to seek a speaker for the 
annual convention of the Arkansan Conference of Social Workers. His 
position as Democratic national committeeman provided his introduction 
to Rexford G. Tugwell of the RA. Initially the connection meant 
nothing, but it paid dividends in 1935 when Hays became "disillusioned, 
disenchanted" with his role in the NRA because of what he perceived as 
probably unconstitutional extensions of governmental functions by that 
agency.15 When Henry Wallace of the Department of Agriculture asked him 
to report on conditions in Arkansas, Hays was happy to oblige. 
The trip through eastern Arkansas gave Hays a good understanding of 
the problems of cotton tenancy. Hays first picked up two hitchhikers, 
one a renter and the other a tenant. The renter had 106 acres which he 
worked with one tenant and a tractor rather than the two tenants of the 
previous year. He was satisfied, but the tenant saw the other side of 
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the picture; he said, "there was plenty of work and what I don't 
understand is why it ain't that way now, 'cause the land is still 
here."16 After that, Hays talked with a merchant whose sales were down. 
Again the report was of men seeking work. DoWJ. the road, Hays heard 
tales of absentee ownership, tenant unrest, racial discrimination, and 
poverty. He talked to 19 people in all and reported on their problems. 
He suggested solutions including, among others, some method of resolving 
disputes between tenants and owners and access to the courts for 
tenants with legal disputes, resettlement of displaced farmers near 
cities at a cost capable of being borne by the relocatees, federal 
coordination of programs with the states, black education, and ownership 
of the land by those tenants who were capable. Finally, he said, 
The whole subject of making the tenant farmers an independent 
and productive class, (sic) should be administratively 
recognized and the facilities of every appropriate federal 
agency should be invoked in the development of a plan for 
elevating the lives of this vast group of American 
citizens. 17 
Two months later, in June of 1935, Hays received an invitation to join 
the RA.18 
Hays joined the agency and became one of its publicists. In one of 
his standard speeches, he restated the history of tenancy--the increase 
since 1880, the 42 percent of American farmers in that category, the 
concentration of two-thirds of the tenants in the South. Then Hays 
listed the causes of tenancy--the historical speculation on the 
frontier, the destruction of soil fertility by natural causes, and the 
economic problems caused by absentee ownership, poor credit, and low 
incomes. Hays then reminded his audience of the report of the 
president's commission on tenancy that "While two out of three tenants 
in the South are white, four out of five negro farmers are tenants."19 
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After discussing the magnitude of the problem, Hays began to sell the 
RA. He mentioned the 12,000 far·mers in Alabama whose individual net 
worth grew from $3.00 to $362.00 in two years because of help from the 
RA. Speaking of their rehabilitation, Hays noted that in that area 
"some folks think the word is 'rehave' and I submit that this literal 
interpretation of the good Latin word is quite significant. Let's keep 
up the work of helping people to rehave. n2Q . . . 
Or, as he told a Hot Springs, Arkansas, audience, "when [farmers] 
reach the end of their rope, they appeal to the Resettlement 
Administration, which undertakes to help them to help themselves."21 
RA spokesmen stressed that helping farmers to help themselves produced 
results such as those reported by Mrs. Nettie Clay of Bearden, Arkansas. 
As Mrs. Clay wrote: 
It is 11:30 a.m.--the last clothes are in to boil ••• Now for 
a quick lunch, then finish the wash. The fire is built in 
the stove, and as I turn away to get things together for a 
meal, a car stops at my gate and unexpected guests arrive. 
Do I have to give the usual short washday dinner? No, indeed. 
From my storage pantry, which was built under the guidance of 
the home supervisor [from the RA] and in which are stored some 
1,500 jars and cans of food, I quickly select materials for a 
balanced meal worthy of the most exacting appetites.22 
Although critics claimed that the programs tended to help only easily 
salvageable middle class farmers rather than rehabilitating the hard 
core poor such as tenants, supporters of the agency, Hays included, 
stressed that the virtue of the RA was that it helped people to become 
once again self-respecting. It was not charity; it was necessity. 
Hays appealed to the general populace, but he also appealed to 
special interest groups. For example, in 1935 he spoke to the Christian 
Rural Fellowship on the evils of absentee ownership. He said, "Absentee 
ownership means the continuation of poverty. It is the curse of 
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Southern agriculture." Furthermore, "Religion is needed in the delicate 
task of bending the rigid rules of law pertaining to the land, making 
the rules responsible (sic) to human needs." Hays reminded his listen-
ers that "Man is the center of our interest. His welfare is above 
everything else."23. The basic message was that "The earth is the 
Lord's," and "as a Christian [the user of the land] must seek to place 
the personal relations of the contract above technical rights."24 A 
Christian had the obligation to support the RA. 
In his home state, Hays became a bridge between the New Deal and 
Governor Carl Bailey. Hays suggested that tenant legislation was 
desirable on the state level. The Washington New Dealers drafted the 
legislation and sent it to Hays. He gave it to Bailey who used his 
influence in the state legislature to enact it. Again, when Hays asked 
Bailey to investigate the problem of exploitation of tax forfeited lands 
which were sold at scandalously low prices, the governor appointed a 
commission in 1936 which included Hays as spokesman for the Washington 
viewpoint. The recommendations of that commission, the Arkansas Farm 
Tenancy Commission, became the basis for the State Land Policy Act of 
1939.25 
Among the commission's recommendations were solutions to the full 
range of problems associated with tenancy. Federal and state assistance 
in the construction of adequate housing was of vital concern. Also, the 
committee called for a state donation of seed, equipment for food 
preservation, and instruction about the need for a better balanced diet, 
how to can, and why gardens should be planted on otherwise idle land. 
Education was also a key, with the committee advocating practical how-to 
courses as well as lessons in the value of cooperation and responsible 
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citizenship. Specifically, the report stated that education was equally 
important for black and white persons. Health instruction and free 
clinics financed by matching funds from state and federal governments 
were the recommended solutions to the traditional problems of malaria, 
pellagra, tuberculosis, and hookworm. And the report spent a consider-
able amount of space on the problems of relations between tenants and 
landlords, recommending longer leases, better accounting procedures, and 
other means of making the relationship more equitible. Solutions to the 
crisis of overpopulation on farms included a slower pace of mechaniza-
tion and an increase of industrial development so that displaced farmers 
might be absorbed into the cities gradually as jobs became available.26 
The report dealt with all aspects of the problem. The state legislature 
accepted its ideas, but effective implementation of such a far-reaching 
program required money and time. In the crisis of the depression years, 
many became impatient and demanded a faster, more radical, potentially 
revolutionary solution to the problems. One solution which Hays tested 
was Christian socialism. 
In the fall of 1934, Hays involved himself with the National 
Religion and Labor Foundation (NRLF). Between November 9 and 11, the 
NRLF met at Paris, Arkansas, to discuss the woes of their world. 
Delegates to the conference stayed in the homes of miners, tenants, and 
poor blacks while they worked together to solve the problems of their 
hosts. The conference consisted initially of testimonials and wit-
nessing about the rocky road along which the downtrodden and exploited 
masses traveled. One member of the employing class had the honor of 
discussing his plight; however; reports of his speech were hostile. The 
next day the foundation members toured the mines and fields. The climax 
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of the meeting came with an evening of speeches. First a speaker from 
Commonwealth College, the workingman's socialist academy at Mena which 
was closed in 1940 because of radical and somewhat communist sympathies, 
attacked the capitalist system. Then Hays spoke about the importance of 
religion. Success, to Hays, was a matter of knowing goals and making 
the sacrifices necessary to attain them.27 
Clearly the NRLF was something more than might be expected to 
attract a conservative Arkansan. But Hays was more. The Christian 
socialism of the NRLF and its attempts to educate the people of eastern 
Arkansas, even in the face of opposition from employers who had 
successfully driven union organizers from the region, were well received 
by the needy of the area and by the New Deal lawyer, Brooks Hays. He 
translated his enthusiasm into action, forming a chapter in Little Rock 
within two months of his exposure to the organization at Paris. That 
service earned him an of fer from Willard Uphaus to take the chairmanship 
of the chapter. Hays was enthusiastic about the organization but unsure 
about so overtly tying himself to such a shaky organization. He 
preferred .more freedom of movement for himself in his crusades.28 
However, his connection with the NRLF led him easily into an involvement 
with Claude Williams, a link with the Southern Tenant Farmers Union 
which led back to the New Deal. 
Claude Williams was a graduate of Vanderbilt, an ordained 
Presbyterian minister, and director of Commonwealth College. According 
to H. L. Mitchell of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, Williams was 
also a card-carrying Communist, and he was eventually expelled from the 
STFU on that charge. In the ea.rly 1930s Williams' religion and his 
politics led him to work actively with the struggling United Mine 
67 
Workers District Twenty-one and with the unemployed of western Arkansas. 
Early in 1935 Williams spoke before a group of men who were protesting 
the lack of fairness in their treatment by relief agencies. For his 
actions, he was jailed on charges of barratry, habitual provocation of 
arguments. His incarceration led to strong protests from the American 
left. Uphaus wrote to Hays on January 30, enclosing a letter of protest 
addressed to Harry Hopkins. Reminding Hays that Williams was highly 
respected and trusted by the working people of Arkansas, Uphaus asked 
Hays to write Hopkins, too. He also mentioned that his organization had 
petitions representing the protest of 80,000 wo!kers. On February 19, 
Uphaus again contacted Hays seeking information about the condition of 
Williams in the Fort Smith jail. The same day Hays received a telegram 
from New Haven, Connecticut, informing him that concern in that area had 
caused the writers to seek aid from both the governor of Arkansas and 
Hays. Nothing helped. Hays sought information from the Fort Smith Red 
Cross and prepared a defense team for Williams. But he was unable to do 
anything when bond was set at $1,200. Even Rose Terlin of th YMCA asked 
what students might do to help. The answer was nothing because Williams 
was in jail and due for a trial.29 
On February 21, Hays learned that Williams was in deep trouble. 
Not only was he in jail, but he faced hostility from both police and the 
people of Fort Smith. The police claimed that Williams had anarchistic 
literature in his home and that he had impersonated a government 
officer. Fort Smith had recently been the site of the conviction of 
another man on a similar literature charge; so Williams was in a 
difficult situation. The next day he went to trial--a sham lasting but 
five minutes--and received a sentence of 90 days and a $100 fine for 
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barratry. More than a dozen men had endured arrest with Williams, but 
after convicting one man of anarchy and Williams for barratry, the 
prosecutor and judge dropped the charges against all others. 
Probably one element in the persecution of Williams was his overt 
association with blacks. He even invited them into his home, a viola-
tion of the mores of white Arkansans. However, Economic Justice, the 
radical Arkansas newspaper, ignored that factor when it reported the 
case. Under the headline "Claude Williams Framed and Imprisoned," the 
newspaper claimed that Williams was arrested on a "trumped up charge of 
barratry," but all that he was doing in Fort Smith was organizing 
striking relief workers against a pay'reduction from thirty cents to 
twenty cents an hour. Also, he was attempting to establish a "New Era" 
school, that is an agency to educate workers in the Christian socialist 
orthodoxy concerning political and economic issues.30 
Of course, Williams appealed his conviction. Norman Thomas, peren-
nial candidate for president on the Socialist party ticket, encouraged 
Hays to use his influence to have the case dropped. Finally in May 
Hays informed Thomas that the prosecutor had agreed, and Williams was to 
go free. Hays also told the socialist that the NRLF was as firm as ever 
in its commitment to the fight against the abuses associated with cotton 
culture. When Thomas wrote to Hays that "the cotton country, at least 
in the eastern part of the state, is more cruel and barbarous than any 
place I've ever seen," Hays was unable to disagree. His sympathies lay 
with the tenants and with Claude Williams in his "courageous fight for 
the workers in his section of Arkansas.31 When Hays went to Washington, 
D.C., the Southern Tenant Farmers Union leadership followed him into the 
Resettlement Administration with clear evidence of the cruelty of the 
cotton region. 
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In January of 1936, under pressure from his neighbors, H. C. Dibble 
of Parkin, Arkansas, evicted nearly 100 of his tenants because of their 
membership in the STFU. In reaction to the evictions, the STFU 
established a tent colony near a road to publicize the plight of tenants 
homeless in winter. Owners reacted by evicting tenants by the 
thousands, leading Dr. William Amberson of the STFU to circulate a memo 
to H. L. Mitchell and Howard Kester of the organization, a memo which 
stated in part that "the utter brutality and callousness with which the 
planters are throwing off families is beyond belief."32 While the 
evictions continued, the STFU held a meeting in the Methodist church 
near Earle. Two deputies entered the church, and the sharecroppers 
panicked. One grabbed a gun. He received a beating and a trip to jail 
for attempting to murder a deputy. The deputies returned to the church, 
shot and wounded two tenants, and arrested three more. The STFU members 
expected the trials to be just because there was a witness, Willie 
Hurst, who was willing to testify against the deputies, but Hurst died 
by a bullet from an unknown assailant, after which no inquest met. 
Without his testimony, the STFU member first arrested, James Ball, 
received a sentence of seven years, a term later reduced to one. On the 
day after the events at Earle, Kester and others met in the colony near 
Parkin. Again deputies attacked the· meeting, and again they beat 
several tenants, accompanying their blows with threats that resistance 
might lead to anoth~r Elaine massacre. The STFU disappeared from 
eastern Arkansas, but violence and evictions continued.33 
Mitchell and Kester went to Washington seeking help for the 
dispossessed tenants of Arkansas. On January 25, they and Jackson met 
with Rex Tugwell, Will Alexander, and Brooks Hays of the RA. The STFU 
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leaders described the crisis in Arkansas and requested a RA project for 
the dispossessed tenants. Hays indicated that there might be legal 
complications because the RA had rigid procedures and normally selected 
its clients on an individual, not a collective basis. Also, the waiting 
list for positions on the collective farms was normally long. However, 
Hays, Alexander, and Tugwell concurred that immediate relief was easily 
arranged through the WPA. .The three also called on regional RA 
director, T. Roy Reid of Little Rock, to expedite the creation of a 
producers cooperative, the long term solution to the problem. But the 
provision of relief by the WPA encountered problems. Floyd Sharp, head 
of the WPA in Little Rock, delayed taking any action because he feared 
to alienate Joe Robinson--the senator was hostile to both the New Deal 
and the STFU--and employees in the Little Rock office distorted their 
reports to Aubrey Williams in the national headquarters of the WPA. Not 
until Williams conducted his own investigation into the treatment of 
STFU members by the WPA was relief begun for the dispossessed tenants. 
But the New Dealers in Arkansas declined even then to help the STFU with 
any great enthusiasm. As a practical matter, virtually no benefits went 
to the STFU from either the RA or the WPA, but finally the Farm Security 
Administration provided crop loans and relocation assistance to the 
evictees.34 Meanwhile the terror in Arkansas led to national reactions. 
On capitol hill liberals such as Vito Marcantonio of New York and 
Maury Maverick of Texas considered introducing an anti-terrorism 
resolution. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Federated 
Council of Churches of Christ in America called for an investigation of 
conditions in Arkansas. A report of the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) indicated that the Wagner Act, despite its clearly defined 
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protections of such groups as the STFU, was pointless without congres-
sional willingness to expose violators; implicitly the NLRB report 
challenged the congress to examine the plight of the tenants even over 
the objections of the Arkansas delegation. In a symbolic gesture of 
support, liberals of all persuasions hosted a dinner in honor of the 
STFU at the Cosmos Club in Washington, D.C. To that dinner, Kester 
brought a battered and bandaged sharecropper. To some of those present, 
the action seemed nothing more than a cheap propaganda trick, but Hays 
stood among those who regarded the gesture as honest and proper.35 
Hays backed the STFU, an organiztaion whose members contended that 
the solution to the problems of tenancy lay in collective ownership of 
the cooperative farm's lands. Such a stance by Hays was not surprising 
because he already belonged to other organizations which advocated that 
view. One of those organizations was the Southern Policy Conference. 
Between April 25 and 28 of 1935, in Atlanta, Georgia, Southern liberals 
met to "prepare the way for intelligent political action" including the 
Bankhead-Jones farm tenancy bill, cooperative farms, governmental 
ownership of transportation, utilities, insurance, and credit, and 
socialized medicine and hospitals. Some members of the Conference, 
including its vice-chairman, Brooks Hays, advocated close ties to the 
World Court and the League of Nations.36 
Not to be confused with the Southern Policy Conference, although it 
shared many of the same goals, was the Southern Policy Committee of 
Washington, D.C. The Atlanta conference lobbied for rural rehabilita-
tion and indicated displeasure with those legislators such as Josiah 
Bailey and Cotton Ed Smith who opposed such vital remedies. The 
committee did much the same. Comprised of such Southern reformers as 
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Maury Maverick of Texas, John McClellan of Arkansas, Joe Starnes of 
Alabama, Albert B. Chandler of Kentucky, Lister Hill of Alabama, and 
Brooks Hays, the group met informally to reinforce its advocacy of rural 
electrification, tenancy laws, and resettlement. Its members used their 
influence in congress to promote the goals of the Atlanta conference, 
excepting the socialist ones. The unit met regularly until June of 1937 
when other duties kept the members from meeting. Its claimed successes 
included a successful lobbying effort which resulted in passage of the 
Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Act of that year.37 
The Bankhead-Jones act was a landmark piece of legislation for 
tenant farmers. It attempted to combine all the previous New Deal 
programs into one manageable package directed by one agency, much as the 
RA had done. Also, the act formulated new, more radical programs as the 
pressures from the left forced Roosevelt into a more liberal stance. 
The second New Deal was a period of increasing concern for human needs, 
unlike the first which had tended to concentrate on economic revival for 
all sectors of America. During the second stage of the depression, the 
New Deal came to be more consistent with the concerns of Brooks Hays. 
But the first phase was not a time of failure or frustration for 
Hays. Despite another failure to win political office, he was able 
successfully to serve his constituents. Both the NRA and the RA 
accomplished something. Each acknowledged the needs of its clients, and 
each attempted in a limited way to improve the conditions of life for 
those who were hard hit by the depression. Hays was able to see clear 
signs of progress, even if that progress was too slow. And prominence 
in the two agencies allowed Hays to pursue more extreme causes. His 
ties to the NRLF and STFU helped to reduce the radical image of those 
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organizations, and he proved a useful go-between on the occasions when 
the New Deal and the radicals dealt with one another. The most solid 
accomplishment of the period was the inclusion of the tenancy 
commission's recommendations in the body of Arkansas law. Beyond 
Arkansas, Hays was able to use those recommendations effectively when he 
lobbied for national laws of comparable scope. Between 1933 and 1937 
Hays established the positions, the contacts, and the interests which 
were to come to fruition during the years of the second New Deal. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NEW DEAL, NEW OPPORTUNITY, 1937-1941 
After the initial flurry of activity without direction and with the 
sole purpose of immediate amelioration of longstanding problems, the New 
Deal began to develop a discernible pattern by the midway point of 
Franklin Roosevelt's first term. For the most part the pattern con-
sisted of an assortment of trial-and-error projects which resembled one 
another only in their common goal of easing, then resolving, the prob-
lems of the depression. The first measures emphasized the rehabilita-
tion and the provision of means for desperately poor Americans to 
survive while that economic revival occurred. Compared with what had 
gone before, the New Deal approach was almost revolutionary, but in a 
time of crisis there was little organized opposition. Helping to still 
opposition was the reality that Roosevelt's approach helped to amelio-
rate conditions. Americans were getting back onto their feet by the 
latter stages of the first New Deal. 
However, recovery led to problems for even such a moderate position 
as that held by those who believed that readjustment of the system was 
needed. From the left came challenges much more serious than that 
presented by scattered groups such as the Southern Tenant Farmers Union 
and the National Religion and Labor Foundation. Their advocacy of 
agrarian socialism was within the American tradition, harking back in 
some respects to the populism of the 1890's. The new challenge to 
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Roosevelt, the challenge from men such as Huey Long, Frances Townsend, 
and Father Caughlin, was premised on welfare socialism, cradle-to-grave 
security made possible by the destruction of America's "free enterprise" 
system. As well as being more radical, the new leftists were popular, 
winning converts from the millions who found radical panaceas and 
immediate improvement more desirable than the slow and limited solutions 
of the Roosevelt administration. 
The left was not the only source of worry for the New Deal by 1936. 
Opposition from the right was intensifying as well. Businessmen and 
farmers who had accepted government aid out of desperation, being 
remarkably consistent with one of the dominant themes of United States 
History, rejected the concept of federal intervention once they had 
begun to recover thanks to that assistance. Under pressure from both 
sides, the New Deal had to move toward one or the other. Because the 
left was more powerful at the time, Roosevelt and his New Dealers tried 
to accommodate, or at least appease, that group. 
Thus the second New Deal was more radical than what had gone 
before. With a new emphasis on satisfying the left came a new commit-
ment to people rather than economic sectors. In agriculture the shift 
was indicated by the replacement of the Resettlement Administration by 
the Farm Security Administration. As the government had first concen-
trated its attentions on the large landowners in the AAA, then assisted 
lower middle class yeoman farmers by the RA, so now the government com-
mitted itself to aid for tenants. The transition created problems for 
some New Dealers, but not for Hays. 
Hays was a social worker, so the new emphasis on people created no 
problems. Also, he believed in reform, so the concept of change was no 
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deterrent. And finally, he believed in party loyalty, so when the 
commander in chief of the Democracy said "column left," Hays made the 
turn. Thus, when the second New Deal began, Hays continued much as 
before. There was an increased degree of activity in state and national 
politics and a greater expression of advocacy of federal involvement, 
but there was no radical departure from the patterns Hays had developed 
earlier. 
However, Hays' activities in the second New Deal era had conse-
quences different from those of earlier years. By remaining loyal to 
the national administration while less committed partisans fell by the 
wayside, he defined himself more clearly than ever as a Southern 
liberal. His ties with the conservative elements became more difficult 
to maintain and, as a result, he became more adept at compromising and 
arranging truces. And he gained, by the end of the era, a following of 
his own--a group of people who approved of his service, his approach, 
and his image. In 1942 that following rewarded him with a seat in con-
gress. 
So the second New Deal was for Hays basically a continuation of 
what had gone before. He continued to publicize his agencies, and he 
maintained his role as emissary from the national to the local New Deal. 
He did it all without hesitation, and his consistent loyalty made him an 
invaluable man in Southern liberal political circles. Whether committed 
or not, by 1942 Hays had an unshakeable reputation as a member of the 
reform clique. 
But Hays had little inkling of what was involved as he began the 
second phase of his New Deal service. His concerns remained the same. 
Still he sought favors for his friends as he had done for so many years. 
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In 1937 he attempted to gain for Maurice T. Soule the position as 
inspector for District 14 of the Bituminous Coal Commission, and in 1938 
he imposed on his friendship with Carl Bailey to suggest June Wooten for 
a judgeship of the district court. Hays even had the nerve to write to 
Hattie Caraway in November of 1938 to recommend an applicant for the 
position of elevator operator in her building in Washington, D.C. Hays 
told Caraway that "Hancock is a reliable colored boy • • • who worked 
in Hays' office building in Little Rock for many years.I Hays was a· man 
who took a paternal interest in his friends and associates, black and 
white. He also had no appreciable qualms about soliciting favors from 
strangers, assuming as he did that today's stranger is tomorrow's bene-
factor or beneficiary. 
In 1936, for instance, Hays read a column by Mark Sullivan--a nos-
talgic piece about family farms. Hays decided that a similar effort 
about tenancy was a valuable tool in the fight for tenancy legislation. 
So he talked with Sullivan, but Sullivan declined to make a commitment. 
Despite that setback, Hays was not deterred. He always had a forum, 
and, when committed to a cause, he used any available platform to sell 
his programs. Before the South Carolina Education Association in 1940, 
Hays told his audience of the consequences of Southern poverty, espe-
cially in the light of the hard reality that millions of southerners had 
fled North in the previous quarter of a century. The result of that 
flight was, as Hays said, that: 
The biological effects of malnutrition which so many millions 
have endured find ultimate expression in a social problem of 
the urban North for our people are there and they have carried 
the influence with them. 
Clearly poverty in the South was a national problem rooted in regional 
backwardness. It was a problem whose qnly real solution was economic 
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reform. Hays continued, "It is essential, of course, that we preserve 
the economic base for a democratic society" by eliminating the freight 
rate differential and other methods of economic discrimination against 
the South. But education about democracy was also essential if the 
South were to overcome the decades of miseducation about the mythical 
land of cavaliers, magnolias, and juleps as well as the other non-
democratic Southern myths--black inferiority and the trashiness of poor 
whites above all.2 Deep in Dixie, Hays told his people that they must 
abandon a lie if they were to survive. Apparently Hays agreed with 
Howard Odum's assessment that "superiority is cultural, not racial," and 
he sought to prosyletize those who failed to recognize that truth.3 
He even tackled the ministers in 1939, telling the ministerial 
alliance in Russellville that they must remember that the church had 
two functions. It had an obligation to spread the gospel, of course, 
but it had also to deal with the problems of everyday living or it would 
find itself without influence in society, a concern which Hays confided 
to his diary late in 1939. In that instance Hays wrote that the Ameri-
can church must become realistic or it might become as the Russian 
church, and America might follow Adolf Hitler's route to paganism. ·As 
he told the ministers, the church had a clear choice, "either master or 
be mastered by materialism."4 At the same time as he cautioned to 
beware of materialism, Hays actively engaged in providing material 
betterment for the desperately poor of his state. The Resettlement 
Administration had been moderately successful in providing relief and 
rehabilitation, and even as Hays was lauding the RA to audiences in the 
South and Southwest the agency was giving way to the more elaborate and 
radical Farm Security Administration (FSA). The RA emphasized relief, 
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but relief programs were bandaids, not cures. Almost immediately after 
the formation of the RA, previously nebulous sentiment crystallized, and 
a demand developed for what was traditionally the one true solution to 
tenancy--ownership in accordance with the Jeffersonian agrarian tradi-
tion. In 1935 Senator John H. Bankhead of Alabama introduced legisla-
tion to fund tenant loans at one billion dollars. After failures and 
compromises, the bill passes the congress as the Bankhead-Jones Farm 
Tenant Act of 1937 which incorporated the functions of the RA and the· 
program of purchase loans. With new functions came a name change to the 
FSA which was headed by Will Alexander.5 
Even while working with the RA, Hays involved himself with the 
creation of the FSA. To him it was a "typical lobbying job."6 He sat 
in on discussions about the general principles of the legislation, but 
he left most of the details to others. More important, he used his 
position on the Democratic National Committee to gain access to repre-
sentatives and senators whom he wished to convert. Once Hays tried to 
meet with Senator Ellison D. "Cotton Ed" Smith of South Carolina. His 
card, which listed him as national committeeman, insured that he re-
ceived an audience. Once in Smith's office Hays heard a reminder of the 
hostility which Smith held toward the concept of federal aid to the 
poor. The senator said to Hays, "Rex Tugwell sent one of his damfools 
out here last week." As Hays recalled, "I didn't tell him I was another 
of the damfools."7 By using his committee credentials Hays gained 
access to a previously closed mind. Continuing his lobbying, Hays 
helped to sell the program. When the final vote came, only 82 congress-
men opposed the bill in the house.8 
Hays joined the FSA as regional attorney for the Department of 
83 
Agriculture handling FSA legal matters from the Little Rock office. 
Hays' job consisted primarily of land acquisition and sales. He handled 
the paperwork involved in the agency's purchase of submarginal lands, 
and he prepared deeds and mortgages for those who bought land with FSA 
loans.9 Between 1937 and 1942, Hays continued to work in public rela-
tions for the Roosevelt administration and the FSA. At Ridgecrest, 
North Carolina, in August .of 1938, Hays reiterated the problems of 
Southern poverty--disease, ignorance, inability to develop as Christians 
and as human beings. He also noted the improvements which the relief 
and rehabilitation agencies effected. And he closed with a challenge, 
saying, 
Undreamed of possibilities for achievement are at our very 
doors. If the hearts of our people are stirred with a sense 
of the needs of this vast throng of people, we will see the 
dawning of a new and better day for our beloved Southland.IO 
At Muskogee, Oklahoma, in October of 1938, Hays emphasized the possi-
bilities of the region which included western Arkansas and eastern 
Oklahoma. Noting the diversity and abundance of resources in the 
region, Hays called on his audience to avoid the regional jealousy which 
had allowed exploitation of their section by the Northeast--a region 
which used governmental power to its advantage. He asked for revived 
pride and cooperation as means of creating regional equity. Government 
by the people (implicitly the New Deal) was the road to salvation. In 
February of 1940, an audience in Austin, Texas, heard the most direct 
statement of all; Hays told that group that "Much can be accomplished by 
federal legislation," and again "national legislation is essential."11 
Like many of the New Deal agencies, the FSA eventually became 
obsolete, but, even as the FSA was disappearing, Hays continued his 
advocacy of federal involvement in the tenancy problem. But he was 
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among the minority. The FSA came under attack from conservative groups 
and competing agencies within and without the government. Its functions 
eventually became the realm of the Farmers' Home Administration, a more 
conservative agency with a greater inclination to heed the wishes of 
middle-class farmers' lobbies. However, by that time its job was large-
ly done. World War II removed many tenants from the farm to the factory 
and brought some measure of_prosperity to those who remained--a pros-
perity based on high demand, higher prices, and allotment checks, Social 
Security, and other transfer payments. Additionally, sons and daughters 
who left the farm often sent money to those who remained behind. Of 
course, the RA and the FSA were not totally effective; 13 percent of the 
South's farmers were still tenants in the 1970s. But tenancy was not 
sharecropping, and the Southern tenant was better educated, healthier, 
less isolated from his community, better informed, and generally im-
proved. Admittedly, only a fragment of the improvement came from the 
tenancy programs. Most came from the pattern of concern and govern-
mental involvement which originated with the second New Deal, a tendency 
unreversed for three decades. But the tenancy programs were the core 
around which rural electrification, subsidies, and a better way of life 
developed. For Hays the programs were worth the costs; however, because 
of his conviction that they were legitimate, for Hays the programs led 
to political complications. 
Despite his success in the farm agencies, Hays still suffered the 
enmity of his rivals for political position in Arkansas. Among those 
enemies was J. C. Futrell whose dislike for Hays dated back to the 
Priddy fiasco of 1932. In 1935, hearing rumors that Hays was to receive 
the position as head of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in 
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Arkansas, Futrell wrote to Harry Hopkins that "Brooks Hays would be a 
failure, his appointment would be a real tragedy, but would please the 
reds • • ·12 Hays had an image as a radical by Arkansas standards. 
Also, he habitually rejected the conservative factions, including that 
of Futrell. But Futrell left Hays alone until 1936. In that year 
Futrell ran Percy Hinton against Hays in the race for national commit-
teeman. Hinton waged a vigorous campaign; Hays ignored Hinton and won 
reelection by a three-to-one margin.13 Having shown that he had little 
need for conservative Arkansas politicians, Hays moved on to more impor-
tant matters such as serving the national party. 
As national committeeman, Hays had to deal in 1936 and 1937 with 
the vigorous fight taking place in the Puerto Rican delegation. Seem-
ingly one group of Puerto Rican Democrats wanted their committeeman 
replaced by a memeber of their faction. The committeeman had resided 
outside Puerto Rico for a time, and he was a member of the Liberal party 
of Puerto Rico as well. Thus, according to those who wished to remove 
him, he was ineligible for his post on the committee. The committeeman 
was disinclined to step aside without a struggle; so, the Democratic 
leadership of Puerto Rico appeared headed for a showdown which might 
lessen its efficiency for some time to come. The impasse fell to Hays 
and other committeemen to resolve. Finally, in August of 1937, they 
determined that Puerto Rico was to enjoy dual representation until the 
matter was permanently resolved by means of new elections.14 While 
serving the poor, Hays remained a party loyalist. 
As a regular Democrat, Hays not only wanted party harmony in 1936. 
He also wanted to help insure the re-election of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
In March Farley asked Hays to provide a list of speakers on behalf of 
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the New Deal gospel; Hays complied. In July Farley told Hays that the 
Roosevelt First Voters League sprang into existence as the "answer to 
the spontaneous demand of American youth to insure the President's re-
election," and Hays received the task of publicizing the league in order 
to attract independents, Republicans, and Young Democrats to the 
Roosevelt campaign.IS Then Farley asked Hays to organize the National 
Council of Roosevelt Electors in Arkansas to raise campaign funds for 
the national candidate. At the same time the Democratic National Com-
mittee Colored Division asked Hays for assistance. He sent to that org-
anization the names of two black volunteers. Then he wrote to Farley 
that the Democrats needed to create an independent organization for a 
non-partisan black group to channel interest in the 1936 election in the 
proper direction. Finally Farley requested that Hays forecast the 
results of the election. Hays gave a "conservative" estimate of 175,000 
to 35,000 or a five-to-one advantage for Roosevelt.16 The role of 
national committeeman during an election year thus involved a great deal 
of organizational ability, but at the same time Hays had other duties. 
In the waning days of the campaign, Hays received a request from 
Sam Rayburn that the Arkansan give a few speeches in Illinois, Ohio, or 
Indiana. Hays agreed to give two in either Illinois or Indiana. After-
ward, there was nothing left for Hays but to await the outcome of the 
election. Of course, he contributed to the campaign; he gave $175.00. 
After the votes were totalled, Roosevelt was re-elected, and Hays was 
in attendance at the inaugural ceremonies.17 
The Democrats were in debt after the campaign, and Hays became a 
member of the fund-raising subcommittee. That group designed a process 
for the collection of money from the solid South--South Carolina, 
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Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas--the 
area in which there was in reality no opposition party. Each state's 
national committee members were to establish a state organization which, 
under the guidance of a regional committee, was to collect annual or 
monthly contributions and pledges from Democrats within the state. 
Collection was to continue for three years, and each state's quota 
rested on the 1936 presidential vote within its borders and its per 
capita income for each particular year.18 That plan was to be Hays' 
last contribution as a member of the committee. With his other services 
to the New Deal, it almost gained him a federal judgeship from 
Roosevelt, a reward which failed to materialize because Caraway refused 
to approve. She disliked Carl Bailey, a friend of Hays and governor of 
Arkansas after 1936.19 
Friendship for Bailey not only prevented Hays from winning a judge-
ship; it also cost him his effectiveness as a link between the New Deal 
in Washington, D.C., and the sometimes recalcitrant New Dealers in 
Little Rock. The case of Carl Bailey was complicated, involving 
national and state politics as well as personal feuds in the classical 
tradition of Arkansas. For Hays it meant the end of his usefulness to 
both the New Deal and the Democratic party, and it was all unnecessary 
except that Hays was loyal to his friends. 
In 1937 Joe Robinson died, leaving vacant his position as senator 
from Arkansas. Hays was tempted to run once again, but he wanted to be 
elected, not appointed. Also, he wanted to please his father. In 1937 
as in 1930 Steele Hays counselled his son not to enter the fray. Hays 
was hesitatingly eager, and rumors flew that Bailey intended to appoint 
Hays to the vacancy. Finally, Hays ended the speculation concerning 
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his future by telling Bailey that work for the Farm Security Adminis-
tration was preferable to a temporary appointment with no guarantee of 
election. Hays was unwilling to serve, but Bailey had the urge.20 
When Bailey decided to appoint himself to the seat, complications arose. 
Historically in Arkansas custom had allowed the Democratic 
Executive Committee of Arkansas, in effect the governor, to appoint the 
Democratic nominee for special elections. Thus, at an earlier time 
Bailey might have appointed himself without difficulty. Unfortunately 
for the governor, rules changes in the wake of Hays' defeat in 1933 had 
given the power to Democrats in convention. Nevertheless, Bailey 
nominated himself by means of his executive committee. As should have 
been anticipated by any knowledgeable veteran of Arkansas politics, that 
action provoked an uproar across the state. It also caused 700 
delegates, representing 47 of the 75 counties in the state, to hold a 
convention and nominate Congressman John E. Miller for the seat. 
Initial sentiment, however, seemed to indicate that Bailey might get by 
with his coup. The Monroe County Citizen of Brinkly, Arkansas, 
presented the virtues of Bailey's decision in its edition of August 12, 
1937. Noting that "It is no light thing to appear to deny to the people 
their right to choose their representatives," the newspaper report 
acknowledged that the governor might' well lose not only the senatorial 
but the gubernatorial chair due to voter resentment. But what Bailey 
did, according to t~e paper, was actually consistent with his earlier 
reforming efforts. Having defeated the bosses> he used the tool of the 
bosses--the right to choose candidates for vacancies in the 
committee--to insure that the bosses were unable to regain power in the 
state. At least in The Monroe County Citizen the perception was that, 
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hoist with their own petard, the bosses cried hollowly about democracy 
denied.21 
Arkansas State Democratic Committee Chairman June P. Wooten tried 
to explain the situation to the national Democrats. As he told Farley 
in August, Bailey won the nomination by a vote of 32 to 3 in a procedure 
which was fully in accordance with the rules of the Democratic party and 
the laws of the state of Arkansas. Despite that combination of circum-
stances, Wooten explained, enemies of Bailey held a mass meeting--not a 
convention--and nominated Miller as an independent--not a Democrat. 
According to Wooten, Miller even opposed the New Deal and Roosevelt, as 
bis congressional record showed. Wooten encouraged Hays as well, 
writing on August 17, 1937: 
If Miller goes through with his race, we will have a scrap on 
our hands, but we do not anticipate that he will get very far. 
The opposition consists mainly in the disgruntled boys who 
went off the Futrell payroll and, as there were a good many of 
them, naturally they can make a showing.22 
The head of the state Democrats told his national committeeman and 
Roosevelt's campaign organizer that the candidacy of Miller was un-
authorized and an attempt by the anti-New Deal machine to retake the 
state from the legally chosen New Dealer, Carl Bailey. With such infor-
mation and with his close friendship for the governor, Hays took leave 
of absence from his job to help in the Bailey campaign. He anticipated 
an attack by Bailey on Miller as an opponent of the New Deal, so he com-
piled a congress by congress list of Miller's votes. Also, he listed 
the few pieces of legislation that Miller had managed to get passed by 
congress. But the record was not the issue of the campaign. The prob-
lem was the perceived denial of democracy to the Democracy. 
On October 4 Hays received a letter from Charles T. Coleman which 
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expressed shock and disbelief because Hays had told "a prominent federal 
employee" that Farley wanted all governmental employees to support and 
work for Bailey. The charge was without basis although Farley did con-
gratulate Bailey on the nomination. Frances Perkins, Henry Wallace, and 
Harry Hopkins also indicated a preference for Bailey while Miller won 
endorsements from Fifth District Congressman David Terry (the man who 
appropriated Hays' seat in 1933), Senator Caraway, and the widow of 
Robinson. And of course Hays endorsed Bailey. As he explained it, 
Bailey had come to recognize the error of his ways; furthermore, he was 
a good governor for disadvantaged groups and civil service employees. 
Hays disliked the means by which Bailey won the nomination and intended 
to continue in opposition to them, but because of the governor's past 
performance, Hays backed B.ailey, "not because of his nomination, but in 
spite of it."23 
Miller slaughtered Bailey in the election. Remarkably, an inde-
pendent defeated the regular Democrat in a statewide race in Arkansas. 
Causes of the defeat, according to the Arkansas Democrat, a source 
unfriendly to Hays and Bailey, included the letters of congratulations 
from prominent New Dealers. As the Democrat explained the situation, 
Arkansans were hostile to what they perceived as an undue intrusion of 
outside forces in an internal matter, but Hays failed to indicate that 
hostility to those who endorsed Bailey. Possible motivation for Hays 
lay in his ambitions for a race against Caraway in the near future, 
ambitions which needed a victory by Bailey for their realization. Thus, 
Hays was blind to the reality of the situation in Arkansas and, as a 
result, misinformed Farley and the others about the mood of hostility 
toward outside interference and the non-democratic nominating process. 
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Hays clearly misled Farley early in the race. Farley wrote to Hays 
on August 25 that Arkansans were indicating disapproval of the procedure 
used by Bailey. An unnamed citizen of Batesville apparently sent Farley 
copies of editorials against Bailey. Farley was concerned, but Hays 
interpreted the situation in such a way as to minimize the problems. He 
told Farley that the newspapers in question were politically insignifi-
cant, as was the unnamed citizen. Furthermore, Hays described the pro-
ceeding which nominated Miller as a rump convention attended by official 
delegates of only a handful of county organizations. Finally, the nomi-
nation of Bailey occurred in the same fashion as ten previous selections 
to fill vacancies, including that of Caraway in 1931. As Hays told 
Farley, it was "admitted by all that under the rules of the party the 
governor [was] the regular Democratic nominee."24 
According to the Chattanooga Times, Miller benefitted from the 
backlash against a hand-picked candidate. But endorsements were no 
handicap. After all, Miller had endorsements, too. Surprisingly for 
Arkansas the significant difference in the two candidates was their 
political positions. Bailey was clearly a New Dealer, and Miller ran 
openly in opposition to the federal programs. Arkansans who voted pre-
ferred the conservative. Even Hays came to realize the significance of 
Roosevelt's policies in the campaign. As he told Will Alexander after 
the defeat, "the real issue was progressive principles versus Tory 
control," and Hays expressed pleasure that his controversial support of 
Bailey further identified him with the progressive wing of the 
Democracy.25 But that element of the Democratic party in Arkansas was 
less than overwhelmingly popular by 1938 because the economic crisis 
which allowed the New Deal appeared to be history. Both senators were 
unenthusiastic about the New Deal, and the liberal governor and his 
friends were in trouble. 
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The anti-Bailey or conservative forces sought again to remove Hays 
from his position as Democratic National Committeeman, but with national 
support Hays resisted and maintained a respectable level of activity for 
his party. After the special election Hays returned to speechmaking on 
behalf of the Democrats and their New Deal. In late October he attended 
the State Policy Committee meeting at Birmingham, Alabama, and spoke at 
Auburn, Tuscaloosa, and Montevallo. He visited Tuskegee, Alabama, then 
went on to Mississippi, North Carolina, and Georgia, by way of the 
Memphis Rotary Club. He continued to report his displeasure with 
Caraway and Miller--two Democrats who voted with the New Dealers but 
sympathized with Harry ByLd and other hostile congressmen. Hays' urge 
to run for the senate gave way, because of its impracticality in the 
aftermath of Bailey's defeat, to a hesitant interest in the seat vacated 
by Miller. In reference to the animus of the Miller forces and their 
attempt to remove him from the national committee, Hays told a corre-
spondent that "I learned long ago that there are a good many penalties 
attached to staying with your convictions, particularly if those con-
victions happen to be of a liberal stamp."26 Hays had ideological as 
well as practiced reasons for his mistaken support for Bailey. The need 
to fight the conservatives was leading Hays into a race which he had no 
chance of winning. 
In March of 1938, Hays heard from his father once again about the 
need for caution in politics. In the first place, the elder Hays 
counselled his son, after so many previous defeats, victory was 
essential. Such a victory was impossible in 1938 because the leadership 
93 
in Arkansas--Miller, Caraway, and others--opposed a Hays candidacy. In 
fact, Steele Hays reminded his son, "They will fight you." The only 
counterforce to the senators was the governor, and support from Bailey 
was more a hindrance than a help because of the recent controversy. 
Seven of the eight counties in the Fifth Congressional District opposed 
Bailey and, by extension, Hays. Finally, to attempt a race so shortly 
after having appeared to sacrifice his principles for Bailey was to 
create the appearance to many of Hays' supporters that there had been a 
Bailey-Hays deal. If Hays were to create such an impression, he risked 
the destruction of his reputation for honesty and integrity. The advice 
convinced Hays. In response to an inquiry from Will Alexander, Hays 
decided to end the rumors that he was using an appointive office as a 
platform from which to campaign. On March 18 Hays wrote to Alexander 
that, "The prospect of two more years in this job uninterrupted by 
political controversy is very pleasant."27 There was no Hays candidacy 
in 1938. 
In fact, after 1938 Hays was a waning element in an increasingly 
conservative Arkansas. He resolved his problems with Caraway after he 
determined that her anger was due to the appointment of one of her 
political enemies to a position she wanted for a friend. Hays arranged 
that she have the patronage she sought, and Caraway appeared to be 
appeased. At the same time Hays avoided a more dangerous issue, black 
Democrats. In 1938 the Arkansas Negro Democratic Association (ANDA) 
petitioned for inclusion in the activities of the Arkansas State 
Democratic Convention. J.M. Robinson of the ANDA wrote to Bailey, but 
Bailey merely referred the matt~r to committee for study. Robinson was 
confused about the structure of the Democratic party, so he sought 
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assistance from Hays, apparently believing that the National 
Committeeman was a member of the state committee on procedure. Hays 
explained that he was not a member of the committee; however, he 
investigated the matter. He found that no action had occurred on the 
part of the state Democrats (hardly a surprise), so he referred Robinson 
to the proper authority, June Wooten, who let the matter die. Liberal 
Democrats in the south were not liberal enough to reopen the issue of 
race which Jim Crow had settled decades earlier. Only during the time 
of Orval Faubus a decade later was the Democratic party of Arkansas to 
open its ranks to a select few black members. 28 By then Hays was safely 
removed from the matter, but in the pre-war years he avoided the issue. 
Having accomplished all that he could in Arkansas, Hays spent his 
final year as committeeman quietly preparing for the national convention 
of 1940. In February he heard from Marion Rushton about the plight of 
the South at that meeting. The national Democrats had rescinded the 
two-thirds rules in 1936 after the rule had almost split the party in 
1932. That decision had reduced Southern power in the party because the 
South was merely a minority whose votes became unimportant due to the 
new simple-majority nominating procedure. In 1939 there was another 
threat to the South. A movement began which sought to base national re-
presentation on votes for the party in the preceding national election, 
not on the votes in the preceding presidential primary. In the one-
party South the turnout was normally significantly lighter in the elec-
tion than in the primary, the actual determiner of the elections. Thus, 
Southern delegate strength faced even more reduction if such a rule were 
to pass. Rushton wanted Hays to help in the fight against the measure. 
Hays agreed that the change was potentially harmful, but he stressed 
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that the poll tax was more so because it reduced voter turnout, and he 
rejected the contention that the abandonment of the two-thirds rule hurt 
the South. However, he agreed to fight "any effort to impose on the 
South" at the convention of 1940.29 
More important to Hays, as to many people in 1939 and 1940, was the 
question of a third term for Roosevelt. In the summer of 1939, there 
were signs that it might be a major issue in 1940. Hays disapproved 
because he feared that if the third term became an issue it would cause 
the neglect of the really vital question, poverty. Hays indicated 
privately that he was not enthusiastic about the third term. But Hays 
was out of the arena before the decision came, resigning from the 
national committee in 1939 after the Hatch Act made it illegal for 
governmental employees to have an active political life. 
So the 1930s ended with Hays once again out of politics. But the 
decade, especially the final few years, despite its setbacks and con-
troversies, was a rewarding one for Hays. His service to the New Deal 
gained visible benefits for the needy of Arkansas even while he was 
making political errors. So there were rewards to compensate for de-
feats. Especially was that true because the New Deal agencies were only 
one aspect of Hays' service to the South during the depression. As was 
his custom through his career, Hays was a joiner; he was active in most 
of the reform movements of the 1930s. 
Among the most-significant of the human rights organizations which 
flourished in the 1930s were the Commission on Interracial Cooperation 
(CIC) and the Southern Conference on Human Welfare (SCHW). The CIC was 
what Gunnar Myrdal referred to as "the organization of Southern 
liberalism in its activity on the Negro issue ... 30 Organized in the 
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aftermath of the post-World War I wave of lynching, the commission 
sought to provide a channel of communication between the segregated 
peoples of the South. Its founder and director was Will Alexander, a 
man whose background was in the ministry and in social work. Under his 
leadership, the CIC became the first Southern organization to attempt to 
help blacks to help themselves. It superseded the individual 
paternalism of the Southern past with its collective paternalism. It 
even had occasional integrated meetings, something unheard of in the 
South of Jim Crow. But it was a loose coalition of Southern liberals 
who held varying degrees of acceptance of black equality, so its 
effectiveness fell victim to the need to balance a wide variety of 
views. For fifteen years the CIC led the way for Southern liberals, but 
in 1935 Alexander left for the New Deal, and by 1936 the CIC was fading 
as Southern liberals moved beyond it. By the time Hays joined in 1936, 
the CIC was largely moribund.31 However, membership in the CIC led Hays 
almost automatically into the more radical organization which appeared 
in its place, the SCHW. 
In 1938 the tenancy commission of Roosevelt issued the report which 
identified the South as America's number one problem. Some Southerners 
denied the report while others preferred to stress that it ignored too 
many of the really severe Southern problems. Joe Gelders, labor 
organizer and Communist, met with H.C. Nixon of the Southern Policy 
Committee, and the ~wo arranged a meeting for Birmingham, Alabama to 
"foster the progressive movement in the South with no reactionaries 
needing to apply."32 Hardly a reactionary, Brooks Hays was interested 
when he received his invitation to attend. On September 1, 1938, he 
wrote to Louise O. Charlton of the SCHW that he wanted to do special 
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assignments for the group in the areas of tenancy and race relations. 
Charlton countered that she wanted Hays as a member of the panel on the 
poll tax with Virginius Dabney. Hays preferred to free-lance, and 
besides he was involved more than he wanted in the poll tax fight in 
Arkansas.33 
In the elections of 1938, the Arkansas Conference for Social and 
Economic Progress (ACSEP) spearheaded a campaign to repeal the poll tax 
by means of a constitutional amendment. Lacking money even to pay for 
stamps, the ACSEP relied on the enthusiasm of its members as it sought 
to keep poll tax repeal separate in the minds of potential voters from 
the nearly one dozen other amendments on the ballot. Hays indicated 
concern that his opponents might combine opposition to one or more of 
the other amendments with opposition to the poll tax and defeat the 
whole ballot. Hays attempted to wage a quiet campaign--a quiet campaign 
that might go unnoticed by the opposition until it ws too late. For 
Hays, replacement of the poll tax by registration, as the amendment 
prescribed, was "not a.perfect system but it certainly would prevent the 
sort of thing that was put over in the congressional race in 1933," the 
race in which Hays lost his opportunity to represent the Fifth 
Congressional District.34 Hays gained support for his fight from 
Franklin Roosevelt. The president wrote to Hays that the poll tax had 
reduced voter participation in Virginia to one-third of the white 
population. As to black disfranchisement, that was a separate matter 
which poll tax repeal would not affect. Roosevelt was so supportive of 
repeal that he sent Joe Gelders into the South to organize repeal 
efforts in eight states. Gelders failed, as did Hays. In Arkansas 
there was still concern that twelve amendments were too many for any one 
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election. It led Hays to wonder if perhaps there should be some limit 
to the number of issues on the ballot in any given election. Once again 
poll tax reform fell to defeat on November 8, 1938. 
Hays was bewildered because he thought poll tax repeal was only one 
element in the effort to make people more aware of their democratic ob-
ligations. It was misunderstood as a means of getting the poor to vote 
and, if properly understood, was doomed to disappear within ten years, 
Hays predicted. He wrote, nevertheless, that "it is startling to find 
so many people who distrust democracy."35 Within a few days he was able 
to report with his characteristic optimism that "We lost the poll tax 
fight but prepared the state for the change thai is sure to come."36 In 
the meantime Hays had no desire to tie himself to the poll tax question 
in Birmingham. 
When H.C. Nixon offered several panels to Hays, the Arkansan again 
indicated his wish to be free. At Birmingham his only official duty was 
as vice-chairman of the participation committee. That was hardly a 
burdensome task, so Hays prepared to enjoy an exciting conference. The 
agenda was crowded because the conference committed itself to work for 
constitutional rights, lobby for and perhaps work itself for the elimi-
nation of the poll tax, and seek solutions to problems including pover-
ty, lack of credit and manufacturing·, so.il erosion, low incomes, dis-
ease, tenancy, and poor housing--the whole range of Southern problems. 
The conference included panels on "credit, farm tenancy, constitutional 
rights, education, labor relations, women wage··earners, freight-rate 
differentials, youth, health, and child labor."37 
On November 20, 1938, the Birmingham meeting convened. Its general 
purpose was to allow Southern liberals to get acquainted with one 
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another, but it welcomed Northern observers. Participants included 
Senator Lister Hill of Alabama, liberal historian Howard K. Beale, 
Governor and Mrs. Bibb Graves of Alabama, and many others representing 
the best and the brightest of Southern liberalism. Eleanor Roosevelt 
spoke; John Bankhead served as a panelist on farm tenancy; and Hugo 
Black was an honored guest. Also present were Communists, fellow 
travelers, and labor leaders. On panels and in the audience, black and 
white people mingled throughout the first session. 
The second day of the conference was somewhat different. Hearing 
that the first meeting had been integrated, City Commissioner Theophilus 
Eugene Connor, "Bull" to his friends, ordered that there be enforcement 
of the city's segregation ordinance. It was so done with only Eleanor 
Roosevelt indicating defiance by sitting in the aisle rather than in the 
white section so that she symbolically tied white to black. Despite 
compliance, the SCHW gained a reputation for defiance when it passed a 
resolution condemning segregation in its meetings and calling for future 
meetings to occur where no segregation ordinances applied. The 
Associated Press reported the SCHW's "condemnation of the South's Jim 
Crow laws for the separation of whites and Negroes," whlch caused 
reaction such as the editorial in the Montgomery, Alabama, Advertiser, 
~ '•· 
which read in part, "Surely there was enough work to do to soften the 
rigors of life in the Deep South without challenging the folkways of our 
people and raising extraneous issues."38 
Intermingled with the minor stir about the presence of Communists, 
the Jim Crow issue caused problems for Hays. Early in December he wrote 
to Francis Pickens Miller, an old friend, a solid liberal, and one of 
those alienated from the SCHW after Birmingham.' Hays said of the SCHW, 
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"it looks like a perfectly hopeless undertaking because of the publicity 
over the Jim Crowe (sic) and other resolutions which the extremists 
insisted on passing. The public response in Arkansas was "explosive," 
and Hays managed to appease his friends only by explaining that he was 
in New Orelans when the Jim Crow resolution passed unanimously.39 
Miller left the SCHW. Politicians such as Lister Hill and John 
Bankhead deserted the organization, but others such as Claude Pepper and 
Hays remained involved, Pepper openly and Hays unofficially and without 
publicity. In December of 1939, Hays was still tied closely enough to 
the SCHW to be one of those who approved the appointment of Howard Lee 
as executive secretary despite allegations against Lee of Communism, 
allegations which gained credence when Lee began collecting money for 
the party after World War 11.40 But at the same time Hays was moving 
away from the SCHW despite ~ts increasing involvement with repeal of the 
poll tax. Barry Bingham, publisher of the Louisville Times and Courier-
Journal, wrote to Hays on December 26, 1939, that the SCHW, although 
still seeking what Hays sought, was not an appropriate organization for 
Hays to associate with. John F. Wells, journalist, told Hays the same 
thing. The second SCHW conference, in Chattanooga, could be no better 
than the first, and an ambitious politician needed to avoid 
identification with the group. Hays agreed. Nineteen-forty was an 
election year, and Hays had the urge to run once again. So he decided 
to disassociate himself from the meeting at Chattanooga. He severed his 
ties with the SCHW, and the last of the liberal Southern organizations 
continued on its suicidal way until, after the election of 1948, it 
"died in obscurity, poor and neglected, forgotten both by its friends 
and its enem~~s."41 
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Even then Hays was not fully removed from the liberal causes of the 
1930s. In 1937 Raymond Leslie Buell had asked Hays to help organize a 
committee to investigate the relationship between the American economy 
and world trade. The question arose because Cordell Hull, secretary of 
state, was having difficulty in gaining acceptance of the reciprocal 
trade agreements with foreign nations. Always glad to join, Hays agreed 
on December 28. He became a founding member of the Economic Policy Com-
mittee (EPC), a group intended to promote discussion of Hull's belief 
that the American and world economies were interdependent and that the 
economic situation was tied directly to peace. The EPC was designed to 
involve liberals and conservatives, agriculturalists, laborers, indus-
trialists, religious persons, and all others. It advocated increased 
production, more employment, and a decreased cost of living to be 
achieved by world trade. It accomplished little, but Hays remained a 
member until 1940. In March of that year, he indicated that he was 
still impressed with the organization, but the Hatch Act forced him to 
resign from political organizations. Again Hays indicated that he was 
looking for a new job.42 His usefulness to Arkansas was fading with the 
waning of the New Deal. Clearly it was time to return to elective poli-
tics. His last local crusade had failed. 
As Democratic National Committeeman and as a friend of Governor 
Carl Bailey, in 1939 Hays found himself involved in a situation more 
difficult than any which had gone before. He had helped the poor in an 
impersonal and paternal way through the New Deal agencies and the 
liberal organizations. He had involved himself in the case of Claude 
Williams. But in 1939 he received a request that he stop a "murder," a 
legal execution ordered by his friend, Carl Bailey. In April of 1935, 
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two black men were charged with rape in Blytheville. For four years the 
two appealed their conviction, and for four years the case was a center 
of attention for liberals in Arkansas. Finally the appeals ran out, and 
Bailey determined to execute the two on June 30, 1939. Two weeks before 
the deadline, liberal and radical forces intensified the campaign to 
save the Blytheville boys from execution. The Joint Action Committee of 
Commonwealth College telegraphed Hays that the trial transcripts indi-
cated that the proceeding had occurred under the influence of a mob 
spirit. With no legal recourse remaining, the committee asked Hays to 
intercede with Bailey for clemency. The committee also sent telegrams 
to John P Davis of the National Negro Conference, Walter White of the 
NAACP, Louise Charlton of the SCHW, and Angelo Herndon and A. Philip 
Randolph, prominent leaders of the fight for black equality. Davis 
wrote to Hays, explaining political reality. Davis told Hays that the 
Democrats would lose three million black votes if they allowed another 
Scottsboro, what blacks perceived as another legalized lynching.43 Hays 
did nothing for one week. 
On June 24, 1939, with the executions six days away, Hays finally 
replied to Davis. He refused to act. Hays said that clemency was none 
of his concern because he worked in agricultural matters. Also, he said 
that he felt personal relationships should not influence such matters. 
He told Davis to talk with the governor when Bailey returned to Little 
Rock. Similar appeals from others received the identical form letter 
from Hays with the same one-week delay in replying. Time ran short. 
On June 27 Lee Hays, an earlier recipient of the form letter, wrote a 
second time. He indicated to Brooks Hays that he understood the concern 
about political embarrassment, although he disagreed that it would 
103 
happen if Hays interceded to save the two doomed men. Further, he indi-
cated that he continued to support Hays for governor, then posed the 
questions, "Do governors live in vacuums?" Finally, he expressed regret 
that Hays had failed to join the one million American voices for clem-
ency. Then Brooks Hays had a change of heart. He called Bailey; then 
he wrote to Lee Hays explaining that his outright rejection after 
deliberating for a week was due to his acting in haste. 
On July 6 Brooks Hays wrote to Davis in much the same form as he 
had to Lee Hays. He explained that he had called Bailey after having 
talked with the defense attorneys. He asked Bailey if the governor had 
examined the case. Bailey affirmed that he had had sufficient time to 
examine the matter. That ended the conversation; Hays failed to request 
clemency. He told Davis finally, "I am sorry that I did not have an 
opportunity to write to you before the execution."44 Hays' humanitar-
ianism faded when race was involved. However, there was no penalty for 
such a flaw in Arkansas. 
On Sunday, February 25, 1940, Brooks Hays' Bible class in Little 
Rock honored him for fifteen years' service. Attendance that day set a 
record.45 It was proper that such an occasion brought out unusually 
large crowds. For Brooks Hays was ending one of the most productive 
periods of his life, and much of his productivity had gone for the 
betterment of his fellow Arkansans. Not always did he win, but to a 
remarkable extent he managed to be on the right side morally or 
politically. Eventually his people came to realize the rightness of his 
stands, but in the meantime they merely sent him to congress. There he 
enjoyed 16 years of comparative peace untroubled by excessive 
controversy. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUCCESS, 1942-1957 
On January 4, 1941, John B. Thompson, chairman of the Southern 
Conference for Human Welfare, wrote to Hays that organized labor was in 
crisis because congress was considering legislation on behalf of 
compulsory arbitration and "forced contracts," legislation which 
appeared to outl_aw the right to strike. All 'Thompson asked was that 
Hays sign an enclosed letter and forward it to Hatton Sumners of the 
House Judiciary Committee. Earlier, Hays had willingly if not eagerly 
supported much more controversial issues. But in 1941 Hays declined. 
On the letter from Thompson, in red letters large enough to preclude any 
misunderstanding, was the notation, "No Reply."! Hays was finished with 
the SCHW; he was eliminating all potential controversy as he prepared to 
run for congress. 
Hays almost changed his mind late in 1941. Driving home from 
Annapolis on a December Sunday, Brooks and Marion heard a news report of 
the Japanese attack on Pearl.Harbor. Like many Washingtonians, the 
Hayses went to the Japanese em9assy to gawk. More importantly, Hays had 
to reconsider his options. Even though he was in his early forties, he 
felt the patriotic impulse. As he recalled, 
I sort of played with the idea, very superficially, of 
enlisting. Men my age did enlist. But, of course, I had the 
children to educate [,] and I had my own niche in public 
service which I thought could be just as important as carrying 
a gun or manning a vessel.2 
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Having rejected the option of military service, Hays prepared for 
his congressional race by pacifying his enemies. Homer Atkins was the 
key. Atkins led the fight to get Hays removed after the Bailey debacle, 
and his animosity toward Hays continued when he became governor in 1940. 
His inclination to hamstring Hays showed clearly in an episode of 1941. 
In cooperation with the United States Department of Agriculture, Hays 
sought in that year to modify Arkansas' Soil Conservation Act. Hays 
needed Atkins' influence with the legislature, so he asked C. Q. Kelly, 
Atkins' liaison with the New Deal in Little Rock, to secure the support 
of the governor. Supposedly both Atkins and Kelly agreed that the 
changes were positive even though they normally opposed .the type of 
ideas that Hays supported. But Atkins had higher priorities than merely 
the quality of the legislation. Despite supporting the concepts 
embodied in the proposed law, he killed the bill to keep Hays from 
gaining the glory. But in 1942 Atkins had a change of heart. Seeking 
re-election himself, he asked Hays for a truce. Hays agreed to stay out 
of the governor's race if Atkins stayed neutral in the congressional 
fight. Atkins and Hays kept the agreement, but associates of the gover-
nor helped the lieutenant governor, Bob Bailey, who opposed Hays.3 In 
the morass of Arkansas politics loyalty had no place. Lacking an issue-
-Hays having no recent elective office ·in which to create a record-
-Bailey chose to attack Hays as a left-leaning lover of the minority 
race. Bailey accused Hays of being a "nigger-lover."4 
An advertisement of the Bailey forces in the desperate waning days 
of the campaign proclaimed "Brooks Hays Friend of Leftists;" further-
more, "This Radical Will Upset the Social Patterns of the South."5 To 
conservative Arkansans Hays had the credentials to qualify on both 
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counts. Not only had he been a member of the Southern Policy Committee 
since 1932 and the Southern Conference for Human Welfare from 1938, but 
he was founder of the Little Rock branch of the Urban League, and his 
work for the Little Rock Tuberculosis Association had taken him into 
black homes, camps, and sanitariums.6 Hays ignored the attacks, 
pref erring to occupy the higher ground. 
Hays began his campaign for the congressional seat on July 11, 
1942. Rather than hometown Russellville, he selected Conway, a city 
more centrally located in the district, as the site for his first 
campaign speech. Of pr·imary concern to potential voters and, thus, to 
the prospective congressman, was agriculture. As he had throughout his 
career with the Resettlement and Farm Security administrations, Hays 
expressed his commitment "to conservation of resources. Then he 
addressed the farm problem, offering to work for parity and gradual 
tariff reform--two items which Southern farmers had perceived as 
necessary as early as the populist era. Then Hays had words of praise 
for the productivity of the American farmer, but he also stressed the 
need for further diversification in Southern agriculture. To achieve 
even higher productivity and greater diversity, Hays advocated the 
traditional Southern solutions--federal aid with local control and 
better education. Finally, Hays donned the cloak of patriotism and 
discussed the war effort, cautioning his audience that victory over the 
enemy was fruitless if no precautions were taken to prevent inflation 
from dissipating wartime prosperity.7 
Racial matters were less important in Arkansas in 1942 than they 
became later. So the people of the district rejected Bailey's attacks, 
and Hays had the victory he had failed to win so many times before. In 
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the primary a minority of the eligible Democrats voted. Hays defeated 
Bailey by a margin of 16,000 to 12,500, and, after the formality of·the 
general election, began what was expected, according to Arkansas and 
Southern tradition, to be a lifetime of congressional service unbothered 
by concerns such as serious challenges to his re-election. 8 
On being sworn in as congressman from the fifth district of 
Arkansas in early 1943, Hays achieved job security. The seat seemed to 
be his for life if he chose to keep it. As long as he provided an 
occasional benefit to the district--a dam, a piece of legislation in the 
interest of farmers, or the like--he was free to wage his crusades 
without political peril. Especially was that ·so because his most 
important legislative fights were for traditional Southern liberal 
causes such as anti-lynch legislation, a permanent Fair Employment 
Practices Commission, and abolition of the poll tax. For the span of 
Hays' career in congress, each attempt to pass such laws failed. 
Southern strength made passage impossible, and Hays' constituents knew 
it. So they let him fight his hopeless fight for 16 years. Not until 
the crusade appeared to gain some success did the people of the fifth 
district rise against their crusader, but that would not come until the 
late 1950s. Meanwhile, Hays pursued a liberal path, even though liber-
alism was evolving too rapidly for him to keep pace. 
World War II changed Ameri~a as much as any event in the nation's 
history. Not only did the war reduce American poverty, establish 
American economic dominance of the world, and alter interrelationships 
within and without the American community, but the war also provided the 
background for the diminution of conservatism--a philosophy whose 
tendencies toward isolation, limited government, and toleration of 
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discrimination proved to be insufficient for the changed postwar world. 
In the new America arose a significant alternative, a liberal democracy. 
Prewar liberals tended to be preoccupied with the economy; those who 
sought a broader program were normally ignored if not persecuted. 
However, the reduction of economic hardship combined with America's new 
world position to allow liberals to broaden their objectives and thus 
gain new supporters. 
Having endured first the Great Depression then a war of unequalled 
destruction, both physically and psychologically, postwar liberals 
determined to strive for a new and better world. As did conservatives, 
liberals wanted peace, but liberals believed peace was possible only if 
the United States cooperated with the Soviet Union, and only if the 
United States worked with and within the United Nations. An activist 
American government was to preserve that peace. Unlike conservatives, 
liberals wanted that same government to maintain the prosperity which 
the war had brought to America. Full employment; governmental 
regulation of the economy; a fair share of America's wealth for its 
producers--farmers and workers; and governmental guarantees of 
employment, decent housing, and medical protection; plus an extension 
of traditional New Deal programs such as the Tennessee Valley 
Authority--all these were the liberal consensus.9 Even Southern 
liberals were willing to support most of the program, objecting to the 
extent but not necessarily the concept of federal activism. But there 
was one area of change for which white Southerners of all philosophies 
had little tolerance. 
Northern liberals, faced with the wartime contradiction of fighting 
for justice and democracy while denying both to a sizeable number of 
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American citizens, determined that one of their major postwar goals was 
to be racial equality. Elimination of the poll tax, reduction of Jim 
Crowism, and enactment of federal anti-lynching legislation were all 
elements of the liberal program. But the primary goal of liberals who 
sought to bring black Americans into equality with whites was the 
establishment of equal economic opportunity for all. The means of 
gaining that goal was the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC). 
Southern opposition to the national liberals' FEPC, at least the 
opposition of men such as Hays, was not antipathy to justice for blacks.· 
The Southern liberal opposition rested on differing traditions and an 
alternative set of assumptions about man and society. The long-enduring 
faith of Southerners in the superiority of local or state action to 
federal interference was so ingrained that it required no conscious 
rationalization. It was as habitual as the belief in the salvageability 
of most people and the corollary that the more fortunate had an 
obligation to use their success as a means of helping their less 
fortunate neighbors, white and black. Paternalism and skepticism about 
the efficacy of solutions from the distant and impersonal government in 
Washington, D.C., were the bases for Southern opposition to the FEPC. 
That position endured severe testing from the new liberalism in the 
battle which began to develop even before Hays went to Washington, D.C., 
in 1943.10 
In 1941 there appeared in Alabama the League to Maintain White 
Supremacy. Stimulus for its appearance was the increasing 
radicalization of black Americans. A. Phillip Randolph led the fight 
against white discrimination, and his threatened march on Washington 
forced Franklin D. Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 8802. 
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Establishing the Fair Employment Practices Commission, that order 
appeared to many blacks the "most significant document ••• since the 
Emancipation Proclamation," and the successes of the temporary body were 
such that liberal white and black activists began a campaign for a 
permanent FEPc.11 
In September of 1943, Randolph founded the National Council for a 
Permanent FEPC, an organization which gained the sympathetic support of 
such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewish 
Community, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP), and the Urban League. But the effort fell short. 
According to Walter White of the NAACP, "the Congress thought it more 
important to recess in order to participate in political 
campaigns ••• than to take action for the protection of hum.an lives and 
destinies."12 In other words, politics came first. 
Then it was convention time. In 1944 the Democratic platform 
included support for the United Nations, Israel, and the World Court, as 
well as guaranteed prices and crop insurance for farmers. It even 
advocated an Equal Rights Amendment. The civil rights plank read as 
follows: 
We believe that racial and religious minorities have the right 
to live, develop and vote equally with all citizens and share 
the rights that are guaranteed by our constitution. Congress 
should exert its full constitutional powers to protect those 
rights.13 
But congress declined to take up even such a weak challenge, preferring 
to move in the opposite direction. 
At first the temporary FEPC was financed from the President's 
Emergency Fund. In 1945 the Independent Offices Appropriations Act 
eliminated that procedure by requiring that congress appropriate funds 
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for all such agencies. In that year the House Appropriations Committee 
denied funding to the FEPC. Only after compromise with the Senate was 
the FEPC funded and then only at one-half of its request. The final 
legislation specified that the FEPC was to have no money after June 30, 
1946. Thus the congress effectively abolished the FEPc.14 
On September 6, 1945, Harry S. Truman presented to the congress his 
Twenty-one Points, a list of legislative demands. Having given only 
faint support to the attempt to keep the temporary FEPC alive, Truman 
repeated an earlier request that "legislation be enacted placing the 
FEPC on a permanent basis."15 The New Left historian, Baron Bernstein, 
has noted that Truman's "efforts specifically on behalf of the Negro 
were occasional ~nd usua.lly ambiguous. "16 An earlier critic of the 
president wrote in the Pittsburgh Courier of September 22, 1945, that 
"there is as yet no evidence that he has tried to use any of his great 
power to bring pressure on the recalcitrant Southern Senators and 
Representatives," who were so successfully hamstringing every attempt to 
revive the FEPc.17 Having avoided a strong stand when the FEPC bill 
died in the House Rules Committee in June of 1945, Truman merely 
complained that the congress was strangling the FEPC when the Senate 
killed another bill by filibuster in January and February of 1946. 
Truman's complaints rang hollow when placed alongside his refusal even 
to meet with FEPC supporters such as White and Randolph.18 
Having failed in congress, Truman established the President's 
Committee on Civil Rights on December 5, 1946. Executive Order 9898 
authorized that body to of fer suggestions to Truman concerning "the 
adoption or establishment, by legislation or otherwise, of more adequate 
and effective means and procedures for the protection of the civil 
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rights" of Americans.19 The committee issued its report in 1947, a doc-
ument entitled To Secure These Rights. The report called for anti-poll 
tax measures, a federal voting law, and other liberal measures, includ-
ing a permanent FEPC. Southern reaction was more negative than not. 
Some warned that the report would promote anarchy and rape. Others 
reminded the public that Southern whites knew best what was good for 
"their" blacks. There seemed to be strong agreement that any action on 
the report would be political suicide for Truman. The president decided 
to sit the fence again. Even Hays noted that the time was not auspi-
cious for action. Although he regarded the Southern reaction as overly 
emotional, Hays suggested a halt in activity. For him, no progress was 
possible in such a heated environment.20 No progress occurred. With 
liberals and Southern Democrats increasingly hostile to one another, 
Truman's middle course simply led nowhere in 1947. In 1948 the pres-
ident found himself in the uncomfortable position of straddling a fence 
which was being torn down from both sides. 
In their convention of 1948, the Democrats sought to avoid a split 
on civil rights. They tried to keep the plank of 1944 which had been 
merely a collection of generalities. But the platform committee 
included a young liberal from Minnesota, Hubert Humphrey, who demanded 
as a minimum that the Democrats support the findings of the presidential 
commission. He demanded the abolition of the poll tax in federal elec-
tions, a federal anti-lynch law, desegregation of the armed forces, and 
a permanent FEPC. Moderates recognized that any such platform would 
further alienate already unhappy Southerners. The platform committee 
repudiated Humphrey and sent a compromise plank to the convention floor. 
Southern conservatives were unwilling by then to accept even a warmed 
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over version of the plank of 1944. Southern delegates called for an 
affirmation of states' rights. Provoked, the liberals reacted by accep-
ting Humphrey's plank by a voice vote. The Dixiecrats bolted. In 1948 
the Democratic platform included a "call upon the Congress to support 
our President" in the areas of "full and equal political participation," 
non-discrimination in the armed forces, "security of person," and equal 
employment opportunity.21 
With many liberals having joined Henry Wallace's progressives, most 
analysts held that the Democrats faced almost certain defeat after the 
Dixiecrats left. The solid South faced a clear threat from the split. 
People like Governor Ben Laney of Arkansas, who "remonstrated against 
the usurpation of federal power" involved in Truman's civil rights plan, 
were a danger to the party regulars, Sid McMath, William Fulbright, and 
Brooks Hays.22 Typical of.Southern Democrats, "Representative Brooks 
Hays, liberal Arkansas leader, had no enthusiasm for the civil rights 
program(,) but he saw nothing to be gained by bolting the party."23 
The third and fourth party threats failed to materialize; then, despite 
Thomas Dewey's optimism, the Democratic candidate won the general 
election. 
To some, the election was a mandate for Truman's civil rights prog-
ram. Truman believed so. Having moved to the left during the campaign, 
Truman was under the influence of white liberals and blacks who believed 
that their maximum proposals were their minimum demand. The left 
refused to compromise, but political reality required compromise if any 
program were to become law. After the elections of 1948, the executive 
was in liberal hands, but the legislature was dominated by a coalition 
of Southern Democrats and Republicans. The conservatives managed to 
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kill even Richard Russell's civil rights compromise, a bill which called 
for a constitutional amendment to kill the poll tax, state anti-lynch 
measures, and a voluntary FEPc.24 Even weak legislation was too strong. 
Sixteen FEPC bills died in the House Education and Labor Committee 
during the session of 1948. The Senate was inhospitable, especially 
after internal rulings made cloture more difficult in 1948.25 But 
Truman and the left determined to continue the struggle. In April of 
1949, the board of directors of the NAACP declared "the priority of FEPC 
over all other legislation on civil rights."26 On April 28 Senator J. 
Howard McGrath introduced the administration's civil rights package 
while Adam Clayton Powell sponsored FEPC legislation in the House. 
Testimony before the Powell committee illustrated the problem of 
enacting legislation in a 'hostile environment. 
The Powell bill included a provision that the FEPC have power to 
issue cease and desist orders to violators.27 That was too much for 
many witnesses. Congressman Charles E. Bennett of Florida objected to 
"a lot of pretty wild people, with pretty long hair" who were trying to 
destroy Southern democracy, and Republican Clare Hoffman of Michigan 
said that some backers of the bill wanted to promote intermingling and 
some were seeking intermarriage. The bill had many supporters as well. 
Mike Masaoka of the Japanese-American Citizens League noted that discri-
mination continued in California which had no FEPC while in New York 
which had a FEPC there was little overt discrimination. A spokesman for 
the NAACP testified about the benefits for both North and South, and a 
representative of the State Department noted that the legislation would 
be beneficial to American foreign affairs.28 Committee member Thomas H. 
Burke of Ohio was willing to support milder sanctions, a "switch in the 
closet or a club in the corner."29 Even the threat of punishment was 
too much for Hays who said: 
••• if there is a penalty provision in the FEPC law, we have 
created a fear in the hearts of millions of people and it 
would be a tragic reversal of this trend toward justice, lead-
ing us to racial frictions rather than allaying them.30 
Hays had an alternative, the Arkansas Plan. 
As early as 1945 Hays foreshadowed the Arkansas Plan when he 
debated Charles Lafollette of Indiana on the issue of the FEPC. 
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Lafollette took the liberal position in saying that "we are not attemp-
ting with this legislation to eliminate prejudice. Prejudice is some-
thing which sits in the inside of people." But to Lafollette it was 
possible to eliminate the overt display of prejudice, discrimination. 
He argued that "people will come closer together when they know there is 
behind a Federal agency a power eventually to enforce action, to pro-
hibit discrimination," as was the case when management accepted organ-
ized labor after the federal government forced the two sides to meet 
together.31 
Hays disagreed. In the first place, "The situation which our 
opponents approach in terms of fair employment and with a legalistic 
instrument we approach in terms of full employment and with the consent 
of the community as its vehicle." Arguing the impossibility of 
legislating morality, Hays compared the FEPC with prohibition and anti-
evolution laws, saying, "it will crash ••• upon the rock of popular 
resistance." Finally, Hays said that the very concept on which the FEPC 
rested was erroneous. According to Hays, "What the Negro really needs 
in the realm of civic and economic life as distinguished from social 
pursuits is a lessening of his race connection" and any process whereby 
a man was to be reinstated by the FEPC due to race would intensify the 
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"race connection" and, thus, the problem.32 As Hays argued in a later 
confrontation with Vito Marcantonio of New York, liberals were "forcing 
the Negro to judge all legislation by its contribution to breaking down 
the barriers of segregation rather than by its contributions to his gen-
eral welfare as a citizen of the United States", and Hays preferred to 
keep economic improvement as separate as possible from racial matters.33 
After the elections of. 1948, with the chasm between liberals and 
Southern Democrats widening, the moderate Hays sought to bring the two 
sides together. In February of 1949, Hays revealed his compromise, the 
Arkansas Plan. Noting that a year had passed in futility since Truman 
sent his proposals to Congress, Hays stated that such a lack of success 
might indicate flaws in the program. One flaw obvious to Hays was that 
some of the president's so-called civil rights were actually "social 
aspirations," matters of state and local prerogative. Approaching the 
matter as Stephen Douglas had Henry Clay's Omnibus Bill, Hays said, "If 
an answer to the difficult problem involved in the proposals is found we 
must study the problem in sections." He expressed regret that "the 
recommendations have been submitted as one proposal--impinging as they 
do upon an infinite variety of human relations and involving widely 
different legal questions."34 
The first element of the president's plan was the desegregation of 
the armed forces. The Arkansas Plan defined that matter as already 
resolved. Changes in the policies of the various services and the 
Supreme Court's rulings invalidating segregation of common carriers made 
that aspect irrelevant, especially as, according to Hays, "under the 
Constitution the question of segregation was largely a state matter.·35 
The president also sought to eliminate the poll tax by federal law. 
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As a Jeffersonian liberal, Hays believed that the Federal Government 
lacked the power to make such a law. For him the only means of 
transferring state powers to the national government was by amending the 
Constitution. Hays said, "While I do not like the tax, I think it is a 
reasonable exercise of States' rights and I do not think that there is 
any substantial impairment of citizen rights to vote." However, should 
change be necessary, modification of Section 2, Article 1 of the 
Constitution was the correct procedure, not a "Congressional statute 
[which] might become a precedent for further federal intervention in 
election machinery."36 
Anti~lynching legislation was another element of the president's 
plan. Hays sought a highly restrictive law which would allow federal 
intervention only as a last resort. In effect, after a lynching, the 
federal government had to wait until local delay and apathy made a 
successful federal prosecution virtually impossible. Hays noted that 
membership in a lynch mob was a violation of state law, and the need for 
federal intervention in such matters arose only if the state was clearly 
not acting in good faith in prosecuting violators. The need for active 
federal intervention was also minimal because lynching was largely a 
historical phenomenon by 1949. Hays said, "I have lived in communities 
where lynchings have occured (sic), first as a boy 40 years ago and as a 
young man in another community about 25 years ago." Those experiences 
convinced Hays that such acts were the perpetrations of lawless people 
for whom federal law was no deterrent. For Hays the only useful law was 
one which stipulated that "violence to become a Federal offense must be 
committed for the purpose of taking the person's life."37 
Finally, Hays addressed the matter of the FEPC. Truman wanted a 
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Federal agency with investigative and enforcement powers. Hays sought, 
as he said, to 
••• model an educational and voluntary program after the 
program for handicapped workers in an attempt to induce those 
who framed industrial policies • • • to adopt policies that 
would advance us toward the ideal of equality. [Anything more 
was sure to] cause deep cleavages between the races in 
38 Southern states • • • • 
Citing the words of Abraham Lincoln of October 16, 1854, Hays 
said, "A universal feeling, whether well or ill-founded, cannot be 
safely disregarded." Thus, to Brooks Hays the FEPC should be " a coun-
seling service to work for non-discrimination in industry."39 Such was 
the Arkansas Plan, an illusion of reform which in reality changed 
nothing. 
The plan won the endorsement of Richard Russell. Even Lester 
Granger of the Urban League liked the anti-lynching and poll tax 
features because he preferred something, however weak, to nothing. But 
the plan had no chance. Truman's response on hearing of the Arkansas 
Plan was to ignore it. By that time he was personally and politically 
committed to his own plan and sympathetic to civil rights advocates such 
as Thomas L. Stokes who held the view that "basic rights guaranteed in 
the Constitution [had been] compromised since the Civil War.40 Among 
other weaknesses, one flaw in the Arkansas Plan was that compromise was 
no longer possible. 
The Arkansas Plan died in committee. No civil rights bill passed 
in 1949. The administration decided to delay any further action to 
1950. In January of 1950, the National Emergency Civil Rights 
Mobilization held a rally attended by 4,000 participants from the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, B'nai B'rith, the Americans for 
Democratic Action, Greek-letter fraternities, and the National Baptist 
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Convention, among others. Participants determined to stress FEPC legis-
lation in 1950. At the same time Truman made his firmest conimitment to 
the FEPCe He met with Hays and reaffirmed the non-negotiability of 
his civil rights program. He asked black leaders to the White House 
and promised them a vote on the FEPC "if it takes all summer. Finally, 
he stated at a news conference of January 27 that "My compromise is in 
my civil-rights message ... 41 
The FEPC bill ran into initial opposition from Sam Rayburn, but its 
supporters maneuvered the bill past him. The bill passed the house 240 
to 177 after Samuel K. McConnell, Pennslyvania Republican, amended it to 
eliminate enforcement provisions. However, the bill died in the Senate 
when cloture failed. No new attempt to pass FEPC legislation occurred 
for nearly a decade. Some of the reasons for the failure of the cam-
paign for the FEPC were declining interest in civil rights, increasing 
concern with the Marshall Plan and McCarthyism, and reduction of liberal 
Democratic strength in the congressional elections of 1950. Even Hays 
voted against the McConnell Bill.42 His political safety required it. 
Civil rights agitation was unfashionable in Arkansas in 1950. In 
the race for governor that year both candidates, including Sid McMath 
who was more liberal than Hays in 1948, opposed "FEPC, socialized 
medicine, and the centralization of political power in Washington." 
·Like Hays, both were states' rights oriented but not especially racist; 
prior to the Brown decisions, "blacks were typically both neglected and 
very largely forgotten in campaigns for governor."43 
By 1952 the Democrats were clearly on the defensive. The 
Republican platform charged them with selling out China, illegal war in 
Korea; and "tragic blunders" at Yalta and Potsdam. The Democratic civil 
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rights plank was a mere restatement of that of 1948. The Republicans 
allowed the federal government to protect civil rights within its 
borders but reaffirmed the primacy of the states within their confines. 
The Republicans won, of course, and the crusade for the FEPC was ended. 
By 1956, a year in which Hays played a major role in drafting the 
platform, the Democrats were saying that "the Party of Jefferson and 
Jackson pledges itself to continued support of those sound principles of 
local government which will best serve the welfare of our people and the 
safety of our democratic rights."44 The major parties abandoned the 
FEPC, but some minor progress occurred. 
On December 3, 1951, Truman's Executive Order 10308. established the 
Committee on Government Contract Compliance, a committee which served 
as the model for similar agencies in the administrations of Dwight 
Eisenhower and John Kennedy. The efficacy of those bodies became 
apparent in a report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 
1961. The report stated that both government and non-government 
contractors continued to hire in keeping with local usage. When in the 
midst of discrimination, forget equal opportunity. In 1969 the 
Department of Defense reportedly gave contracts to firms which continued 
to discriminate.45 
Hays continued in congress until his defeat after the Little Rock 
crisis of 1958. He stood by hi.s section in signing the Southern 
Manifesto and in defeating the civil rights legislation sought by 
Eisenhower in 1956, and he fell in defeat with his section when the 
administration won passage of the weak Civil Rights Act of 1957.46 
Throughout his congressional career Hays was consistent in his 
opposition to federal civil rights legislation despite an active 
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commitment to equal opportunity for blacks. Had he done otherwise, he 
might have been a former congressman much earlier. 
Aside from civil rights, another key interest of Hays as a typical 
Southern congressman was foreign affairs. As early as 1944, he and 
Walter Judd of Minnesota made a junket to England to discuss with the 
American ambassador and parliamentary leaders the need for cooperation 
in the postwar years. It was a fairly innocuous venture into foreign 
affairs, as was Hays' introduction of a resolution on March 14, 1945. 
Acting on the suggestion of a friend in Little Rock, Hays attempted to 
have the name of Iwo Jima changed to Marines Island as a commemoration 
of the noble effort put forth there. Hays also introduced legislation 
to create a memorial for Ernie Pyle, the war correspondent who died in 
action. Both bills died in committee, as did his amendment to the G.I. 
Bill of Rights. The intent of that amendment was to empower the 
administrator of the veterans' educational program to restrict access to 
colleges to only those within the serviceman's home state. Only when 
certain institutions became overcrowded due to their popularity with 
returned G.I.s was the administrator to invoke the rule. Other bills 
which disappeared into the gulf of the congressional committee system 
included one which called for a memorial to the dead of the Marine Corps 
to be built in Washington, D.C., and one which attempted to provide 
federal funds for tombstones for deceased veterans. Even Hays' bill to 
aid returning veterans to adjust to civilian life died in committee, as 
did his concurrent resolution calling for the creation of a joint 
congressional committee to develop a policy for the occupation of the 
defeated nations. Hays' primary contribution was his support for laws 
to continue the financing of the war, as was the case when he voted with 
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the majority in the 79th congress to extend the defense act of 1941. 
Hardly embroiled in controversy, Hays was one of the 354 congressmen who 
voted "aye," while only 28 opposed. Equally non-controversial was the 
resolution which Hays introduced and the house passed unanimously to 
have Douglas McArthur address a joint session of congress if he should 
be in Washington, D.c.47 Hays' contribution in the area of foreign 
affairs or war-related matters during his first few congresses was not 
of major historical importance, but it was sufficient to maintain his 
popularity with the patriotic constituents of his district. 
More significant was his advocacy of an effective program for the 
postwar recovery of the war-damaged regions. On September 20, 1947, he 
wrote to Truman that the congress had need tQ act quickly to stabilize 
the European economy. Hays asked the president to call a special 
session because the problem was severe. He wrote, 
One does not have to believe that a collapse of Western Europe 
during the coming winter is inevitable--though many do so 
believe--to hold that the United States must do all within 
our [sic] power to prevent widespread suffering and distress 
among the European Nations.48 
Such aid required congressional authorization, and congress needed the 
extra time which a special session would allow so that it could 
deliberate without undue haste or distraction. Hays gave a similar 
report to a constituent in October. Hays explained to president J. R. 
Grant of Ouachita College that Europe needed to produce to recover, and 
the people needed some incentive to work harder. Also, to make foreign 
aid palatable to an Arkansan whose patriotism tended to wane when his 
money rather than his blood was at stake, Hays pointed out that congress 
and the United States had the right as well as the obligation to 
specify conditions and monitor the recovery plans. Hays then appealed 
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to the conscience of the president of the Arkansas Baptist college. He 
explained that the situation was ·one which went beyond the question of 
the legitimacy of American aid. The issue was emergency relief, a 
humanitarian concern. Admittedly hunger was not yet epidemic, but it 
was highly probable that it could be so by the next winter. Wheat 
supplies were disappearing, and, in combination with cold, the 
inevitable hunger when they. were gone would cause sufficient desperation 
that Europeans might turn to the Communists. Hays mentioned 
specifically that Russia would probably use its wheat as a bargaining 
counter in its negotiati9ns for communist governments.49 Hays 
understood how to appeal to the folks back home; he skillfully used 
morality and the specter of Communism and tossed in a bit of government 
control and fiscal respons"ibility, and he managed to sell the package. 
Truman agreed with his position too. On November 17, 1947, a 
special session of congress approved emergency aid to China, Italy, 
France, and Austria. Despite initial concern that the isolationists 
might stop the bill, passage came by an overwhelming margin. That vote 
was regarded by Hays as an auspicious sign for the impending decision on 
the Marshall Plan. He was right. George Marshall's design for European 
recovery by means of collective planning and American financing 
encountered problems because it proposed massive expenditures--$17 
billion over a period of approximately four years--and because of 
concern that it might provoke Russian opposition. However, the plan won 
:.,.. 
speedy passage after a successful communist seizure of power in 
Czechoslovakia in early 1948 and Russia's coercion of Finland into an 
alliance at the same time. Those who feared to provoke Russia had no 
more credibility, and the apparent spread of "monolithic Communism" 
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convinced those who had preferred to save their money. The plan passed 
the house by 329 to 74 and the senate by 69 to 19. The European economy 
stabilized due to the more than $10 billion which the Marshall Plan 
provided it, and the iron curtain descended to separate the monolith 
from its potential victims.SO· 
Although Europe seemed to be safe, the rest of the world was still 
vulnerable as the cold war intensified. Alliances and financial 
assistance failed to save China; even the government of the United 
States was not exempt, as several spectacular revelations of Communists 
in high places seemed to indicate in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
The stalemate in Korea illustrated to some that force was not the total 
solution. Communism appeared only containable, not beatable, and the 
crisis which resulted from the seeming indomitability of the hostile 
force allowed the rise of men such as Joseph McCarthy, the Wisconsin 
witchhunter. Hays addressed the issue of McCarthyism at least once, 
that coming in 1954. Speaking before the Young Democrats of Florida, he 
claimed that the Democrats were victims of unfair calumniation by the 
opposition. Some members of the opposing party were charging that the 
postwar situation was due to the preference of the American people for 
Democrats. Hays preferred to blame the Russian government for creating 
the tensions which were leading some.Americans into a return to 
isolationism, the old method o~ avoiding world problems. Hays then 
verbally retreated; noting that the attackers were not true Republicans. 
Also, he indicated that he regarded them as a problem which the 
Republicans, not the Democrats, had to correct if there were to be 
Democratic participation in foreign policy, an area which Hays believed 
should be a bi-partisan concern.SI 
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Eventually the Republicans disposed of McCarthy, and Hays was again 
able to support the foreign policy of Dwight Eisenhoewr. In late 1954 a 
crisis which appeared possibly to be another Korea was developing in 
Formosa, the island refuge of nationalist Chinese which the Communist 
Chinese seemed ready to invade. To indicate that the president was 
committed to the protection of Formosa and that he had the support of 
his people, the congress passed 410 to 3 in the House and 85 to 3 in the 
Senate the Formosa Resolution. That resolution was a blank check given 
by congress to the president which empowered him to protect the island 
by any means, including armed force, that he might deem necessary. To 
Hays the.decision of the Democrats to support Eisenhower was a positive 
sign, and the decision of the president to request such a resolution was 
wise. Faced with such a hawkish and united posture on the part of the 
United States, Communist China took no military action.52 
The bi-partisan Hays won over the president. In 1955 he became a 
member of the American delegation at the United Nations. In April of 
that year, he debated Chester Gross on CBS. Describing the U.N. as the 
.. best hope of a stabilized world and a permanent peace," Hays cited Iran 
and Israel as two instances in which the U.N. had kept the peace; then 
he encountered Gross' contention that the U.N. should be eliminated 
because it erred or failed on occasion. As he told Gross, "you wouldn't 
say that because American policy has been subject to criticism that the 
United States should be dissoved and ••• attacked ...... 53 Hays 
also helped in the passage of the legislation which continued the Mutual 
Security Administration in 1955, and he supported the futile efforts of 
Eisenhower to gain a disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union. At 
the same time he continued his concern with the dangers of Soviet 
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expansionism to the underdeveloped areas of the world.54 
Speaking to a group of U.N •. supporters in 1956, he reflected on the 
improved state of relations with the Soviet Union after the collapse of 
McCarthyism. Noting his pleasure that the Soviets had shifted to an 
emphasis on economic and educational competition, Hays nevertheless 
remained firm as a cold warrior. He said that the United States must 
continue to help the underdeveloped areas and that it must increase its 
use of the U.N. as a channel for that aid. Otherwise the third world 
might fall into the trap of thinking that aid from the Soviets was 
possible without any accompanying Soviet influence. The United States 
had to compete in its areas of strength so that the potential victims of 
the Soviets would remain aware that there was an alternative.SS 
His final effort on ~ehalf of foreign affairs came in April on 
1957. Hays led the fight to pass a bill which allowed Great Britain to 
defer seven yearly payments on its war loan. Backed by both Eisenhower 
and Sam Rayburn, the bill passed the house by a vote of 218 to 167. 
Rayburn said of Hays, "the explanation of this bill by the gentleman 
from Arkansas was the clearest, best and most convincing by any member 
of Congress in this session."56 
Equally satisfying, although unspectacular and often unsuccessful, 
was Hays' service on behalf of domestic legislation. In 1943 he sup-
ported the amendment to the antiracketeering law of 1934, an amendment 
which strengthened the earlier legislation but failed to solve the prob-
lem. As a good Southerner, he opposed the bill to increase the debt 
ceiling, but proponents prevailed 268 to 129. He was also in the 
minority when the agriculture department appropriations bill for 1944 
was amended to exclude incentive payments, and he failed to get flood 
131 
relief or shipments of feed to disaster areas, but his attempts showed 
his concern for the special needs of this district so he faced no 
political danger from being on the losing side.57 In the next congress, 
after automatic re-election, he continued to fail as creator of 
legislation. His bill to allow the continuation of rural rehabilitation 
projects died in committee in 1945, his attempt to create fact-finding 
boards for the investigation of labor disputes fell to defeat the same 
year, and the resolution "requesting the President of the United States 
to issue a proclamation on Mother's Day expressing our love and 
reverence for motherhood" died in committee in 1946. 58 
On the brighter side, Hays supported the Employment Act of 1946, 
the law which established the President's Council of Economic Advisors 
and the Joint Congressional Economic Committee. By a vote of 322 to 84, 
the House passed the bill which established federal responsibility for 
employment, production, and buying power. Also in 1946 he won backing 
from Henry Wallace for his proposed legislation to authorize that the 
Commerce Department collect and transmit commerical and industrial data 
to businesses. At the same time he lobbied with his colleagues for 
passage of housing legislation essential to the postwar readjustment of 
the United States because it authorized increased federal assistance in 
the construction of badly needed homes for a newly prosperous nation. 
He backed labor by opposing Taft-Hartley in 1947, and he tried to take 
care of his constituents by attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to get 
federal funding for the construction of buildings to house agricultural 
agents in areas where agriculture was a major source of employment, 
Arkansas for instance.59 In 1950 and 1951 he attempted to establish 
federal responsibility for employment assistance to minorities, and in 
1951 he sought to extend coverage of Social Security to employees 
already covered by state and local retirement systems. In 1951, as 
well, he reintroduced his bill to allow federal financing of county 
agricultural buildings. 
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In 1953 Hays failed to exempt intrastate shipments of goods which 
crossed state lines in transit from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, a clear reversal of his pro-labor stance in the Taft-Hartley vote 
because his proposal would have allowed exemption from the minimum wage 
law for those who handled the affected intrastate shipments. Also, 
Hays' drought relief bill of that year failed to attract support. And 
in 1955 Hays tried unsuccessfully to create legislation for federal aid 
to school construction. But the most important piece of domestic 
legislation for his district came from others. In 1948 congress 
authorized the modification of the Arkansas River to make it navigable 
up to Tulsa. In 1955 the project had developed to the point that money 
was authorized for construction of the Dardanelle Dam, the barrier which 
made Russellville into a resort town. But when Hays described the 
benefits of the project to the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce in the 
election year, 1956, he said, "navigation will give us a share in the 
Nation's industrial growth ••• population losses can thereby be 
arrested," and the area could enjoy the benefits of cheap 
transportation--a means of exploitation of Arkansas' bauxite, lumber, 
coal, minerals, and agriculture.60 A good congressman gave direct 
benefits to the voters. 
The final key to successful service as a congressman was party 
loyalty. Way back in 1948 when the Dixiecrats ran amok, Hays and 
Arkansas' other liberals kept the voters in the Democratic column. Hays 
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even advocated compromise to heal the breach. He called on Truman to be 
moderate, Hays believing the Dixiecrats were sure to cooperate. He even 
had nice words for the bolters, indicating that they had some worthy 
objectives, even if their methods were wrong. He helped Arkansas to 
remain loyal in 1952 when no state outside the South gave its electoral 
votes to Adlai Stevenson. And he campaigned for his party's loser in 
1956. His big speech came at Birmingham, Alabama, on November 1, 1956. 
At Birmingham, Hays abandoned his bi-partisan approach, saying, "We 
cannot afford to permit the Republican Party to continue to lead us in a 
policy of drift in foreign affairs and stagnation in domestic affairs." 
Fortunately, there was an alternative; Hays described Stevenson as the 
best qualified candidate since Woodrow Wilson. Especially attractive 
was the fact that Stevenson was a man of principle. Hays used as his 
example of Republican duplicity the old struggle for the FEPC. He 
said: 
While the Republican members of Congress were making a mockery 
of the Civil rights issue, the President indicated his 
opposition to the Powell Amendment because it damaged the 
cause of Federal aid to education. Now we find the proponents 
of the Powell Amendment embracing the President, who no longer 
sees any such dangers in extraneous amendments. 0 1 
Obviously the solution to the problem of unprincipled politics was to 
elect Stevenson. Unfortunately, Hays went ignored in the North. 
Stevenson carried only seven states, all in the South. Alabama and 
Arkansas remained among the faithful. 
Faithful--that was the perfect word to describe Hays. As a 
congressman he remained full of faith, and as might be expected, used 
his position to spread the word about the value of religion. He had 
done so throughout his career. When the problems of poverty came to be 
superseded by the rise of threats to world peace, Hays remained a 
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spokesman for the Christian way. In September of 1940, Hays was 
attending a meeting sponsored by the National Conference of Christians 
and Jews, one of his long-time affiliations; simultaneously Rumania 
eliminated all of her Baptist Churches. That a state was able simply by 
decree to eliminate the outward sign of one entire denomination was a 
clear indicator of the fragile condition of religion in a hostile world. 
It was a message to Hays that he and his co-religionists had best 
abandon their narrow doctrinal prejudices. They must, if only for 
self-preservation, enter the fight for another oppressed religious 
group, the Jews, no matter where they might be. Too many Baptists and 
other Christians failed to grasp the danger, and in 1944 Congressman 
Hays had to report to his people in Arkansas that "Somewhere, somehow, 
Christian forces failed in Europe ... 62 At the same time Hays expressed 
concern about the rehabilitation of European churches in the postwar 
world. His concern remained despite his meeting with a Baptist in 
Paris who reported that 2,000 French Baptists had managed to remain 
organized, even with the difficulties of the war. And his concern 
remained despite the meeting he had with J. H. Rushbrooke, president of 
the Baptist World Alliance, and M. E. Aubrey, secretary of the Baptist 
Union, a meeting at which Aubrey reported that "the free churches are 
maintaining a united defense of our· concept of religious freedom," and 
trying to keep religion free from political cont~ol.63 
On his trip t9 Europe in 1944, Hays found a Bible and a devotional 
written in German. Several years later he found the opportunity to 
return the books, but the German churchman to whom they belonged asked 
Hays to keep them as a reminder that Christianity was a force 
unrestricted by political borders.64 That even a representative of 
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those who had failed in the years of war was able to remember the 
Christian message had to encourage Hays about the revival of 
Christianity after the holocaust. Equally exciting as a symbol of the 
strength of religion was one of the last controversial but most typical 
of Hays' legislative actions. 
In 1949 Mike Monroney of Oklahoma asked Hays to sponsor a 
resolution for the creation of a prayer room in the capitol. Approval 
was unanimous, and in 1955 congress finally gained a suitable place to 
gain the spiritual support Hays always advocated for its members.65 The 
congressmen had a private place in which not 
••• to determine through prayer a course ·of expediency and 
success but rather to find in resort to spiritual resources 
the answer to the question that stirs the heart of more public 
men perhaps than the people know, namely, 'What is right? 1 66 
In 1957 and 1958 Hays had his greatest opportunity to answer that 
question. 
After 15 years' service as a competent if not brilliant 
congressman, Hays was secure. He had maintained his reputation as a 
reformer, the Arkansas Plan did that. At the same time, he had stayed 
loyal to the region, taking a safe internationalist stance in foreign 
affairs, continuing to work for economic improvement in his state, and 
not alienating too many constituents. Politically he had little to 
fear. At the same time he continued as a party regular, supporting the 
proper bills and working with the leadership. Indicative of his 
security was the presence of token or no opposition in virtually every 
re-election campaign. But that all ended in 1958. 
While Hays was enjoying the congressional life, a crisis arose in 
his district. Integration became a more important question than any 
other in 1957 and 1958. True to form, Hays attempted to serve as the 
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conciliator, the negotiator between the opposing sides. Lacking a 
commitment to either position, he seemed a natural choice. But the man 
in the middle of ten finds himself in a crossfire and has to make a 
choice. Little Rock was the pivotal test of the legitimacy of Hays' 
image as a moderate. 
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CHAPTER VI 
LITTLE ROCK, CRISIS, AND DEFEAT 
On September 24, 1957, acting under orders from President Dwight 
David Eisenhower, 1,000 federal troops arrived in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
to preserve the peace. For the first time since Reconstruction, the 
federal government used_its military power to protect the rights of 
black citizens. The crisis which precipitated such an extraordinary 
exercise of federal might by a president not known for his commitment to 
civil rights had its origins in the Brown decisions of 1954 and 1955, 
but the precipitating events were more immediate. What might have been 
an easily controlled situation blossomed into one of the most disgrace-
ful episodes in the history of Arkansas, and the primary reason for that 
escalation was the failure of all elements of leadership. Caught in the 
middle of the controversy because he believed in his responsibility to 
his constituents, Hays found himself not only unable to effect a compro-
mise but also--to his absolute surprise--unable to preserve his congres-
sional seat, a position which only a short time before had seemed a 
virtual sinecure. In the chaos which accompanied the desegregation of 
the public schools of Little Rock, Hays found that moderation on racial 
matters was no longer a tenable position when the civil rights 
revolution occurred. 
In the aftermath of the Brown decision of 1954 and the implementa-
tion decision of the next year, many school districts prepared to comply 
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with the law. Even in Arkansas there were strong indications that 
desegregation was to proceed peacefully. The school board of Hoxie, 
Arkansas, for example, chose to obey the decision, even fighting the 
segregationists in court when those opponents attempted to hinder or 
prevent implementation of the desegregation plan. With help in its law-
suit from the federal justice department, the school board of Hoxie won 
the right to desegregate. Other small districts in Arkansas desegre-
gated with even less difficulty. Timing was vital to peaceful 
desegregation, for opposition was hardening.I 
The segregationist crusade in Hoxie, although it failed, had impli-
cations for Little Rock. Organizations such as White America, Inc., 
and the White Citizens Council of Arkansas, dominated by its branch in 
Little Rock, appeared in reaction to the battle at Hoxie. After failing 
there, the groups consolidated their forces for the next conflict. That 
unification had implications beyond simply coordinating a collection of 
boisterous but basically inept reactionaries, for one of the prime tar-
gets of the segregationists was Orval Faubus. The governor resisted 
pressure from segregationists to interfere in the Hoxie case. However, 
as his opponents coalesced into a major political force, he yielded to 
the fears imposed by the possibility of his electoral defeat at the 
hands of unified racism.2 
Coincident with the weakening of the governor--a man whose previous 
record had includeq leadership in the desegregation of party and state 
offices--there occurred a more potentially dangerous development. That, 
of course, was the issuance of the "Southern Manifesto." When, in March 
of 1956, all but a handful of Southern representatives and senators 
declared their intent to resist by all means the "unconstitutional" 
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decree of the Supreme Court,3 those congressmen, including Hays and 
every other member of the delgation from Arkansas; gave legitimacy to 
those of their const~tuents whose opposition had previously rested for 
the most part on simple racism. Furthermore, by declaring their inten-
tion to pursue the same course as the Citizens Councils and similar 
groups, the elected representatives of the people of Arkansas gave no 
valid alternative model fo~ the people they theoretically represented. 
Racists had a new license to pursue the struggle, and the pressures on 
Faubus intensified. 
Despite their incr~asing strength, the segregationists appeared to 
be only a remote threat to peaceful compliance in Little Rock. The 
school board and its superintendent, Virgil Blossom, had agreed within a 
matter of days after the decision of 1954 that there was to be no diso-
bedience. Despite the dislike of many citizens for the ruling, there 
was general acceptance that obedience was necessary to maintain the 
image of their city as progressive, harmonious, and law-abiding. Also, 
the expectation was that only minimal desegregation was necessary for 
compliance. And the court's implementation decision that the process 
was to occur with "all deliberate speed" seemed to confirm that desegre-
gation had to take place only one minute step at a time. For a year the 
board surveyed public opinion, and its members addressed community 
groups. On May 24, 1955, with the support of even Dale Alford, the most 
ardent segregationist in the group, the board voted unanimously in favor 
of the "Blossom Plan." The plan anticipated desegregation first in the 
high schools. When that process proved a success, then junior high 
schools and finally elementary schools were to desegregate. The antici-
pated starting date was the school year 1957-1958, and completion had no 
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fixed date although a delay of several years appeared inevitable, and 
elementary desegregation was at least six years away from its beginning. 
Encouraging signs that the plan was acceptable included the dismissal by 
federal judge John E. Miller of a suit in which the NAACP sought to 
force the registration of more than two dozen black children in all-
white schools in January of 1956. Miller ruled that the district was 
moving in the direction of desegregation and, thus, was in compliance 
with the law. Even in early 1957 moderate integrationists defeated 
self-proclaimed segregationists for two positions on the school board.4 
While the deliberate process of desegregation appeared to be work-
ing well, a series of less promising developments cast a pall on the 
overly optimistic desegregationists. Backed by Attorney General Bruce 
Bennett, who had aspirations to replace Faubus in the gubernatorial man-
sion, the state legislature passed laws which clearly supported the ris-
ing tide of massive resistance. One of the so-called "segregation 
bills" created a State Sovereignty Commission as guarantor of the rights 
of the state. Another required the registration of organizations such 
as the Capitol City Citizens Council and the NAACP as well as their mem-
bers. (The intent was to identify integrationists, but segregationists 
had to be included or the bill was unconstitutional discrimination.) 
The two more important bills for those who advocated direct resistance 
provided that school attendance was no longer mandatory in desegregated 
schools and that local school boards had the power to use their funds to 
fight integration. Needing votes for his tax program and fearing the 
competition from Bennett, a man whose views more closely approximated 
those of the men who had helped Faubus into the governor's chair, the 
governor capitulated and signed all four bills. He was not yet 
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sufficiently converted to become their leader but he recognized the 
obvious. The segregationists were on the ascendancy, and their campaign 
intensified as the scheduled date of desegregation approached. In 
August the mother of a Central High School student sought a temporary 
injunction in Pulaski County Chancery Court against desegregation. 
Chancellor Murray Reade granted the injunction, primarily because Faubus 
testified at the hearing that desegregation would provoke violence, per-
haps bloodshed. The League of Central High School Mothers had its vic-
tory, and it had the governor. But a day later the federal district 
court of Ronald N. Davies overturned the injunction, enjoined any person 
from interfering with the Blossom Plan, and ordered desegregation on 
schedule. With the date only four days away, the crisis was nearly at 
hand.5 
The day before school was scheduled to open, September 2, Faubus 
declared a state of emergency and ordered the Arkansas National Guard to 
bar the nine black children from Central High. Judge Davies ordered 
desegregation to proceed. The school board sought a delay, citing ten-
sions which made education impossible, tensions which they had failed to 
anticipate and, as a result, were unable to prevent. Davies ordered 
integration to proceed. Faubus reiterated his order that the guard was 
to keep blacks out of Central High. Also, he asserted his duty to pro-
tect his state from unlawful usurpation of power by the federal govern-
ment, that is, Judge Davies. Davies sought an investigation by the 
justice department into Faubus' claim that the guard was necessary to 
prevent violence. On receipt of the report, Davies asked Atttorney 
General Herbert Brownell to request an injunction against the use of 
troops by the governor. Brownell complied, and Faubus received a 
summons to justify himself before Davies on September 20.6 In the 
interim Faubus met with Eisenhower at Newport, Rhode Island, on 
September 14. 
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At Newport, Brooks Hays became a major participant in the unfolding 
melodrama. In Washington, D.C., Hays read of the decision by Faubus to 
place troops at the school. To him the governor was preserving order 
but violating the law. A confrontation between state and federal 
authority seemed imminent to Hays. As representative of the fifth dis-
trict1 Hays regarded it as his responsibility to save the people of 
Little Rock from that confrontation. He returned home and talked to 
moderate friends. Then he determined to call Sherman Admas, adviser to 
Eisenhower and a friend of Hays from the time that they served in con-
gress together a decade earlier. Adams responded favorably to Hays' 
effort to arrange a meeting between Faubus and Eisenhower, especially 
after Hays indicated that the governor was not a rabid racist but rather 
was a rational man who faced a difficult situation. Adams agreed to 
study the proposal, and the telephone lines remained active for several 
days. After Hays amassed a telephone bill of $250.00, finally agreement 
came that Faubus was to send a telegram to Eisenhower. In the communi-
cation Faubus asked to see the president to discuss how the governor was 
to proceed in complying with the various court orders. The negotiations 
went slowly because Eisenhower wanted the message to contain the exact 
wording that he chose. Furthermore, after the message met the presiden-
tial specifications, an aide to Faubus raised objections which threat-
ened to destroy the negotiations. Hays, however, operated on the 
assumption that Faubus was not really as committed as were some of 
his followers. Presumably the governor was more concerned with his 
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political future and might accept the role of leader of those Southerners 
who established racial harmony, something consistent with his career 
until 1956. So Hays kept the lid on, and Faubus sent the telegram. 
When Eisenhower replied with an invitation to Faubus, the governor indi-
cated his appreciation of the negotiator by inviting Hays to attend the 
meeting at Newport.7 
The trip to Newport was slow, and Faubus was silent through much of 
the flight, brightening only when Hays described the potential historic 
redefinition of federal-state relationships which was the potential 
result of the meeting. Unfortunately, at Newport those hopes failed to 
materialize. Faubus and Eisenhower spoke privately for about ten to 
twenty minutes. When the conversation ended and the two joined Hays and 
Adams, Faubus appeared to be unhappy. However, as Faubus recalled the 
meeting nearly twenty years later, the governor had the better of the 
exchange. According to him, when he first met Eisenhower he received a 
lecture from the general," as if he were merely a lieutenant. Having 
listened to the list of restrictions and prohibitions, Faubus countered 
with a recitation of facts about Arkansas. For instance, the University 
of Arkansas had integrated several years before, and while Faubus was 
governor blacks had enrolled in all of the other state institutions of 
higher education. According to Faubus, _more schools were integrated in 
Arkansas than in eleven other Southern states combined, and both the 
Republicans and the Democrats had integated their state organizations, 
something done by no other Southern state up to that time. Faubus 
explained that many Arkansans felt that they deserved special considera-
tion for their progress rather than the singling out for opprobrium 
which they received when once they sought to delay. And Faubus told 
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Eisenhower that recognizably delay was not a solution, but it was a 
vital element in the efforts to avert the impending crisis. As he 
described the situation, the integrationists had forced Little Rock to 
become an example for the South. By doing so they had forced the segre-
gationists to counter with intensified efforts as resistance. Each side 
escalated its commitment until both had too much at stake to back down, 
and the only way to avoid the clash was to delay further movement toward 
integration. The.lull was to provide time for each side to retreat 
gracefully to a more flexible position. According to Faubus, the presi-
dent appreciated the situation, especially when Faubus couched it in 
terms of a military campaign, and Eisenhower appeared willing to con-
sider delay as a viable option. The possibility became greater when 
the two joined Hays who confirmed the report of progress in Arkansas.8 
At that point the possibility for a successful compromise at Newport 
appeared bright. Then Brownell entered the conversation. 
According to both Hays and Faubus, when Eisenhower described the 
private conversation to Brownell, the attorney general destroyed any 
hope of delay. When Eisenhower asked if Brownell could get Davies to 
postpone the hearing for a few days, Brownell replied that such an action 
was illegal. Before that flat rejection, Eisenhower was so willing to 
compromise that he told Faubus that.there was no question that the gov-
ernor had the right to call up the guard. Their disagreement lay in the 
orders which Faubus gave to bar entry to blacks. Eisenhower found that 
action to be improper, but the disagreement was yet a possible topic for 
further discussion during the period of delay. However, Brownell pre-
cluded without deliberation and unilaterally the postponement of con-
frontation. After that the meeting continued for nearly two hours more, 
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but without the possibility of agreement the discussion was casual, and 
most of the time was filled by the storytelling of Hays. Suddenly the 
president called the meeting to an end, and the Newport conference con-
cluded. Both Faubus and Hays expected an invitation to return in the 
afternoon for further exploration of the situation. What they received 
was instructions to prepare a statement for the press.9 Back in their 
hotel room the two men did nothing at first. Faubus appeared to be once 
again withdrawn, and he accepted readily the proposal by Hays that the 
congressman draft the statement. Working hastily to get a copy prepared 
for review by the president, Hays first mentioned that the trip was 
worth the effort because Faubus had clarified his position to the presi-
dent and had assured Eisenhower of a cooperative attitude. In addition, 
Faubus had clearly indicated his need to reconcile his obligations under 
the federal and state constitutions. Most important of all, Faubus 
indicated in the statement that, regardless of personal opinion, the 
Brown decision was law, and as such it must be obeyed. Faubus even 
agreed to abide by the decision of the federal court in Little Rock. 
Nowhere did he indicate that he was returning to Little Rock to withdraw 
the guard, but Eisenhower claimed in retrospect that such an understand-
ing was arrived at during the meeting. Eisenhower's perception of 
duplicity on the part of Faubus was one element in the later decision to 
solve the problem by force. But at Newport Faubus merely changed a few 
words of the statement which Hays wrote, as did the president. Then the 
governor read the statement at a press conference. Eisenhower issued a 
similar statement, and the actors retired from the stage for a few 
moments, each with his own perceptions of what had happened.10 
Hays went to Fort Worth, Texas, for a speaking engagement, but the 
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crisis forced him back to Little Rock. Between his speech in Fort 
Worth and one scheduled for Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Hays called Faubus 
to see how the situation stood. In what may have been a last impulse to 
regain his standinp, with the Southern liberals, Faubus asked Hays to 
hasten to Little Rock. Hard line segregationists among the governor's 
advisors were intensifying their pressure for resistance. Between 
September 15 and September 20, Hays counselled Faubus to obey the court 
order and not have the guard obstruct the entry of blacks into Central 
High. But he was too late. At one point in their conversations, when 
Hays asked Faubus to submit, the governor replied, as Hays recalled more 
than a dozen years later, "Well, Brooks, if I did this it would be com-
mitting political suicide [,] and I'm not going to do it."11 For his 
own politica~ survival, Orval Faubus abandoned all pretention to a 
liberal position. With segregationists in control of the state and 
Brownell's hard-line advice guiding the federal decision-making process, 
the confrontation was simply a matter of time. 
Despite the seeming inevitability of crisis, Hays continued to work 
to avoid the collapse. With time running out, Hays asked Faubus to 
write to the parents of black students requesting that the children 
remain at home voluntarily for a few weeks. Faubus was to offer tutors 
and guarantee his office as an agency of peace. Faubus was ready to 
accept the proposal on the condition that the courts agreed not to 
require integration before the end of the month. Davies refused. On the 
Thursday before the schools were due to open, Hays asked Adams if there 
might be some way to transfer the national guard to federal control. He 
hoped that such an action might; by removing the options, give Faubus a 
means of saving face. But Adams rejected the plan. Nothing was left 
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but the hearing, and that process took its expected course. Faubus 
tried to have Davies disqualified on the basis of prejudice, but the 
effort failed. Then at the hearing Faubus denied the jurisdiction of 
Davies over the governor of a state, claiming that only the Supreme 
Court of the United States had that power. He boycotted the hearing, 
his counsel refused to cooperate, and Davies enjoined both Faubus and 
the guard. The crisis had arrived. Hays worked on, meeting with Harry 
Ashmore of the Arkansas Gazette and Mayor Woodrow Mann on the Sunday 
before the opening to decide how to protect the children. Their 
decision was that the police provided the only true option.12 
On Monday, September 23, 1957, the nine black students sneaked into 
Central High School by a side door. The crowd of 1,000 whites who had 
gathered in front of the high school became unruly when the news reached 
them. They had missed the entry because they were watching members of 
the mob maul several white reporters, but some of them seized a second 
opportunity and pounced on a black newsman who ventured too near, and 
others began taunting the whites within the school with racist comments. 
Alarmed white parents began withdrawing their children from the beseiged 
school, and finally the school administration ordered the nine black 
children home. The local police held firm, but the possibility of their 
collapse was apparent even to Eisenhower by then. Earlier Blossom had 
requested federal marshalls, but Brownell refused. Again on the day of 
crisis, Hays requested marshalls, and again the request received rejec-
tion. With no recourse, Mann asked for troops. On hearing of the near 
riot, Eisenhower signed the necessary papers after calling the incident 
an outrage. The next day, Tues.day, September 24, 1957, the lOlst 
Airborne and nationalized Arkansas National Guardsmen secured the 
peace.13 
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After that, the situation stabilized, and Hays returned to 
Washington, D.C. With troops in place, the battle returned to the 
courts. By May of 1958, Eisenhower felt comfortable enough to withdraw 
the airborne and finally the national guard. In May, two black students 
graduated from Central High School without disturbance and with only a 
token force of guardsmen. The 1958-1959 school year was peaceful 
because the schools were closed while state and federal authorities 
fought in the courts to determine the legality of the private school 
system created by segregationists to replace public schools. Only in 
the spring of 1959 was the final determination reached. Under court 
order the private school corporation dissolved, and Little Rock's 
schools opened with token integration in the fall of 1959. But the 
crisis had an important result for Hays. He was a highly visible actor 
in the tragedy at Little Rock. Because his involvement was not clearly 
supportive of Faubus and segregation, he came to be perceived as an 
advocate of the opposing theory, integration. That misperception of the 
position of one of the few neutrals in the struggle was the stimulus for 
a successful campaign by Dale Alford to unseat Hays. 
But Hays was not anticipating anything of the sort in the summer of 
1958. Once again he was seeking re-election, and once again he faced 
opposition in the primary. That was no great concern, for he had suc-
cessfully survived primary challenges from Amis Guthridge in 1952 and 
from another racial conservative in 1956. In the primary of July of 
1958, Hays emerged victorious once again. Running against a segrega-
tionist opponent, he won 59 percent of the 71,000 votes cast. It was a 
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safe margin if not as great as the 70 percent that Faubus polled in the 
gubernatorial race, and Hays seemed assured of another term in congress. 
Insuring his victory was the party rule which bound all defeated candi-
dates not to run as independents, a rule which precluded the problems 
which cost Hays his first congressional race in 1933. Hays was confi-
dent in July that he had survived the difficulty engendered by his lack 
of support for the segregationists.14 
Until late October the illusion remained intact. But with only· 
nine days before the ritual of re-election, Hays received a shock. Dale 
Alford announced as a write-in opponent in the general election. On or 
about October 28, the segregationists forces resolved to stop Hays. 
Claude Carpenter, a trusted lieutenant of Faubus and a man who preferred 
to work behind the scenes, had for some unknown reason long harbored 
animosity toward the congressman, and he evidently regarded 1958 as the 
prime opportunity to eliminate Hays. Carpenter resigned from the Faubus 
staff and, according to Faubus, assumed the task of managing the cam-
paign against Hays. But his candidate was weak. Alford met with Faubus 
in October, and when the meeting ended he seemed prepared to end his 
campaign. As Faubus recalled the episode, he explained the difficulties 
to Alford. For one thing, he was not on the ballot; for another, the 
regular nominees of the party had no option but to oppose an interloper, 
if only to maintain the viability of the concept of party loyalty. 
Alford had no pros~ect of victory, said Faubus. When Alford left, 
Faubus was satisfied that the matter was sett:ed and Alford was no 
longer a candidate. The wavering Alford, however, changed his mind and 
arranged another meeting with Faubus. Once again Faubus convinced 
Alford not to run. With the matter resolved, the governor went about 
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his normal gubernatorial duties. To his surprise, he heard on the radio 
that Alford had announced. Faubus' recollection of surprise must seem 
strange to Hays who believed that Faubus was the mastermind of the 
Alford campaign after Carpenter persuaded the governor of its possibil-
ities. As Hays recalled in an interview with Joe Frantz, only the 
machine of the governor had the control to utilize the hostile but dis-
organized mood of the district against the incumbent.15 
Hays probably erred. Even he recalled the episode of October 28. 
On that evening, Sheriff Marvin Hawkins of Conway County, an old friend 
of Hays and a consistent party supporter, met with Faubus and asked the 
governor to withdraw his forces, to call off the dogs. Supposedly 
Faubus agreed to preserve the validity of the primary. He promised to 
return to Little Rock and end the insurgency. Unfortunately, Faubus was 
no longer in control. Carpenter told Hawkins at a later date that the 
organization ignored its chief because the process had developed beyond 
the point of stopping it. So Alford was in the race despite the best 
efforts of Faubus.16 
Alford was a natural front man. He had a good voice and a pleasant 
personality, and best of all he was somewhat of an opportunist. He had 
accepted the Blossom Plan, and he also created an image of himself as a 
dedicated segregationist, but to Hays he appeared to be no more commit-
ted to either position than was Faubus. And he was well known. So he 
had a chance, especially when he defined the crucial issue of his cam-
paign. He and his workers repeatedly stressed the theme of defense of 
the state against the intrusions of federal tyranny. One time the 
Alford comment was that "Mr. Hays is a national Democrat and I am an 
Arkansas Democrat. Mr. Hays is a Harry Truman Democrat and I am an 
Orval Faubus Democrat."17 Or, "Not one time have we ever heard Con-
gressman Hays say a single word of praise of our great and wonderful 
Governor Faubus;" rather Hays was one of those heinous national Demo-
crats who followed Paul Butler, chairman of the Democratic National 
Committee, in selling out the states to national interests.18 
States rights was a key issue in Little Rock in 1958, but it was 
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not the only problem for Hays. Having been in congress for so many 
years, he had necessarily created dissatisfaction on the part of certain 
groups of constituents. Among the groups which Hays had alienated were 
postmen, veterans, and landlords. On at least one occasion he had failed 
to support a discharge petition to move a bill out of committee, a bill 
which called for pay increases for mailmen. Any postal workers who 
recalled that episode were hostile to Hays; Alford reminded the mail 
service employees in 1958. Also, Alford emphasized that Hays had voted 
against the interests of veterans. Truman had vetoed a veterans bill 
which he regarded as providing excessive payments for non-service con-
nected disabilities, and Hays had supported the veto. When reminded, 
veterans were unhappy. The most important group of people who objected 
to Hays' performance were some landlords in Little Rock. Those real 
estate tycoons had seized the opportunity provided by the large numbers 
of airmen at Little Rock Air Force Base during and after World War II to 
make neat profits. Hays, of course, was a leading supporter of rent 
controls not only during the war but after as well. His legislative 
position was an economic disability to a powerful segment of property 
owners in the key city of his district.19 
Despite the several issues in the election of 1958, probably they 
played a fairly minor role in the outcome. Hays had, after all, gained 
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the votes of 59 percent of those who cast ballots in the primary. Even 
the people who regarded segregation as a key were possibly exaggerating. 
During one strategy meeting of the Hays forces, one friend told Hays 
that his only hope of victory was to declare in favor of segregation. 
Hays refused, and the advisor continued to pressure the candidate. 
Finally, son Steele ended the matter by reminding the counsellor that 
Hays was not able to compromise his principles by professing such a 
belief. Besides, Hays wanted to remain out of the controversy, and even 
a declaration in favor of segregation might not be sufficient even 
though he had not created an image as a stalwart integrationist either. 
Although his campaign workers at least attempted to smear Alford as an 
integrationist by publicizing the vote on the Blossom Plan, Hays recog-
nized that a significant number of his constituents shared the views of 
one old timer who was interviewed on national television during the cam-
paign. As Hays recalled the interview, it went something like the 
following: 
'Looks like everybody in Little Rock is a segregationist.' 
'Yes sir, everybody is a segregationist.' 
'Well, your congressman's not, is he?' 
'Naw, Brooks is funny. He's a funny feller.' 
'Well, I guess you'll vote against him?' 
'Naw, I'm going to vote for him. Brooks is an institution. 1 20 
Hays may well have been an institution, but the institution was in dan-
ger. Issues abounded, but the decisive factor which determined the 
election proved to be a simple gimmick. On the day before the election, 
Attorney General Bennett ruled that voters had the right to use pre-
pasted stickers with the name "Alford" on them rather than having actu-
ally to write in the name on the ballot. Furthermore, those stickers 
were to be accessible. The Alford forces printed stickers which bore 
the candidate's name with an "X" beside it. All the voter had to do was 
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attach the sticker to the ballot, and in at least one precinct that 
process was made easy. Not only were the stickers placed on the tables 
of election inspectors, but they were handed to the prospective voter at 
the same time as the ballot was proffered. One election judge, Mrs. 
Boyce Drummond of North Little Rock, swore later that she believed that 
the manner of handling the stickers, the election judges handing them 
out with the ballots, created confusion in the minds of some voters. 
According to her, some of them thought that the sticker had to be 
affixed to the ballot to make it legal. Thus, Alford gained votes from 
areas in which Hays normally ran well. When the ballots were counted, 
Alford was the winner with 51 percent of the vote in Little Rock and a 
greater percentage from the outlying areas. Middle and lower income 
precincts gave Alford 60 percent while upper income areas gave him only 
40 percent. Even black precincts cast 27 percent of their votes for the 
supposed arch-segregationist, perhaps due to the confusion which Mrs. 
Drummond reported. Alford won by a margin of 24,026 to 18,504 in the 
district but by only 1,200 in the city. According to Hays, the margin 
of victory indicated that the segregation question was not the key. As 
he noted, 
I received twelve thousand more votes against my segregation-
ist opponent in July of 1958 than Dale Alford received in his 
twelve hundred majority defeat of me in November. 71,000 
votes were cast in the July primary, and only 60,000 in the 
November election when Alford was their write-in candidate . . . ' 
so apparently a significant number of segregationists voted for Hays in 
July than stayed away from the polls in the fall. And if everyone in 
the city was a segregationist, even in the fall many must have rejected 
Alford; otherwise Hays would not have come so close to victory.21 
Hays alleged that the margin of victory came not from dissatisfied 
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voters but from illegalities of the traditional Arkansas sort, not just 
from the doubtfully legal stickers. However, he declined to contest the 
outcome. For one thing, he had the painful experience of 1933 which 
caused him to expect little success in 1958. Also, he knew that it was 
highly unusual for a challenge to succeed in Arkansas. In addition, he 
decided that he would create a better public image if he displayed the 
moral courage to rise above.such a dirty situation rather than challeng-
ing and appearing to be no more than another hack grubbing desperately 
for a political plum. Another consideration was that Hays was somewhat 
tired of trying to represent a polarized community. But the most real-
istic reason was that an appeal to congress was largely futile. John 
Wells, former secretary to Carl Bailey and in 1962 author of Time Bomb: 
The Faubus Revolt, asked congress to investigate the election, and the 
House went through the motions. A committee visited Little Rock, but it 
took no testimony and failed to call election judges before its members. 
The committee and the full House accepted Alford as fairly elected 
because, according to Hays, Southern Democrats preferred the segrega-
tionist and conservative stance of the write-in candidate, and the 
Republicans were willing to accept that Democratic preference in order 
to keep intact the coalition between the two groups. At any rate the 
new congressman from the fifth district was Dale Alford, at least until 
redistricting after the census of 1960 caused his district to merge with 
that of Wilbur Mills and encouraged him to retire from congress. He 
reappeared only in 1966 when. he and Hays squared off once again in the 
race for governor. Both lost. Hays ran third, but Alford was 11,000 
votes behind him in fourth. So Hays proved something at last.22 
When the 1958 congressional race was over, Edward P. Morgan of ABC 
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News indicated to some extent the reaction from moderates and liberals 
throughout the United States. Morgan told his audience: 
Faubus cut Hays down at the polls last Tuesday by a dubious 
trick • • • • A man accomplished in breaking pledges even to 
presidents, Faubus did not scruple to keep a solemn promise 
to support all the Democratic candidates, Hays included. 
Instead the governor released his executive assistant, 
Claude Carpenter, to help hatch a covert plan sprung in the 
last eight days of the campaign • • • • But there was no 
vindictiveness in Hays himself ••• , 
then Morgan described Hays' final press conference, the one at which one 
of the reporters summarized, "if there was ever a Congressman who ought 
to go to Heaven, it's Hays." As usual, Hays made the conference com-
plete by telling an anecdote. For the occasion he told the story of the 
man whose jackass kicked him so severely that he had to call the doctor. 
When the medical man told him that he was sure to die, the man was per-
turbed~ He told the doctor, "I sure do hate to have it written on my 
tombstone that I was killed·by a jackass . . •• Couldn't you make me 
live long enough to die of pneumonia."23 Hays was to survive the kick. 
Immediately the condolences began pouring in. Sloan Rainwater of 
Walnut Ridge wrote to Hays that he was "surprized (sic), grief-stricken 
and shocked [but] in defeat you were magnificent." Willard Uphaus 
reminded Hays that his labors must continue in the SBC and later in 
politics again. Hundreds of letters and telegrams flooded Hays' office 
and home. Even Richard Nixon said, "When statesmanship of the type you 
represent in such an exemplary way becomes a victim of demagoguery and 
prejudice," then responsible leaders of both parties must educate the 
people about civil rights "if America is to continue to be a nation of 
responsible laws rather than irresponsible men."24 
Those irresponsible men celebrated their triumph. In its issue 
for November of 1958, The Citizens' Council featured a cartoon which 
162 
pictured a dead "Moderation" crushed by a ballot box. The editorial 
proclaimed, "We suspect that the advocates of appeasement, of surrender-
in-advance which has been mis-named moderation, will remember this elec-
tion for many a year • • • [Southern moderates] have gone the way of the 
Whigs, while emitting the bellows of a Bull Moose in the process."25 But 
Hays failed to accept the death awarded to him. His attitude remained 
that "The views of my opponent are more in harmony with those of the 
people at this time ••• [However,] I think my moderate point of view 
will one day be vindicated."26 Hays was, of course, to prove a more 
accurate seer than the editor of The Citizens' Council. But it was not 
apparent in the next few years. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the 
segregationist forces mobilized and armed to resist the destruction of 
their way of life promised by the activists in the civil rights revolu-
tion. Compromise, the middle way was impossible. Eventually the segre-
gationist position fell before the combined might of civil rights 
groups, the federal government, and aroused public opinion. By the time 
that happened Hays was among those on the anti-segregationist side of 
the gulf; no longer was he straddling. But that evolution of Hays from 
moderate neutralist to open and dedicated advocate of equality, even 
equality imposed from outside, was unanticipated by anyone in 1958. As 
the final year of the decade began, a sixty year old man found himself 
unemployed and seeking a new career. After Little Rock, Hays' life in 
public service seemed finished. But the defeat proved to be what he 
needed.· Freed at last from the constraints of pleasing the voters, Hays 
became his own man. That man was a high quality example of the moral 
liberalism which had suffered so many defeats during the twentieth cen-
tury, a moral liberalism which was too potent for most Southerners, 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION, 
1950-1958 
A vital element to Brooks Hays throughout his long and productive 
career was his faith. For decades he worked by whatever means to 
translate the elements of his faith into a better world in which for 
all to live. Eventually, that effort had to become more than a one-man 
crusade. Thus, when the opportunity arose, Hays displayed no reluctance 
whatever to the idea of entering into the heartland of those who 
regarded religion and life as eternally separate. Having challenged 
his Baptists for so many years, to put into practice their principles, 
Hays invaded the sanctuary of unconcern, .~eized his Baptists by their 
complacent preoccupation with the afterlife, and brought them, despite 
their reluctance, into a world in which their moral armor was a 
potentially powerful weapon against an infinite variety of evils. 
In 1950 an old Russellville friend, Bruce Price, helped Hays to 
gain the vice presidency of the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC). In 
1953 Acker C. Miller, chairman of the Christian Life Commission (CLC), 
appointed Hays to the Committee on Progress in Race Relations. The CLC 
was the conscience of the SBC, and its functicns were primarily to 
inform the membership about pornography, alcohol, and other dangers 
while at the same time suggesting the proper method of dealing with 
those problems. The race relations committee was a fairly new and 
166 
167 
controversial element of the CLC which failed to convince many Baptists 
that racial discrimination was inconsistent with Christianity. However, 
it served as a springboard for Hays' rise within the CLC and the SBC. 
In July of 1955, he won election without dissent as chairman of the 
CLc.l By that time Hays was well established in the center of his 
non-adventurous and conventional denomination. 
As early as 1952 Hays.wrote to Hugh A. Brimm in regard to race 
relations. Expressing pleasure that the SBC had integrated its seminar-
ies, Hays reminded Brimm that "We simply must be constructive, even 
bold, in plans for improving conditions" of Baptist treatment of 
blacks.2 But events moved faster than Hays was prepared to handle, and 
Baptist assistance to blacks came, within a few short years, to be 
insufficient. The issue quickly came to be equality; with the repudia-
tion of his paternal approach, Hays panicked. 
When, after the Brown decisions, the Southern congressional leader-
ship abdicated its responsibility to its people, Hays had to rationalize 
to the liberals within his church his signing of the document of abdica-
tion, the Southern Manifesto. In a letter to Miller of the CLC, Hays 
wrote that he intended his signing of the declaration to "allay fears 
and relieve tensions, not to create them."3 Hays had failed to remember 
his father's lesson regarding "the relationship between the church and 
our assumption of moral responsibility" when that relationship appeared 
to threaten his political position.4 The moral lapse was not harmful to 
Hays as he advanced in the SBC; however, it did allow the Louisville 
Courier-Journal to describe Hays, after his presidency of the SBC, as a 
former segregationist who converted, an exaggeration but not a lie.s 
Hays gained the highest office in his denomination, and he used 
168 
that office to lead his people beyond themselves. On March 30, 1957, 
Bruce Price wrote to Hays that it was once again time for a layman to 
become president of the SBC. Price erred in stating that the last lay 
president had served in 1910; in fact only a dozen years had passed, but 
Hays indicated his willingness to serve anyway. Price began campaigning 
for Hays, writing to people such as Dr. J. D. Grey, a potential voter at 
the convention, that Hays had exceptional qualifications. According to 
Price, Hays had been Sunday School superintendent at age twenty-two, 
deacon at twenty-five, president of the Arkansas Sunday School 
Convention before he was thirty, and active as a speaker for the SBC. 
Price also reminded potential voters that Hays was the Washington, D.C., 
Man of the Year in Religion in the mid 1950s. Finally, Hays had been in 
the pulpit as often as Dr. Walter Judd, the most openly religious of the 
congressmen in the 1940s and 1950s. In a six-man race, Hays won in a 
standing vote.6 
The two years that Hays served as head of his denomination were a 
time for the continuation of longstanding political concerns of the SBC 
membership. One of the first Hays faced was an issue of religious 
freedom. In September of 1957, Hays received a letter from a missionary 
family in Colombia, a letter which went also to Senator Strom Thurmond 
of South Carolina. The missionaries., Orland and Margaret W. Corwin, 
complained that Colombian law ~uthorized only Catholic missionaries and 
required that those of other faiths preach only to their own. Hays 
received similar messages from other SBC missionaries, but his only 
solution was to use his contacts within the state department.7 The case 
illustrated the difficulties of SBC missionary work, but it was more 
important as an example of the aggressiveness with which the Southern 
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Baptists tried to convert others to their faith. 
Hays recognized the potential problems of such an aggressiveness. 
As he wrote to Mrs. Burton J. Ray in June of 1958, Southern Baptists 
tended to be too aggressive and to think that only they knew the truth. 
Especially were they hostile to American Baptists, the group from which 
they had split a century before. Hays told Mrs. Ray that he and 
Clarence Cranford, his counterpart with the American Baptists, were 
attempting to work together to reduce the competitiveness of their 
denominations. The problem was neither simple nor of a short standing. 
Hays had in his possession letters of protest from dozens of American 
Baptists. Dating from 1953, typical examples came from Gerald S. Moyer 
of San Lorenzo, California, and from William E. Appleberry of Oakland, 
California, and from Louis W. Bean of Centralia, Illinois. All com-
plained that Southern Baptists moved into American Baptist territory 
without coordinating with already established congregations and, on 
occasion, without identifying themselves as members of the southern 
group. The results were friction, competition, and chaos.8 
The solution was to get both denominations involved in cooperative 
ventures. Early in 1958 Hays and Cranford announced jointly their 
intention to have their people establish a joint "Crusade for Peace."9 
The idea received an overwhelming absence of response and immediately 
fell by the wayside in the heat of the controversy raised by the 
decision of Cranfor~ and Hays to visit Russia. 
On March 19, 1958, William Loeb wrote to Hays warning that the 
Baptist president, by going to Russia, would only give respectability to 
a gang.of killers. As Loeb put it, "You are doing a great disservice, 
not only to the Baptist faith but to the United States of America." In 
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response Hays told Loeb that the trip was non-political and nothing more 
than a return of the visit which Russian Baptist leaders had made to the 
United States in 1953. Hays pointed out to Loeb that no one else had 
objected to the trip. Loeb wrote to Daniel A. Poling of the Christian 
Herald Magazine, and Poling wrote to Hays that "these visits are ill-
timed and unfortunate."10 Hays went to Russia, nevertheless. 
On April 20, 1958, Hays and Cranford attended services at a Baptist 
church in Moscow. With the Reverend Jacob Zhidkov, president of the 
Soviet All-union Council of Evangelical Churches, and Mrs. Cranford, 
Hays heard Cranford deliver the sermon to a crowd of approximately 2,000 
Russian believers. Hays gave to the church two Bibles and six testa-
ments in Russian. In his first statement about the experience of speak-
ing before such a crowd in such a place, Hays said, "They have suffered, 
yet they have faith in the Gospel • • • • I sensed that the crowd 
gasped at the mention of our 8 1/2 million Southern Baptists."11 
Returned home, Hays reported that the Baptists of Russia, despite the 
prevalence of old men and women in the denomination, had apparently 
enjoyed a minor revival under communism. In both the Baptist Standard 
and the Memphis Press-Scimitar, Hays stressed that the clergy in Russia 
had indicated to him that they had more freedom under the commissars 
than they had enjoyed under the czars. However, according to the Press-
Scimitar report, freedom did not extend to the right to speak out on 
public issues as was the case in America. Hays also had to explain to 
Mrs. Alfred Macmillan, in a letter of May 12, that the Baptists were 
unable to establish Sunday schools in Russia because schools were state-
controlled.12 
To the doubters Hays was able to report that their pre-trip alarm 
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was unfounded. On April 28 Hays wrote to Poling that in fifteen years 
as a congressman he had never made such a non-political trip. More dif-
ficult to answer was the letter of a dedicated Baptist who objected to 
mission money helping to finance the trip to Russia. The tone of the 
objection found its clearest expression in the writer's words, "Oh! 
Satan, modernism, socialism, Communism is getting in all our 
churches."13 Despite the general support for the trip, some within that 
loose organization known as the Southern Baptist Convention objected ·to 
any contact with persons of different religions. 
Less troublesome to Hays, although it was to become a major issue 
shortly after his term ended, was the anti-Catholicism of many Southern 
Baptists and other fundamentalists. The attitude appeared vividly in a 
letter. Hays received from Grace Carson in 1959. Carson told Hays that 
she was a Baptist and was teaching her children to be the same. She 
expressed as common knowledge the view that the schools taught only 
Catholic history, a situation presumably impossible to change. She 
wrote Hays, "You • are personally aware of the impossibility of 
cooperating with the Roman Pontiff in matters of faith;" cooperation 
with Satan was easier to attain. Hays' reply was a gentle reminder of 
the basis of Christianity. Beginning by explaining that he understood 
her fears, Hays indicated further that there was no plan to unite the 
churches. Nevertheless, Christians must heed the teaching of Christ 
that they live as oµe with him and with each other.14 Unfortunately it 
was at about the same time that many Baptists indicated that they were 
unwilling to live with each other if the other was a Roman Catholic. At 
Hays' final convention as president, the SBC brought in a former priest 
to feed the worst fears of the members. Not all approved, and one 
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anonymous correspondent wrote to Hays that "the way the recent Baptist 
convention denounced the Catholics was a crying shame," but the hostil-
ity, which abated only after the election of John F. Kennedy to the 
Presidency, was open and unstoppable.IS 
Easier to deal with because the convention united on them were the 
issues of morality. Traditionally, Baptists had fought against gamb-
ling, drinking, and other vices presumably desecrating the work of God. 
As president of the SBC, Hays had to address similar problems. For 
instance, in 1958 he wrote to John F. Nolte that "immorality in Holly-
wood" was a major influence on juvenile delinquency; both church and 
state must fight the danger. Hays reminded Nolte that the Christian 
Life Commission had "been waging a continual war against such immoral 
influences."16 The concern with the influence of Hollywood on immpres-
sionable young people was one which dated back to the 1920s and which 
most fundamentalists shared equally.17 Of concern to the SBC, as well, 
was the increasing spread of pornography. 
When E. A. Worley sent Hays copies of advertisements for porno-
graphic materials, Hays responded that "the publication and distribution 
of obscene literature is one of our major problems," and he promised to 
transmit the advertisements to the solicitor general for appropriate 
action.18 There was little else possible for the president of an organ-
ization committed to keeping itself separate from the state. 
Hays' most important functions as president of the SBC--given the 
loose structure of the organization and the weakness of presidential 
authority--were to serve as a model for his people and as a prod for 
their improvement. An occasional symbolic gesture helped to create the 
example, and Hays' speeches to his constituents normally provided the 
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goad. The potential for leadership by example was indicated when Hays 
released his book, This World: A Christian'~ Workshop. In an attempt 
to illustrate the character of the author, the press release emphasized 
what was, aside from its symbolic value, a trifle. In trying to summa-
rize the man in a single image, the release described a concoction it 
called Brooks Hays Punch. A combination of orange juice and ginger ale, 
non-alcoholic but stimulating, the mixture symbolized the Baptist dis-
approval of liquor and belief that pleasure came from wholesome 
things. 19 
More important was Hays' service as conscience of the SBC, 
especially as the racial issue came increasingly to dominate the conven-
tion. Speaking at Berea Baptist Church in Falmouth, Virginia, Hays told 
his audience on August 24, 1958, that Christians had to care for one 
another. The context had nothing to do with race relations, but the 
message was easily transferable into that context. Hays began with one 
of his traditional concerns, rural poverty. Noting that 10 percent of 
America's farmers made half of the farming profit, leaving the other 
half for the remaining 90 percent, Hays said, "The Southern Baptist Con-
vention has interested itself in this physical aspect of rural life even 
though we give our major attention to values that lie outside material 
conditions." The rural way of life was under threat from economic prob-
lems, but the church had the ability to help. As Hays stressed, "the 
church is still at.every crossroads to carry its message to every com-
munity and keep alive the feeling of responsibility for each other's 
welfare that all good Christians must have."20 While the membership had 
little difficulty in accepting its responsibility for the rural poor, 
when the CLC and the president began demanding that the SBC acknowledge 
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the justice of the black cry for equality, many in the SBC attempted to 
deny that responsibility extended that far. 
On January 30, 1958, Charity and Children reported that Louis W. 
Hollis of Jackson, Mississippi, was attempting a smear campaign against 
the president of the Southern Baptist Convention. Hollis attacked Hays 
as an old-time far left politician whose elevation to the presidency of 
the convention was "one of the most-tragic happenings in the history of 
the Southern Baptist Convention ... 21 The report disapproved of Hollis' 
actions, including his threat to take his people out of the convention, 
but the editorial was more significant in that it illustrated the split 
in the SBC, a rupture which rested on the issue of race and a rupture 
which came to a head in 1958 at the annual convention of the SBC in 
Houston, Texas. Despite the efforts of those who sought to maintain a 
segregated society and despite the efforts of those who sought simply to 
avoid controversy, the issue of racial justice as a facet of Christian 
life was one which was no longer to be ignored after the Houston 
convention. 
Prior to World War II, like most denominations, the SBC did no more 
than evangelize and educate black Americans. The convention did estab-
lish the CLC, the conscience of the SBC, the agency which guided 
Baptists toward the Christian way of dealing with what Hays referred to 
as "social evils and current conflicts."22 Baptists accepted the CLC as 
they did the mission boards and other agencies of the SBC. But by 1954 
the CLC was moving toward more controversial social matters. 
In 1954 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that schools 
should desegregate with all deliberate speed. The Christian Life Com-
mission in that year reported to the SBC that the decision was morally 
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correct just as pornography and other traditional concerns were morally 
wrong. CLC recommendations were that the SBC should recognize that the 
decision was agreeable both to the Constitution and to Christian prin-
ciples of love and equal justice for all. Also, the CLC recommended 
that Baptists should be patient and seek divine aid. The CLC praised the 
court and America's public school system, but it encouraged church and 
state leaders to work toward avoidance of strife and the betterment of 
democracy.23 The report spoke in generalities, but it was a beginning. 
The report passed, possibly due to its general nature, perhaps 
because the convention site was St. Louis, Missouri, away from the heated 
atmosphere of the deep South. In 1954 the court decision was too new 
for opposition to form effectively. The president of the SBC and heads 
of both the Home and Fore.ign mission boards endorsed the decision. Foy 
Valentine of the Texas CLC helped in the battle to desegregate schools 
in Dallas, and leaders of Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in 
Louisville, Kentucky, helped to gain integration without violence in 
that city's schools. But resistance was hardening. Editors of Baptist 
papers in Virginia and Louisiana condemned the CLC while other opponents 
attacked the director of the commission, Acker C. Miller, and some 
threatened to deny funds to the CLC. A leader of the opposition was W. 
A. Criswell, pastor of the First Baptist Church of Dallas, the largest 
congregation in the SBC with approximately 12,000 members in 1958. 
Criswell represented the extreme segregationist position especially well 
when he spoke to the South Carolina legislature in 1957, saying that 
integration was "a thing of idiocy and foolishness" and that segregation 
was the proper way not only in matters of race but in religious bodies 
as well. 24 
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The division was clear, but up to 1957 the nonintegrationists at 
the Baptist convention had the upper hand. In that year the CLC again 
endorsed integration, but the convention refused to accept the report. 
Integration was too controversial, especially with members such as Mrs. 
Elmo Mancuso of Washington, D.C., who wrote that she was shocked and 
sickened to see the president of the SBC in church together with a black 
man after she saw a newspaper picture of the presidents of the three 
largest Baptist denominations at joint service. To many Baptists, inte-
gration was a political matter which the CLC should avoid lest it split 
the church. Other extremists believed integration would lead to a 
foreign takeover of the country.25 
Despite the exaggerated concern of many misinformed Baptists and 
the hostility of others, in 1957 the balance within the conventions 
shifted, and the accommodationists won power. Hays chaired the 1957 
session wherein the CLC reported that racial conflict was a moral and 
religious, not a political or economic problem. Hays presided when the 
CLC attacked segregation, discrimination, and violence, and Hays became 
president of the SBC at the same meeting.26 
In 1958 the SBC met in Houston. Registration totalled 11,966 
messengers, and visitors swelled the crowd to nearly 15,000. In Hays' 
first year as president, those people had seen race become of paramount 
importance to the SBC. Churches of the deep South had tried to elimi-
nate the CLC while Hays had embroiled himself in the controversy in 
Little Rock. On the night before the convention opened, Reverend w. o. 
Vaught, Jr., of Little Rock's Immanuel Baptist Church, had challenged 
the Pastors' Conference to upli_ft the black race by reevaluating the 
true meaning of democracy, reemphasizing educational opportunity for 
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all, providing equality in employment opportunity, and demolishing the 
"walls of hatred" between races .and nations.27 The pastors heard Hays 
affirm that a pastor "must be free to speak his conscience, even though 
his parishoners may think him wrong at times."28 In other words the 
firing of pastors for speaking about desegregation must cease. 
With that background the SBC meeting opened in a mixture of 
"jubilation and tensions."29 The messengers were prepared by Criswell's 
keynote address in which he stated that "we'll divide over anything and 
nothing, anytime ... 30 Criswell set the tone; then Hays spoke. 
Hays talked first of the first convention in Houston in 1915 and 
the growth of the church by the second Houston convention in 1926. Then 
Hays talked of his Arkansas background and his first national convention 
in 1920. Having praised .those who eased his term as president, Hays 
mentioned that the SBC had worked for blacks at least since 1915. Hays 
denied any intention of dwelling on racial matters, but he did reaffirm 
his belief that the SBC needed a conscience and that the CLC was that 
conscience. Aside from encouraging Baptists to be unafraid of contro-
versy, Hays kept his presidential address innocuous.31 Perhaps the mes-
sengers could sit back and relax; maybe the anticipated confrontation 
was not to occur. 
The apparent calm at the convention proved deceptive when the con-
vention elected its president on the second day. Customarily, SBC pres-
idents served a virtually automatic second term. The Houston Post cited 
convention sources as expecting no difficulty in re-electing Hays. As 
in 1957, J. D. Grey of Louisiana placed Hays' name in nomination. Then 
the problems began. R. E. Milam of Oregon was placed in nomination by a 
man who opposed Hays' tendencies toward cooperation with other 
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denominations. A woman rose to object to the election of a politician as 
president of the convention. The chairman ruled that she had no author-
ity to debate the merits of a candidate. She must either nominate or 
sit. She placed the name of Robert E. Naylor, president of Southwestern 
Baptist Theological Seminary, before the convention. The challenges 
forced the messengers to abandon their customary voice vote for paper 
ballots. Hays won easily, and the liberal wing had its first victory. 
Then the election of first vice president resulted in another floor 
fight in ,which the "moderate" Chester L. Quarles prevailed. Quarles 
recognized that segregation hampered Baptist missionary work, but he 
regarded segregation as Christian.32 
The SBC had officers representing all but the most ardent segrega-
tionists. Those persons tended to be absent or to be enjoying the unof-
ficial campaign waged by unofficial agencies. During the convention the 
messengers found themselves· deluged with White Citizens Council liter-
ature from Texas and Mississippi. The tracts used the Old Testament to 
justify segregation and attacked SBC literature for its increasingly 
pro-integration position.33 
The Citizens Council types in the SBC had their day when the CLC 
issued its report on May 22, the third day of the convention. Section 
five of the report was entitled "A Call for Racial Reconciliation". The 
section began by noting the improved awareness on the part of Americans 
that race relations were a problem for both North and South. Also, it 
noted the benefits of better race relations for both national and inter-
national conditions. Then the report called on Baptists to "reclaim for 
all citizens ••• the full heritage of American freedoms" and spelled 
out in specific terms what those freedoms were. Furthermore, the report 
cautioned that missionaries had problems in making conversions because 
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"a gospel that does not lead its advocates to reconcile racial differ-
ences in their own land will not be heard by the people of various races 
in other lands".34 Especially unpopular was the call of the CLC for 
fellowship among all races. 
The report was unacceptable. Even the attempt to receive it as 
information rather than to adopt it faced strong opposition. Reverend 
Montague Cook of Moultrie, Georgia,. used a dictionary to make his point 
that fellowship was identical with integration. He also emphasized that 
the public was likely to construe the SBC action as representing the 
feelings of members despite the fact that the SBC, in the structure of 
the church, was no more than an advisory body. Reverend A.J. Moncrief 
of St. Joseph, Missouri, rebutted that the SBC was trying to follow the 
Bible, not the dictionary or newspapers. He also reminded his fellow 
Baptists that they were a militant group, not a collection of cloistered 
souls. They must continue to live the dangerous life. Having failed to 
reject the CLC report outright, Cook next tried to delete section five 
and to amend the CLC financial report.35 
The financing of the CLC was a controversial matter. In 1955 the 
Fund for the Republic had awarded the CLC $15,000 which director Miller 
had requested for race relations work. The Fund for the Republic had a 
reputation for liberal tendencies; so Miller and Hays deliberated for 
months before what was obviously a gift which might provoke opposition 
from conservatives within the SBC. That money was the item to which 
Cook objected in the financial report of 1958.36 On June 5, 1957, the 
membership of the First Baptist Church of Grenada, Mississippi, resolved 
that the SBC should return the money, should end the CLC, and should 
either cease using money from Mississippi for integrationist literature 
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and a campaign for civil rights, or Mississippi Baptists would provide 
no more assistance to the SBC. .Compounding the situation, the House Un-
American Activities Committee found the Fund to be too liberal. Led by 
Cook, conservatives within the SBC wanted the money returned. However, 
by a voice vote, which the Houston Post recorded as ten to one, the 
Baptists decided to retain the Fund money. In addition to that triumph, 
the Hays wing won another victory when the convention received the CLC 
report as information without modification.37 
The rest of the convention passed in comparative harmony. Then the 
messengers went home to work in state conventions. In Texas in Novem-
ber, the convention accepted without opposition a CLC report which was 
stronger than that over which the national body struggled. Texas Bap-
tists repudiated "force a.nd violence • • • exploitation of race hatred 
for gain ••• (and) bombings of public schools." The report recognized 
the "explosive nature" of the race question but noted that "there are 
perils of cowardice in silence."38 Arkansas Baptists, less progressive 
and lacking a CLC, enjoyed a peaceful convention at which Hays spoke 
concerning "Christian Democracy" at the closing session. Nevertheless, 
the convention passed no resolutions about race and had no report from 
its race relations or Negro work agencies. To Alabama Baptists "caution 
and conservatism should characterize any deviation from established 
patterns of living and learning together," and evangelism and education 
should continue to be the major emphasis of their work for blacks.39 
Oklahoma Baptists spent their days worrying about prohibition and 
whether their governor should be their president. They resolved to 
fight the repeal of prohibition and to keep church and state separate. 
They ignored civil rights.20 
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The range of responses to the events in Houston was typical of the 
SBC. The structure of the church made any other behavior impossible. 
Power for Southern Baptists rests in the local congregation. That con-
dition is exemplified by the selection of the term "messenger" rather 
than "delegate". The congregation makes its decision and sends a mes-
sage to the state or national gathering. At those meetings the messen-
gers agree democratically to policies and programs which they feel Sou-
thern Baptists should accept. But the convention has no right to force 
those who reject its views to conform. As a result, change in the SBC 
must come through education. 
In the educative process a leading role should be taken by the pas-
tor. But many pastors failed to make the effort in the decade after 
Houston. For one thing, the pastor's voice carried no more weight than 
did one of his congregation. Members who disagreed with the pastor 
ignored him. If the disagreement reached sufficient intensity, the con-
gregation had the right to cast the pastor out. Re-employment was not 
easy for a leader who had indicated inability to lead, and there was no 
unemployment insurance for a pastor without a flock. The temptation was 
to keep quiet, and many did. But the work begun by Valentine, Hays and 
the people in Louisville, continued, expanded, and finally achieved suc-
cess in the limited Baptist way when the SBC at last joined the civil 
rights movement in 1968 by issuing a statement which recognized that 
Baptist shared responsibility for the problems which caused rioting. 
Also, the SBC executive committee convinced 8,000 messengers to allow it 
to work for equal justice and opportunity for all people by all means.41 
Despite the criticism of the Baptists for their hesitancy, some 
progress occurred even during the period of the late 1950s when 
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integrationists were educating their slower brethren. Despite firings 
of pastors and the refusal of many churches to desegregate, even in the 
deep South some churches opened their doors to blacks, and some churches 
supported pastors who dared to speak out. And Baptist leaders spoke out 
despite the risks. Most Baptists continued to admire Hays for his cour-
age if not for his convictions. The CLC continued to prod the SBC, and 
the SBC gradually educated itself to its Christian obligation to provide 
justice for all. The process began as early as 1949 and continues in 
the 1980s, but the pivotal factor in bringing Southern Baptists to a 
realization of their moral and religious duty belongs to those who 
fought against the forces of reaction in Houston, Texas, in 1958. 
Having failed to defeat. the integrationists, the segregationists began 
the slide to oblivion which open debate on their position made inev-
itable. That slide was not rapid, however, and Baptists continued to 
resist even as the integrationist position gained increasing support. 
Even before the Houston meeting in response to the crisis at Little 
Rock, the editor of the Arkansas Baptist on October 3, 1957, reminded 
his readers that they had to remain within the law because "lawlessness 
is not the Christian approach", but too many of them failed to accept 
the message. 42 Despite disappointments there were encouraging signs in 
the occasional letters of support for Hays' advocacy of the Christian 
approach. After the Brotherhood Commission meeting of 1957, Hays 
received a letter from Bruce G. Carter which complimented Hays for his 
work in Little Rock and for his efforts at the meeting. Again in 1958 
Hays addressed the Brotherhood Commission, and his topic was race. As 
George Schroeder reported, the "message was most challenging".43 Some 
Baptists were accepting the challenge, but many were not. 
On March 2, 1959, the Religious News Service issued a statement 
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which illustrated that some Baptists were accepting their responsibility 
but which more clearly indicated the problems remaining. The SBC had 
prepared a survey which it distributed to 25,200 churches. Only 6,500 
replies returned to the SBC. Approximately one in four replies indi-
cated that a white church had some kind of contact with black Baptists. 
Of the 6,500 churches surveyed, 1,356 had donated money at some time, 
and 882 pastors reported that they had spoken with at least one black 
preacher on at least one occasion within the preceding two years.44 
Limited as it was, it was a beginning and a step toward eventual 
resolution of the explosive problem. 
In dealing with such a delicate issue, Hays recognized the need for 
occasional discretion. For instance, in 1958 Hays received word from 
Alma Hunt of the Woman's Missionary Union of Birmingham, Alabama, that 
he might be too controversial to speak before her organization. He 
chided her in a letter of April 29, saying "we must avoid giving any 
encouragement to the idea tha Baptists must not address controversial 
matters". Nevertheless, Hays agreed to speak to the Missionary Union, 
not about race, but about his trip to Moscow.45 
But racial matters haunted Hays even as he left office in 1959. As 
a gesture toward Hays, some of his friends suggested that the SBC invite 
Dwight Eisenhower to its convention. After all, the outgoing president 
of the SBC and the President of the United States were friends of long 
standing. But the situation was politically impossible. After sending 
troops to Little Rock, the President of the United States was too con-
troversial a figure to address the non-political Southern Baptist 
Convention. The SBC invited Walter Judd to honor Hays as the Baptist 
president stepped down.46 
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Hays left the highest office of his denomination, leaving behind 
the controversy about racial justice which eventually, by its resolu-
tion, helped the SBC to become a more consistent organization. But that 
was in the future, and when the Louisville Cou~ier-Journal summarized 
Hays' two years as president it gave a mixed report. During the presi-
dency of Hays, the SBC voted that segregation was un-Christian. That 
resolution led to resolutions from the Baptists of Mississippi and Ala-
bama calling for the resignation of Hays. In reaction other state con-
ventions passed resolutions of support for Hays. So Hays ended his 
career as president without alienating too many Baptists and probably 
without converting too many either. There was still ambiguity about the 
similarities of his views to those of the other 9 million Baptists.47 
What, then, was the significance of Hays' two years as president of 
the SBC? On most issues he was little more effective than his prede-
cessors had been. He failed to impose the SBC's concepts of morality on 
the United States; movies and possibly pornographic advertisements con-
tinued to proliferate, and the SBC continued to protest to little avail. 
Gambling, alcohol abuse, and juvenile delinquency remained problems 
without solutions. Nevertheless, there was progress in some areas. 
For one thing, relations with other Baptists improved. Despite the 
general Southern Baptist feeling of hostility, an attitude which 
exploded in the blatant anti-Catholic crusade prior to the election of 
1960, the SBC moved.slowly toward an accommodation with other Baptists 
at least. The trip to Moscow symbolized the reaching out of the SBC 
toward others. More concrete evidence came from the closer ties of Hays 
and Cranford as representatives of the Southern and American Baptists. 
Finally, from Hays' presidency came the significant beginnings of 
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relationships with the black denominations as equals rather than in the 
paternalistic style which had dominated from the turn of the century. 
Beyond doubt the most important accomplishment of the SBC under 
Hays was the major progress made in race relations. The struggle had 
begun more than a decade earlier and was to continue more than a decade 
later, but the decision of the SBC in Houston was not to be overturned. 
Led by Hays and others, the SBC committed itself to work for and with 
blacks in the fight for equality. By example and by advice the leader-
ship of the SBC coaxed and goaded the membership into the recognition of 
the impossibility of reconciling Christian teachings with segregation 
and prejudice. By that effort Brooks Hays, signer of the Southern Mani-
festo and author of the Arkansas Plan began to redeem himself as a 
Southern liberal. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
FROM MODERATE TO LIBERAL--POLITICS, 1959-1973 
In the maelstrom of the integration controversy, no one was safe. 
Even securely entrenched Brooks Hays, veteran of sixteen years of relia-
ble service, by one miscalculation found himself cast from the postiion 
which had taken so long to attain. At sixty years of age, Hays lost his 
job. Many in his position would have given up and faded into obscurity; 
not Hays. Loss of his congressional seat merely encouraged him to seek 
alternative outlets for his energies. Between 1959 and 1973 Hays' pub-
lic activities included teaching at several universities and service in 
various capacities under three presidents, but Hays reatained the poli-
tical urge. The highlight of the period was his return to the political 
arena, first in Arkansas, then in North Carolina. The public life of 
Brooks Hays came full circle by 1972. 
But there was little indication in 1958 of what lay ahead. Having 
failed against Alford, Hays faced greater tragedy at the end of the 
year. His father was the dominant force in his life, and his father was 
slowly dying. Between December of 1958 and June of 1959, Hays made 
eight trips to Russellville to see his father. on the final trip the 
family laid Steele Hays to rest.1 
The combination of family tragedy and Hays' preference for elective 
office made the search for new activity more difficult. He declined 
positions with a refugee organization and with the United States 
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Information Agency. The possibility of a judgeship piqued his interest, 
but nothing materialized. Finally Eisenhower offered him a position on 
the board of directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Although un-
sure if Marion would enjoy Knoxville, the city in which the TVA was 
headquartered, Hays consulted with friends, including those in the SBC. 
Then he accepted the offer.2 
The TVA was an agency in which Hays had long believed. He had 
fought to gain a similar program for the Arkansas River. The agency 
reduced transportation costs for agricultural products. At the same 
time it stimulated industry, creating jobs for displaced farm people in 
the valley. By its presence it promoted private investment and develop-
ment. And its benefits in flood control, scientific forestry, and 
fertilizer research were the sort of things that Hays had supported from 
his days in the New Deal. But simply being a member of the board was 
not sufficient to satisfy Hays. For two years he served, then he left 
with warm memories of his new friends and a new anecdote for his reper-
toire. According to Hays, when he first arrived in Knoxville, a news-
paper editor in Mississippi commented, "We don't know how much Mr. Hays 
knows about navigation or flood control or hydro-electric power produc-
tion, but one thing for sure, the Baptists now have access to the 
largest baptismal pool in all the world."3 
After two years of the TVA, Hays was ready when the knights of 
Camelot beckoned. In the Kennedy administration he served variously as 
assistant secretary of state for congressional relations and as special 
assistant to the president. For the most part his activities centered 
on speech making and traveling -to promote good will and spread the 
gospel of the new frontiar. One of his more exciting assignments was a 
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visit to Africa in 1963. In April of that year, Hays spent the first 
six days of the month with his wife in Liberia. They met the secre-
taries of state and education and the president. They met other politi-
cal figures and the bishops of the Protestant Episcopal and Methodist 
churches. After touring the University of Liberia, the party went to 
the agricultural experiment station at Cuttington College in the wilder-
ness. Then they departed for Nigeria. During three days in that state, 
Mr. and Mrs. Hays repeated the Liberian episode. They met with offi-
cials of the government and toured universities and Peace Corps and 
Agency for International Development facilities. Then they returned 
home, having provided nothing more than another story for the news-
papers. 4 
Such service surely was not sufficient to cause Kennedy to refer to 
Hays as "an outstanding public servant and moral leader."5 But that 
comment to the president of Southern Baptist College at Walnut Ridge, 
Arkansas, gained credibility as Hays toured the country, speaking of his 
and Kennedy's moderately liberal approach to racial problems. In a 
standard speech which he modified for presentation at Peabody College in 
Nashville, Tennessee, on July 10, 1963, Hays reiterated his long-
standing belief that laws were not applicable unless the people had the 
proper attitude. As he expressed it, "the antidote for evil is our 
idealism."6 Again, on Youth Wants to Know, Hays expressed a moderate 
view in saying that "the negroes' [sic] hope for full equality and 
acceptance of status is in the spiritual and moral leadership that the 
people of the South and other sections of the country provide."7 
Because it was little different than his, for the most part the 
Kennedy approach satisfied Hays. But he became increasingly dissatisfied 
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because he thought the White House staff was usurping the functions of 
the state department at an ever accelerating rate. In retrospect he 
recorded that the staff "was doing on a small scale and in an offensive 
way, [sic] what later the Nixon staff did so dramatically."8 All of 
that changed dramatically in November of 1963. 
On the twenty-second Hays was in Lakeland, Florida, addressing the 
luncheon meeting of the Kiwanis Club on the theme of unity. After com-
pleting the speech he returned to his motel room to prepare for a 
scheduled evening speech at Florida Southern College. As he walked into 
the room, he heard the voice of Walter Cronkite saying that Kennedy had 
just been shot seriously, perhaps fatally. Hays returned hastily to the 
White House where he noted that routine work served to keep the collec-
tive grief controlled. As a member of the staff, Hays served as hon-
orary pall bearer for Kennedy, having to borrow the formal cutaway coat 
and striped trousers from a member of his church. After the funeral 
Hays and the rest of the White House aides tendered their resignations 
as a matter of form, but the new president, Lyndon B. Johnson, kept 
Kennedy's people while the transition took place, merely adding his own 
people to the group.9 
But inevitably the atmosphere in the White House changed with the 
introduction of such a dominant force as Johnson. Although Hays was on 
amicable terms with the new president, when the opportunity for him to 
go to Rutgers arose, the White House lost a staff member. The Eagleton 
Institute of Politics at Rutgers had offered Hays its Arthur Vanderbilt 
professorship as early as 1959. At that time Hays had declined, but, 
when the university renewed its offer in 1964, he leaped at the oppor-
tunity. Having cleared his decision with the president, Hays agreed to 
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serve as a weekend White House aide while at Rutgers. For the most part 
he wrote messages for Johnson. Also, he answered the correspondence 
which came to the \\Thite House on religious matters or from religious 
figures. That was a significant reduction from the speaking schedule 
and political liaison functions which he had enjoyed under Kennedy and 
during his early months in the Johnson administration. However, Hays 
continued to make an occasipnal address for Johnson during the two years 
he served as professor in New Jersey.IO 
The Vanderbilt Professorship was a great opportunity for Hays. In 
presenting lectures and ~peaking to students, Hays found his faith in 
young people revitalized. He also spent his time in preparing a work on 
the application of the Judao-Christian ethic to politics, and he wrote 
the first manuscript for ~is memoirs, what was to be Politics is 1'.!1. 
Parish. Still he managed to deliver ISO speeches during his first year. 
And he commuted to the White House on weekends. Ever quotable, Hays 
explained: 
Before I came to Rutgers, I sat down with President Johnson 
and we agreed that I'd keep a desk in the White House as an 
unpaid consultant and would spend 80 percent of my time at 
Rutgers and 20 percent as his advisor • • • • But when I go 
down to Washington each Friday and see what he's left on the 
desk, I sometimes think that Mr. Johnson got the percentages 
reversed.II 
Hays took his assignments for Johnson gracefully and with wit. 
Moreover, when the president asked for help in the area of civil rights, 
the professor performed with serious pleasure. 
One of Johnson's most important acts as president was to force 
passage of the civil rights legisiation which had stalled in congress 
despite the best efforts of Kennedy. On June 19, I963, Kennedy appealed 
to congress to put aside sectional loyalties and to work for passage of 
legislation to guarantee equal rights to blacks. One year later, on 
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June 19, 1964, Johnson's pressure caused the Senate to capitulate. The 
House having previously agreed, the bill became law when Johnson signed 
it on July 2. The law required equality in the administration of liter-
acy tests and required an end to discrimination in determining voter 
eligibility. Also, it banned discrimination in public accommodations, 
facilities, and education. It required equal opportunity in federally 
funded programs and in employment. Finally, it strengthened or created 
agencies such as the Civil Rights Commission and the Community Relations 
Service in order to encourage or force compliance as necessary. Passed 
with support from only one Southern senator, Ralph Yarborough of Texas, 
the law faced great obstacles, especially after the governors of Missis-
sippi, Arkansas, and several other Southern states declared their re-
fusal to enforce it unless the Supreme Court ruled it valid, an act 
which occurred only in December.12 
Expecting strong opposition, Johnson created a committee of promi-
nent individuals who were to augment the work of the Community Relations 
Service by giving "their influence, their skills, and their time to the 
crucial task of fostering voluntary observance of the provisions of the 
bill," as Johnson defined it to Hays.13 One of those chosen to serve 
was Hays. At that point Hays' moderation became open advocacy. His 
message came through clearly in a speech he presented to an audience in 
little Rock on December 7. After preliminary remarks about his devotion 
to his home state and about his increased effectiveness after he became 
a non-politician, he hit hard by telling the audience that the debate 
over federal involvement in areas of state prerogative had ended. The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was law, and the law-abiding citizens of 
Arkansas had no alternative but to obey. Furthermore, it was 
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economically advantageous to allow full entry of blacks into their 
society. Reviving the chivalrous heritage of the South, Hays next told 
his listeners that, having lost their war to preserve segregation, honor 
required them to accept the terms of the victors. Those terms were 
clear: first abandon paternalism for equality and, second, as the 
decision making power was clearly at the national level, participate as 
vigorously as possible to insure that future decisions reflect Southern 
as well as Northern preferences. In sum, the South must not only com-
ply; it must lead the way to true justice and equality.14 
Not everyone in the South was prepared to accept the decision of 
congress, the president, and the courts. Many who tried to follow the 
law found the opposition to be vigorous. In the summer of 1964, the 
Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) led a voter registra-
tion drive in Mississippi. Three workers died violently. In Georgia 
two Klansmen won acquittal of the murder of Lemuel Penn, a black 
teacher. Not until 1970 were the murderers of the four found guilty and 
forced to begin sentences of three to ten years. In the interim, in 
March of 1965, police attacked civil rights demonstrators in Selma, 
Alabama, and another worker died. Johnson demanded and received the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 which prohibited any discrimination in voting 
and authorized federal officials to protect voters from fraud. Finally, 
the fifteenth amendment was in for~e.15 
Throughout the turbulent period, Hays continued to labor to win 
his section's peaceful acceptance of civil rights as a reality. In 
January of 1965, he found himself forced to cancel a scheduled speech in 
Bogalusa, Louisiana, after the Klan there threatened him, and the gover-
nor asked him to stay away.16 Given the problems of the South at the 
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time, Hays undoubtedly made the right decision. The setback failed to 
deter him from speaking on behalf of Johnson's policies, however. 
Shortly after passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Hays addressed 
the National Conference on Citizenship and noted that the American sys-
tem was one in which moral men had the right to change immoral laws. If 
Southerners continued to object to the civil rights legislation, they 
had the right to change the law by using the system, but "criticism and 
defiance must ·be distinguished."17 
Gradually defiance died away as more Southerners came to accept the 
futility of overt resistance. Encouraging signals came to Hays first 
from Mississippi. First, in September of 1965, Hays reported to Cliff 
Carter of the Democratic National Committee that Democrats in Missis-
sippi were slowly coming to recognize that the defiance which had caused 
them to lose their credentials to a black delegation at the convention 
of 1964 was futile. They were starting to cooperate not only with 
blacks but with organized labor as well. In December Hays was able to 
report that his attendance at the Mississippi State Council on Human 
Relations coincided with a momentous occasion. For the first time ever, 
an integrated public meeting occurred in Jackson, Mississippi, and it 
took place without any disturbance. If relations between the races were 
mending so well in Mississippi, possibly they were progressing in the 
rest of the South as well, stated Hays.18 
In December of 1965, Hays received a more definite assignment from 
the president. Johnson asked Hays to become associate director of the 
Community Relations Service. Having been one of the creators of the 
off ice during the Kennedy administration, Hays had no reluctance about 
accepting once the office became a reality. Although Johnson had doubts 
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about the willingness of Hays to serve under Roger Wilkins, a black 
Northerner many years younger and without the extensive experience of 
the former congressman, Hays dismissed those apprehensions and happily 
assumed the position. At the swearing in ceremony for Wilkins, Johnson 
acknowledged Hays' behavior by telling the new director that he had one 
of the best available assistants.19 As it turned out the assignment 
lasted only a short time for Hays. Early in 1966 he was getting the 
urge to return to the campaign trail. Appointment by Johnson to the 
board of Foreign Scholarships and requests for his advice on implemen-
tation of the voting rights project were not sufficient to dissuade Hays 
from seeking the governorship of Arkansas. Brooks Hays resigned from 
the Johnson administration, and as a final gesture of friendship Johnson 
posed in his private White House quarters with the new candidate, a man 
in his late sixties.20 
Stimulus for Hays' decision came from Bill Penix of Jonesboro, a 
man whose record included service as attorney for the school board of 
Hoxie, Arkansas, when that board won a landmark decision in 1956 which 
committed the federal government to assist school districts which en-
countered opposition as they attempted to comply with the desegregation 
rulings. Penix wrote to Hays on March 5, 1966, that the Democrats of 
Arkansas were increasingly discontented with Orval Faubus. However, 
Penix cautioned, Faubus had a good chance of winning the Democratic nom-
ination because none of the prominent Democrats in the state were 
willing to oppose the former governor if he chuse to regain his posi-
tion. Statewide polls indicated that even former supporters of Faubus 
were desirous of a new candidate to contest Winthrop Rockefeller. Only 
a few Democrats had the reputation to challenge Faubus, and the most 
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widely known of them was Brooks Hays. According to Penix, Hays had a 
good chance of defeating Rockefeller if the presidential advisor chose 
to run. Hays was leaving Rutgers and his presidential duties were be-
coming more occasional, so he consulted his son, Steele, and other 
advisors. Encouraging signs came in a report by the Washington Post 
that Winthrop Rockefeller had won 45 percent of the black vote in 1964 
despite the increasing liberalizati~n of Faubus on the race issue since 
1957, a liberalization which included the hiring of blacks for positions 
within his administration. Blacks and whites alike were tired of 
Faubus, and their unnatural alliance with the Republican party seemed 
ready to disappear if Hays proved a viable candidate. The signs were 
promising, but speculation about the role of Faubus continued to disturb 
the candidate until early April. Then Hays and Faubus met and agreed 
that neither was to interfere with the other. Faubus announced that he 
was not in the running unless the party failed to find a legitimate 
opponent for Rockefeller. Hays ran a poll which confirmed his popu-
larity; then he announced his intention of being a governor who coop-
erated with the federal government while keeping that government from 
assuming a dominant role in the relationship.21 
The campaign began well, but Arkansas politics were noted for 
unpredictability. The day after Hays made his decision public, he 
received a letter from a student at Georgetown University. Probably the 
first campaign volunteer in Hays' race of 1966 was Bill Clinton whose 
only request was that Hays allow a delay for school to end. Optimism 
grew in the Hays camp as contributions came from as far away as Florida 
and Georgia. In April the pol~s remained favorable and the filing dead-
line passed, so no surprises were expected. In May hope remained strong 
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that Hays would finish well enough in the eight-man race to participate 
in the inevitable runoff. Advertising stressed the experience of Hays 
as advisor to four presidents, co-author of the G.I. Bill and the Bi-
Partisan foreign policy resolution, and educator. Hays did nothing to 
hurt his chances when he returned to Russellville for a "Kick-Off Rally" 
in June. He promised the nearly 2,000 people there that he would 
increase welfare benefits, ?top illegal gambling in Hot Springs, and 
reorganize the state government. But the optimism of Hays and his sup-
porters proved false. Jim Johnson, the man who had achieved his first 
prominence during the Li~tle Rock struggle when he developed all the 
techniques of Orval Faubus and surpassed the master almost immediately, 
waged an effective campaign in 1966. He lambasted the federal govern-
ment and the man so closely tied to it, Brooks Hays. He attacked Faubus 
as a man who had sold out and identified himself closely with George 
Wallace whose racist campaign in Alabama had gone so favorably earlier 
in the year. Johnson also utilized his attractive wife as an effective 
campaigner. Compounding the problems of the Hays candidacy, a new young 
liberal appeared on the scene. Sam Boyce, the thirty-four year old 
prosecuting attorney at Newport, attracted black and white liberal votes 
which earlier had gone to Hays. When it was all over, Hays ran third, 
far behind Johnson and the moderate J. Frank Holt. Hays threw his sup-
port to Holt as the candidate of party unity, but in the runoff Johnson 
defeated Holt. Roy Reed of the New York Times assessed the victory as a 
protest against Lyndon Johnson, civil rights demonstrations, and the 
liberal programs of the national Democrats. After the primary Hays 
moved to better things, and Johnson fell victim to a lopsided 
Rockefeller victory in the general election.22 
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Defeated again and without even an appointive government position 
in prospect, Hays found new outlets for his political urges. As he had 
30 years earlier, when he had no position he created one. As the 
political climate of the South worsened in the white backlash, Hays and 
other concerned Southerners established the Southern Committee on Poli-
tical Ethics (SCOPE). Late in 1967 George Wallace, visible symbol of 
segregationist resistance in Alabama, came to be regarded seriously as a 
potential presidential candidate. That candidacy appeared a threat to 
the image which moderates had worked so vigorously to create of a truly 
New South. To counter the impression that the region was a hotbed of 
Wallacism, Hays and other liberal and moderate Southerners, men like 
Rodding Carter and Vernon Jordan, created SCOPE as an agency to win full 
and equal participation for blacks. As Hays noted, SCOPE was designed 
to correct the wrong turning which the South had taken when it disf ran-
chised blacks rather than training both blacks and whites to solve their 
mutual problems. Beyond full participation for minorities, SCOPE planned 
a program of voter education, an effort to return dignity to politics, 
and, a fight for free discussion of all issues. Targets for its efforts 
included racism, apathy, voting irregularities, and excessive campaign 
spending.23 
Coming into existence in reaction to the rise of Wallace, SCOPE, as 
well as its leaders, endured speculation that the organization was 
nothing more than a stop Wallace movement. When asked by a reporter, 
Jordan responded, according to the Atlanta Constitution for November 11, 
1967, that "just like racism, the South has no monopoly on backward 
political leadership," implying but not specifying that the organization 
had national aspirations. As acting chairman during the initial stages, 
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Hays was more specific and refrained from criticizing the supporters of 
Wallace. Hays specifically denied that there was any intent to deny 
access to the ballot to any third party candidate. Such an idea was 
unethical. In January of 1968, Hays expanded his arguments. According 
to him, SCOPE came into existence to promote ethics and improve the 
reputation of public service by educating people. It remained committed 
to the position that everyone had the right to vote, even if they voted 
for the candidates of third or fourth parties. On the other hand, no 
one had the right to remove a major party candidate from the ballot as 
had happened to Lyndon Johnson in 1964. The problems which SCOPE sought 
to correct--voter apathy, denial of minority voting, a one-party system, 
and the lack of voter education..,.-had results such as the 16.9 percent 
turnout in the Arkansas congressional election of 1964 or the turnout in 
1966 of only 25.8 percent despite simultaneous congressional and guber-
natorial contests. Even the national average turnout was only 46 per-
cent.24 With such grandiose aspirations, SCOPE had potential; however, 
the organization failed to gain support and faded after the initial 
flurry of .publicity. After 1968 the organization was inactive, but it 
was significant as an indicator of the continuing concern of Hays for 
improvement in the political process. 
Less ambitious, less controversial, and more lasting was the next 
project which Hays initiated, the Former Members of Congress (FMOC).. In 
1970 Hays decided to create an organization to utilize a wasted resource 
of great potential value, retired congressmen. By October the organiza-
tion had more than 300 charter members. Even before that, in June, the 
FMOC was planning a history of .congress, something left undone prev-
iously. As late as 1974J however, the organization still searched 
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for grants to finance the oral histories and collection of documents. 
Other projects proposed by the FMOC included a study of means to make 
congress stronger, a national visitors center, and a congressional 
cemetery. The most successful venture of the FMOC was its effort to 
have a member address the congress on an annual basis. Also of value 
was the honor bestowed on one of its members when Hays received the 
distinction of making an address at Congressional Hall as the highlight 
of the bicentennial celebration of the first continental congress. By 
1974 membership grew to approximately 400, including former president 
Gerald Ford. By 1980 the organization was stable, and the younger 
members handled its activities. Hays and his associate in so much of 
his activity in Washington, Walter Judd, had become honorary members of 
the board of the congressional alumni association which the former 
created and the latter helped to prosper.25 
Hays remained in demand as a speaker as he enjoyed his seventh 
decade of life. In the fall of 1970, he taught a government course at 
North Carolina State University. When that assignment ended, he 
returned to Washington, D.C., and to speaking out on public affairs. In 
1971 at Little Rock, he stated that peace was hopeless without the 
United Nations because law was necessary to the world. He advocated 
changing the organization by eliminating the veto, weighted voting, and 
the U.N. military force. Five days later, on April 21, he was in 
Indianapolis, Indi~na, to address the National Conference of Christians 
and Jews, still one of his affiliations. At a news conference prior to 
his speech, Hays advocated ·bussing if it were for the good of the chil-
dren. Of course, he cautioned that it must be done with the proper 
attitude, something which the controversial Supreme Court decision was 
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not to create. As earlier, this interim period was not fully satis-
fying, and Hays surely had time to contemplate his rejection of the 
attempt to draft him as a candidate for congress from North Carolina in 
1970.26 
In 1972 Hays decided that he had a chance to defeat Wilmer "Vinegar 
Bend" Mizell, Republican incumbent in the fifth congressional district 
of North Carolina. In making his announcement at Winston-Salem, home of 
Wake Forest University and the Ecumenical Institute which he created, 
Hays noted the similarities between his old district in Arkansas and the 
one he sought in North Carolina. Little Rock and Winston-Salem were 
approximately the same size, and both dominated areas of similar geogra-
phy, piedmont and mountains. Finally, both districts were primarily 
agricultural. For Hays it was like being back home in 1933. But times 
had changed, as had Hays. In a time of inflation and unemployment, Hays 
claimed his congressional experience as an asset. He had seen it all 
before. As for his age, nearly 74, the voters were to determine if that 
mattered.27 
Having announced, Hays attempted to help the national party. At a 
kick-off dinner for 72 congressional Democrats, Hays reminded his audi-
ence that they had a tradition of being experimenting and bold. He 
called on them to create a mature and responsible populism. Then he 
returned to his fight with Mizell. In July he announced his intention 
to walk across his entire district before the day of the election.28 
Two days into the walk, on July 17, a Hays man on the scene sent a 
report to Warren Cikins, Hays' aide in every venture for at least 20 
years. Already the candidate had given 23 speeches in the district, 
and the crowds responded warmly. The walk was going well, even if it 
was the butt of many jokes, and it benefitted by the presence of Sam 
Ervin, senior senator from North Carolina. The campaign might have 
been better if Hays had been bullish enough to attack Mizell's 
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record, but it was going well enough, especially in the north around 
Winston-Salem where party organization and Southern Baptists were 
strong. Calculations were that Hays needed a 3,000 to 6,000 vote edge 
there to balance Mizell's strength in his home county. The correspon-
dent, who signed only as "Lloyd," described Mizell's county as "Full of 
true Faulkner rednecks. They love[d] baseball, chewin' tobacco, and 
simpletons like Wilmer."29 Lloyd's report to Hays on the next day was 
more cautionary. 
Lloyd told Hays that the walking tour made good press and that the 
North Carolina organization was attempting to gain mileage from a vaca-
tion Hays had taken in London. Mizell was searching for an issue 
because his attempts to stress his role in getting flood relief for the 
district failed to draw interest when no aid materialized. That aspect 
was good, reported Lloyd, but problems with the national ticket were 
potentially troublesome for Hays. The local press was hostile to George 
McGovern, Democratic presidential candidate in 1972, and South-side 
Democrats were talking about repudiating both the national and the local 
tickets. Hays received a warning to keep quiet about the national con-
vention.30 For a while he did. 
As the walk continued, the organization sought ammunition for use 
against Mizell. In August, Group Research, Inc., reported its findings 
about the Republican. Certainly Mizell was conservative, but there was 
no evidence that he belonged to any organized right wing group, reported 
Group Research. Lacking evidence of that sort, the campaign continued 
206 
to emphasize the walk until Hays began, in September, to attack Mizell's 
record. When a liberal piece of legislation, the Hill-Burton hospital 
bill, failed to survive a presidential veto, Hays blasted Mizell for 
failing to vote for overriding. At the same time Hays attacked Mizell 
for his recent publicizing of a grant to a hospital within the district. 
As Hays pointed out and Mizell did not, the grant came despite Mizell. 
Shortly thereafter, Hays endorsed McGovern, especially the commitment of 
the national candidate to peace in Vietnam. In late 1972 Hays was 
unable to find any further moral justification for the war.31 By the 
time of his endorsement of McGovern, an unpopular position with the 
voters of the fifth district, Hays had little to lose. 
On October 5 the High Point Enterprise described Hays' problems. 
Even though Hays had walked 100 miles, his campaign was run on a shoe 
string and shoe leather. Mizell was popular in the district, and he 
campaigned little, thus reducing his chances of making a mistake. There 
was one possible issue in the construction of the New River Dam, an 
action opposed by conservationists, farmers, and Hays; however, the big 
excitement in the district centered on the naming of a new court house, 
and the political mileage in that issue was minimal for Hays. The only 
advantage for Hays was that Democrats outnumbered Republicans by two to 
one. Unfortunately, Democrats had voted for Mizell in both 1968 and 
1970, and they had no reason to change in 1972. Richard Nixon was 
popular, and his coattails were long. The only encouraging sign to Hays 
was a letter from old friend Harry Ahsmore of the Arkansas Gazette, a 
letter which read in part, "I haven't been represented in Congress since 
they stole your last seat."32 
As the campaign wound its last miles, Hays took time out to raise 
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money, and Mizell finally attacked his opponent. Neither did especially 
well. The Hays forces held a fundraising auction using items collected 
from prominent friends of the candidate. Carl Albert provided his 
gavel, and Mike Mansfield gave a pen. Books came from Ed Muskie, Birch 
Bayh, Edward Kennedy, and Vance Hartke. Sam Ervin gave an ashtray and 
Hays himself donated his walking shoes with the provision that they not 
be taken until the final eighteen miles were added to the 113 already on 
them. The auction raised $1,080, including $2.00 for the pen which did 
not work.33 That show of support was followed immediately by Mizell's 
attack. 
Mizell accused Hays of opposing the tobacco interests which were so 
important to North Carolina. Hays had served on the national fund-
raising committee which gave money to Frank Moss of Utah in 1970, and 
Moss was a leader of the anti-tobacco forces in congress. However, Hays 
pointed out that his work in 1970 had been to raise money for Democrats 
of all types. Sam Ervin, quoted in the Winston-Salem newspapers, dis-
missed the charge, saying "if that's the only charge they can bring 
against a man like Brooks Hays, then he is assured of salvation"--
salvation perhaps, but not victory.34 
After his defeat at the hands of Mizell, Hays returned to Washing-
ton, D.C., and regained his role as elder statesman. Richard Nixon had 
defeated George McGovern in a landslide, and the Republican president 
began immediately, at least in the view of some Democrats, to abuse his 
mandate. After Nixon refused to spend all the money allocated by 
congress, the senate subcommitte on separation of powers began a hearing 
on executive impoundment of appropriated funds. Hays received an invi-
tation from Ervin to testify in late January or early February. The 
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hearings resolved nothing, and Watergate soon overshadowed the issue of 
impoundment. Hays' role in the Watergate investigation consisted merely 
of offering his recommendations that the size and authority of the White 
House staff undergo reduction. He also advocated general nomination and 
campaign reforms and education of the public, but he offered no specific 
solutions. Another area of concern which Hays addressed in 1973 was 
related to Vietnam. At Virginia Tech in April, Hays stated that deser-
tion was ignoble, but time had proved many draft evaders to be right.35 
Elder statesmen were permitted to make suggestions and express contro-
versial opinions while younger people ran the country. 
Hays gained a few more entries in his list of memberships and 
honors during 1973. He became a member of the policy board of the 
Institute for American Democracy (!AD) in February; the !AD was another 
organization intended to preserve democracy through education. More ex-
citing to Hays was his election once again as president of the FMOC. As 
he put it, referring back to his loss to Mizell, "I was just so thrilled 
to be elected to something."36 Seventy-five years of age and 45 years a 
politician, Hays showed no signs of letting his dreams fade. 
The 15 years after the disaster at Little Rock were years of great 
changes in the United States. The civil rights revolution ebbed and 
surged until it was swallowed by white backlash and the Wallace move-
ment. Camelot and the New Frontier came and went quickly, and the Great 
Spciety fared little better, disappearing in the whirlwind created by 
Vietnam. Finally, Richard Nixon promised law and order but fell in dis-
grace when he forgot that his promises included himself. Through all 
the times of crisis and disappointment, the United States moved unstead-
ily close to its ideals. By 1973 civil rights were real if not 
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universal. The commitments to the poor and the helpless which began to a 
great extent under Kennedy and Johnson remained valid if weakened. The 
war was ending, and already the search for a better approach had begun. 
And the lawlessness which elected and destroyed Nixon was reverting to 
traditional forms. 
Throughout the period, in one way or another, Brooks Hays had a 
significant role to play as advisor, educator, or scold. In all aspects 
Hays did well, growing more committed to black equality, peace, and jus-
tice as the years passed. Between 1958 and 1973 Brooks Hays, the 
Southern moderate with tendencies to compromise as expedient, grew into 
a sincere and committed liberal whose preferences were for what was 
right, even if right was unpopular. As he discovered in the elections 
of 1966 and 1972, there was less change in his South than there was in 
him. Hays knew the rules of political survival, but sometimes he forgot 
to play by them. 
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CHAPTER IX 
RELIGION, FROM BAPTIST TO ECUMENICAL, 1963-1974 
Disinclined as he was to retire from public service, so was Hays 
equally determined to remain as active as possible in his service to 
religion. From his early years Hays had been less parochial than many 
of his co-religionists. The movement toward cooperation with other 
groups which Hays stimulated as president of the Southern Baptist Con-
vention was only a small indicator of what Hays was to do once released 
from the constraints of Baptist opinion. In the 1960s and 1970s Hays 
increasingly pursued the goal of bringing all Christians into closer 
relationship with one another. The ecumenical idea came to be of pri-
mary importance to Hays although he retained his ties to the Baptists 
and continued to pursue more narrow concerns. 
In 1964 Hays addressed the Baptist Jubilee Celebration in Atlantic 
City, New Jersey. In his remarks he said of Christian religion that "it 
cannot become the church triumphant until it becomes the church uni-
versal. "I Hays' faith in ecumenicity, the belief that all Christian 
churches should cooperate if not combine, had intensified since the time 
when he told Grace Carson in 1959 that she need not worry about Baptists 
combining with Roman Catholics or Satanists, two groups not especially 
dissimilar according to Mrs. Carson.2 In line with his ecumenism, in 
1964, Hays was in the process of having an experience given to no other 
protestant layman. Having enjoyed the distinction of meeting one pope 
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in the Vatican, he was contemplating meeting another. 
In 1963 an old friendship proved to be beneficial to Hays. In his 
work with poor farmers during the 1930s, Hays had occasion to meet a 
parish priest in Iowa, Luigi Ligutti. Through the 1940s and 1950s the 
relationship continued as the two men maintained a common interest in 
the problems of rural poverty and improved relations among Christians. 
By 1963 Monsignor Ligutti had become advisor to Pope John XXIII on rural 
life. Ligutti arranged for the former leader of the Baptists and his 
wife to meet in the Vatican with John XXIII on October 23, 1963.3 
The meeting began auspiciously. John broke the ice by stating, 
"Mr. Hays, I know you are a Baptist, and Baptists and Catholics haven't 
always loved each other as good Christians should, but I am a Baptist 
I J h .. 4 too, am o n. From then on the audience went smoothly. Much of 
what went on was reserved for Vatican release, but Hays did report that 
the conversation featured the Hays family. John indicated that Hays' 
daughter, Betty, whose birthday it happened to be, was to be included by 
name in his prayers, as would be the other members of the family. 
Significant to Hays because of the Catholic dogma that non-Catholic 
Christians were the "separated brethren," was the parting comment of the 
pope that "We are brothers in Christ."5 
Shortly after the visit, John XXIII began failing and, despite the 
prayers of many--including Brooks Hays~-yeilded his worldly tasks to 
another. The new pope assumed the name Paul VI. Paul shared his prede-
cessor's interest in improving relations among Christian denominations. 
Also, Ligutti continued to serve in the Vatican.6 Thus, when friends of 
Hays suggested a meeting, the a~rangements went smoothly. In July of 
1964, Claude Nelson wrote the Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church that 
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Hays "and his friends think that there would be ecumenical profit in his 
being received by Pope Paul, if possible."7 
On September 28, 1964, without his wife Marion, Hays met with Paul 
VI. To Hays, Paul appeared "less spontaneous ar:.d more formal" than 
John, but gentle and charming.8 The conversation was informal, and its 
highlight came when Hays' escort, Father Thomas Stransky of Milwaukee, 
mentioned that Hays was scheduled to speak before the Protestant Men of 
the Chapel, an organization of protestant military personnel in Europe~ 
Paul promised that he would pray for the success of the meeting. As the 
audience drew to a close, the pope asked Hays to attend the Vatican 
Council meeting of the next day. That simple request caused Stransky to 
comment to Hays about the necessity for a period of scrambling to get 
the five signatures necessary to admit Hays to the meeting. Ever the 
wit, Hays told Stransky not t.o worry because the pope had said it was to 
be done, and the Baptist believed in papal infallibility. Once on that 
theme Hays had to relate another anecdote. At the Vatican Council of 
1870 which established infallibility, one of the two votes in opposition 
to the doctrine came from the Bishop of Little Rock. According to Hays, 
when Pope Pius IX heard of the vote, he said, "So the Big Rock rolled 
over the Little Rock."9 
Returned to the United States, Hays discussed his general impres-
sions of the council meeting. He indicated that the Catholic Church 
seemed to be changing its attitude toward other religions in an attempt 
to ease tensions. Especially exciting to Hays was the elimination of 
the traditional blaming of Jews for the death of Christ. Of course, 
Hays had to end on a humorous ,note. As he told it, he had often bragged 
about his ten million Southern Baptists. But after speaking with the 
pope, whose flock numbered 500 million, Hays for the first time felt 
like a member of a minority.IO 
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Hays' concern for improving relations with other churches had a 
more permanent expression than merely speaking to leaders such as the 
popes. From its founding in 1968 until his "retirement" in 1972, Hays 
headed the Ecumenical Institute at Wake Forest University. Baptists 
were changing, as was indicated by the lack of negative response to 
Hays' meetings with the popes, and Baptists were beginning to examine· 
not only their own past but the history of the Catholic Church as well. 
Beginning the institute, Hays had to prepare an explanation of what 
it was intended to do. Entitled "The Ecumenical Institute, Wake Forest 
University," the four-page typewritten document began by denying that 
the institute was to be directly involved in politics. However, as Hays 
noted, the realities forced it to have a place in a political world. As 
he put it, only if governments permitted their citizens to enjoy greater 
religious freedom could the interchange of ideas between Catholics and 
Baptists occur. If, for instance, the government of Spain objected, the 
ecumenical principle was void for all Spaniards, and they, as a conse-
quence, would be forced to remain ignorant of the outside world of the 
Baptists. 
However, before trying to open communications, Baptists had to edu-
cate themselves. From a leading Baptist university, the people of the 
institute hoped to research the history of the universal church of the 
middle ages as well as the turbulent nineteenth century from which 
sprang the Southern Baptists. Hays intended the institute to explore 
not only the church but the individual in search of a personal God as 
well. As he wrote, on the one hand, 
We will be looking at the Church which crowned and deposed 
Emperors; on the other, at a people who looked for their 
reward in heaven out of a world which was chopping the state 
into a reign of terror, and which was willing to settle for a 
world divided into spirit and flesh, mind and matter. 11 
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Noting that young people were increasingly leaving the church for 
secular service in such agencies as the Peace Corps, Hays stressed that 
it was yet possible to keep social service and religion as one. What he 
sought was "that church which can redeem the state by taking it up into 
its sacred arms."12 Simply put, the Ecumenical Institute sought by 
exploration of the past to provide for Baptists a valid basis for their 
relationship with Catholics. By knowing what _Catholicism had been, they 
could understand what it was. Placing themselves in the shoes of the 
"enemy," they would see that the supposed foe actually was seeking the 
same goals as they were. ·Hays closed by saying, "when we have walked in 
the other man's shoes for a while by walking down his historical 
pilgrimage--then and only then can we talk meaningfully together about 
the present and the future."13 
The Ecumenical Institute was one method by which Hays sought to 
spread his belief in the unity of man, even with religious and political 
differences. Another way of bringing the denominations together was by 
the use of humor. Possibly the most extreme use of the technique came 
in a speech, before the National Conference on Problems of Rural Youth 
in a Changing Environment, which Hays presented at Stillwater, Oklahoma, 
on September 24, 1963. First he told about a Baptist preacher. Then he 
added one about the rural preacher who had his sermon notes destroyed by 
his daughter's dog. That Sunday the preacher explained to the congrega-
tion, as Hays said, "Brethern (sic) I have no sermon. I just have to 
talk as the Lord directs. But I promise to do better next Sunday." 
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Moving right along, Hays presented a joke about an Episcopalian and a 
nice story about how, after the Alford campaign, he felt unable to eat 
his Wheaties but Marion said, "You eat it. You are still a champ." 
That was his Methodist story. Not yet satisfied, Hays next told a joke 
about the Lutherans and finished with two old classics. The better of 
the two concerned the attempted consolidation of the Baptist and 
Christian churches at Russellville. As Hays put it, one opponent of the 
move ended his speech of opposition by saying, "I'm a Baptist and nobody 
is going to make a Christian out of me. The message was Hays' old one 
that "we can clasp hands across these differences of ecclesiastical and 
political ideologies and be friends and fellow Americans, and work 
together for the good of our country."14 
Another aspect of the work of the Ecumenical Institute was its 
attempt to revive the enthusiasm of the young. In the 1960s Hays worked 
extensively with college audiences. Between September and December of 
1963, he toured 115 Methodist and three Western Methodist universities 
and spoke before student audiences. The themes rarely varied, and Hays 
used a reliable format. An audience at Iowa State University in 1961 
heard Hays say, "religion is not a frill, it is not one of the things 
that we can accept or leave alone," and there must be "an intensifica-
tion of devotion to the things that are bound up in the Judaic-Christian 
concept of man's dignity, of God's fatherhood and. of man's brotherhood 
and of all nations' sisterhood."15 According to Hays, "We are looking 
for people in religious life who will make their religion a constructive 
and a practical force."16 Whether through humor or through his ecumeni-
cal activites, that simple message remained constant as Hays left his 
mark on the human experience. But, of course, Hays always did more than 
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rest securely in his ivory tower, whence he could emerge occasionally to 
joust with the villains of this world. Even in his sixties the old war-
rior continued his efforts to translate the theory into a reality of 
better and more humane conditions of life for all. 
In May of 1964, Hays addressed the Baptist Jubilee Celebration and 
challenged his people to leave their shells. As he reminded them. "It 
is in keeping with our Baptipt traditions that the importance of polit-
ical government be acknowledged and the necessity of penetrating our 
social environment be emphasized."17 However, when the Baptists and 
other fundamentalists endeavored to enter the political arena for a pur-
pose which he felt to be wrong, Hays remained independent of his denom-
ination. The issue was prayer in the public schools, a problem created 
by the Supreme Court's decision that mandatory prayer was in violation 
of the concept of separation of church and state. One method of return-
ing religion to the classroom was by means of a constitutional 
amendment. While fundamentalists throughout the country were signing 
petitions to that end, Hays wrote to Emanuel Cellar, chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee. Rather than arguing from the customary 
constitutional position about church-state separation, Hays explained 
one basic reason for his opposition to the amendment to require prayer 
in schools. To Hays, a prayer required by law was essentially meaning-
less. His position agreed with that of the Baptist Joint Committee, a 
much more ecumenical agency than was the SBc.18 The amendment failed to 
survive, not because Brooks Hays was such a force, but because his view 
was more in keeping with American tradition and opinion. It was pos-
sible to be right without being controversial. 
Equally non-controversial but more immediately useful was the 
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service which Hays performed for Worldwide Bible Reading in 1964. With 
radio and television personalities Bud Collyer and Hugh Downs, Hays 
recorded excerpts from the Bible to be distributed wherever Christians 
or potential Christians might desire them.19 Hays did whatever he could 
to spread the gospel. 
At Bethany College of West Virginia, Hays introduced a variation on 
his theme of cooperation. While mentioning the need for urban dwellers 
to work together, Hays suggested an educational reform which died still-
born. To Hays, the need was for theologians to receive a political edu-
cation and politicians tQ learn theology.20 Such an experience would 
allow politicians and theologians to understand one another just as the 
Ecumenical Institute was to bring Baptists and Catholics together. 
Having developed the solution to the matter of communication 
between religious and political leaders, Hays made a political trip to 
Arkansas because of his religious leadership. At least as early as 
January of 1957, Hays had advocated observer status for the SBC at the 
United Nations. The denomination was the only one unrepresented in that 
body, even at that comparatively early date. When finally the SBC com-
mitted itself to the world government, the first Southern Baptist 
observer was none other than Brooks Hays. Thus it was fitting that the 
speaker at Arkansas United Nations Day was the state's former son. The 
speech was hardly a major departure. Hays said that the Communist 
Chinese were not going to gain admission to the U.N. unless guarantees 
for Nationalist China materialized at the same time. Also, China had to 
become peace-loving and back away from her borders. That combination 
was unanticipated by Hays in the immediate future. Hays seized the 
opportunity of the question period to reaffirm his belief in the 
morality of college students and to deny any intention to run for the 
governorship of Arkansas, a decision which changed in the next year, 
1966.21 
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While in Arkansas Hays involved himself in a controversy which 
indicated that the SBC had not abandoned its concern for orthodoxy in 
ritual and belief. His church in Russellville found itself expelled 
from the Arkansas Baptist Convention. During the early 1960s the church 
had begun extending its relations with Catholics and blacks. Generally 
the SBC was becoming more flexible on all but the traditional moral 
issues such as pornography and consumption of alcohol and the new moral 
issues such as abortion. The new openness extended in some congre-
gations to a looser interpretation of the requirements for membership. 
After a re-examination of the scriptures, pastor Charles B. Thompson of 
the First Baptist Church of Russellville led his congregation to accept 
alien immersion, Baptism in a non-Baptist church, as a sufficient com-
mitment to Christ to obviate the customary re-baptism required by more 
conservative SBC congregations. Also, the Russellville church began to 
practice open communion, allowing the Lord's Supper to all who believed 
themselves in a fit state to receive it rather than restricting commun-
ion to those who met the criteria of the person who administered the 
sacrament. 
On October 15, 1965, the Dardanelle-Russellville Association voted 
to exclude the Russellville church from associational meetings. In 
November the state convention refused to seat the Russellville dele-
gates, and it resolved that alien immersion and open communion were not 
valid practices in its member congregations.22 Brooks Hays attempted to 
ease the situation by reminding the Baptists that one of their basic 
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precepts was the autonomy of the local congregation. But the Baptists 
continued to be dominated--on this issue at least--by the conservatives. 
In 1968 three more churches lost their rights for similar reasons, but 
at the same time the state convention sought to bring them back, defeat-
ing its own efforts by requiring as the price for re-admission a return 
to close immersion and close communion. Even as late as 1974, when 
Russellville First Baptist sought seats for its messengers, the expecta-
tion of a strong challenge led them to withdraw despite the return of 
the congregation to the conservative practices of close immersion and 
close communion. In 1975 the Russellville messengers attended the state 
convention. Indicative of the difficulty of achieving unity under the 
loose structure of the SBC was the fact that as early as 1966 the 
national convention refused to deny seats to the Russellville delega-
tion. The national president rejected a motion not to seat them. He 
ruled that the national organization had no power to regulate the prac-
tices of individual congregations in matters of such a nature.23 
Although Hays failed to influence the Baptists of his home state as 
they suffered through a period of vacillation between modernism and 
traditionalism, he did gain acknowledgement for his advanced positions 
in human relations. For instance, in March of 1965, he received the 
first Distinguished Service Award for Leadership in Christian Social 
Ethics. In his remarks he drew a parallel between Paul going to Rome 
when provincial justice proved inadequate and the need for action from 
Washington, D.C., on behalf of black Americans.24 Hays was seemingly 
becoming more liberal as he grew older. The man who had attempted to 
delay civil rights by means of the Arkansas Plan, the Southern Mani-
festo, and his vote against even the weak Civil Rights Act of 1957, had 
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moved by 1965 to the point that he was advocating black pressure on the 
national government for faster enforcement of the law. In other areas 
Hays was establishing himself as a legitimate liberal of the 1960s and 
1970s although his rea~ons were more religious than humanistic. 
An issue which had not been of especially active concern to Hays in 
his youth was capital punishment. Normally, he was silent on the issue, 
and his unwillingness to intercede with more than minimal effort in the 
case of the Blytheville two despite the resulting execution of the two 
was indicative of his limited concern. By the late 1960s, however, Hays 
was strongly and openly ~pposed to legalized murder. As he wrote to 
Mrs. Marion Wright in 1969, capital punishment was "of dubious effec-
tiveness in detering (sic) crime," and it was contrary to Christianity. 
Aside from being too permanent, state executions were usurpations of the 
prerogative of God. Also, during his service as assistant attorney gen-
eral of Arkansas, Hays had witnessed the execution of a sixteen year 
old, and the memory remained with him, he said.25 
With such attitudes it was not s~rprising that Hays encouraged 
those who attempted to end capi.tal punishment wherever it existed. For 
example, when South Carolina did away with its death penalty, Hays sent 
a letter of thanks to Governor John West for his courageous efforts in 
the struggle for repeal. And Hays used all of his letter writing skills 
in a message to James S. Ramsey in 1971. Beginning with a statement 
that "I have long been convinced that no state should take human life," 
Hays went on to argue that "The Bible does not read '.Thou Shalt Not Kill 
unless thou art a state' or 'Vengeance is mine, saith the state, I will 
repay.'" As well as the religious argument, Hays utilized the liberal 
position that capital punishment tended to be exercised in a 
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discriminatory manner. Hays reminded Ramsey that "When a state finds 
that it cannot administer the penalty fairly and justly, favoring or 
condemning no one because of wealth, social station or race, it should 
abandon the penalty."26 
While working to make society more humane, Hays continued to prod 
his Baptists into greater activity in the real world. In The Baptist 
Program for February of 1970, he wrote a short article in which he ind-
icated that Baptists were too important to exclude themselves from the 
world movement for greater cooperation. If they would only learn that 
ecumenicity and union were not synonymous, then they could begin to work 
with others. They had to begin helping one another and working with 
other Christians, at least on an informal basis, because there was a 
need fc;>r reexamination of church-state relations so that the church 
might help the state to develop a more just and moral society. But when 
Hays attended the SBC convention at St. Louis in 1971, he found that the 
Baptist preferred to pursue their internal squabbles. Rather than 
pressing the urgent issues of civil right, the Vietnam conflict, or the 
other concerns of a world gone astray, the SBC rebuked its Sunday School 
Board for ignoring tradition and the scriptures in its informational 
literature. To Hays, the board's hesitant entry into discussion of the 
moral difficulties of American life was a sign of its excessive conser-
vatism if anything.27 A more liberal forum for Hays was the National 
Council of Churches~ In that arena he was among the conservatives. 
By 1971 the issue of Vietnam had evolved beyond the simple pro- or 
anti-war split of the mid to late 1960s. Increasingly support for the 
war shifted to advocacy of peace. Disagreement came more and more to 
involve moral issues such as what constituted an honorable peace or what 
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defined a moral war~ When the NCC met, it faced a controversy because 
some members sought to limit debate simply to that issue of the morality 
of war. Others wished to deal with problems they believed the war had 
sidetracked. Led by Mrs. John Sparrowk, an American Baptist, the rad-
ical wing sought to make the conference a platform for a series of 
indictments of all wars as immoral. The moderate wing, led by vice-
president Hays, sought to pr_eserve the previously established consensus 
that the Vietnam war was a mistake and that American withdrawal should 
be accelerated. From that base the conference was to undertake discus-
sions of issues of concer.n for America's future, not its past, and hope-
fully the NCC might "pull the country together in its moral judgements," 
said Hays.28 The NCC chose to follow Hays, and it moved beyond Vietnam. 
Conciliation remained a key' motivation for Hays. 
At an age when most retire, Hays continued a level of activity hard 
to match even by a younger person. Even Cranford retired in 1971. 
After so many decades of service to Calvary Baptist Church and to his 
n'ational organization, Clarence Cranford gave way to a younger man. One 
of those who paid tribute was Brooks Hays. After praising Cranford for 
distinguished service to the church and to ecumenism, Hays returned to 
work.29 In fact, by 1973, his affiliation was with Cranford's church. 
The former SBC president was a member of the former enemy of so many of 
his people. In 1973 Hays went even farther. The Southern Baptist whose 
ties were to the American Baptist congregation at Calvary began working 
for the Methodists. 
In the fall of 1973, the Capitol Hill Methodist Church held an 
announcement coffee for Brooks Hays who had agreed to become lay minis-
ter in residence for two years. At age 75, Hays agreed to assist the 
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Methodist church in its programs for the elderly, the young, and the 
black members of its sister congregation, Ebenezer United Methodist 
Church. There was hope that Hays would utilize his abilities in bring-
ing diverse groups together as well as his nearJ.y three decades of resi-
dence in the community. Hays served as a friend and a helper to t.he 
elderly around him. Serving meals on wheels and visiting the lonely 
comprised much of the ministry of the man.30 But Hays was more than a 
patronizing purveyor of pity to the poor people around him. 
Brooks Hays become a clown. By 1975 he was a true veteran of the 
grease paint. To brighten the days of the elderly people whose lives 
were restricted by limited mobility, Hays donned clown make-up and 
visited, hopefully entertained, with the assistance of the Capitol Hill 
Methodist Youth organization. Once he got his act into shape, Hays made 
an occasional public appeara~ce in his new regalia. But it was only 
temporary, even though it lasted three rather than two years. Hays 
enjoyed his work with the Methodists, joking in reference to his wife's 
membership in that denomination that "She'll be able to interpret their 
strange ways to me."31 
Hays' pastor at the Baptist church expressed faith that his parish-
oner on loan was too Baptist to stay too long with the Methodists. On 
September 27, 1973, the Arkansas Gazette reported the Reverend George W. 
Hill of Calvary Baptist Church as saying, "I suspect that Brooks' roots 
are deep enough in Baptist soil that the tree will not be unduly bent by 
the winds of Methodism."32 And after more than three quarters of a cen-
tury those Baptist roots were solidly planted. Despite his enjoyment of 
the ecumenical aspect of his relationship with the Methodists, Hays sev-
ered his connection in 1976 when he and Marion moved to the safer suburbs. 
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Even while on loan to the Methodists, Hays maintained his activity 
on behalf of the Baptists. In November of 1974, he became chairman of 
the Fund of Renewal. A cooperative venture of the predominantly white 
American Baptists and the predominantly black Progressive National 
Baptists, the fund sought to raise $7.5 million. Of that money, $4.S 
million was earmarked for Baptist-related minority colleges, and the 
rest was intended to help the general needs of minorities.33 The fund 
was the type of venture which Hays enjoyed, and service to his church 
and to minorities in that venture had to alleviate the feelings of frus-
tration which resulted from an earlier attempt to help minorities, Hays' 
years as chairman of the North Carolina Human Relations Commission 
(NCHRC). 
Never reluctant to pa~ticipate in public affairs, especially when 
the opportunity presented itself to make of public service a more 
Christian occupation, while serving as director of the Ecumenical Coun-
cil at Wake Forest in 1970, Hays accepted the chairmanship of the Good 
Neighbor Council, later the NCHRC. Especially promising was the posses-
sion of the governor's chair by the Democratic Robert Scott. However, 
the NCHRC proved less than successful in its efforts to improve race 
relations in the state. Hays early began his work by suggesting that 
Scott hire a qualified black for a high level staff position. He 
received no response. At about the same time, in January of 1971, Hays 
spoke at North Carolina Wesleyan College where he called for maximum 
utilization of human resources in order to make possible the maximum 
development of the other resources of the South. His message appeared 
to be well-received in some quarters; the Nashville Graphic of 
Nashville, North Carolina, reported that "No amount of effort at the 
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state and national levels can succeed unless there is also an effort 
to build 'bridges of understanding' at the local level." That was 
precisely the point that Hays stressed and that failed to materialize.34 
Progress was slow in coming. The Good Neighbor Council report on 
minority hiring for 1971 said plainly that "non-discriminatory hiring 
has fallen short of its promise," but the report recommended only fur-
ther studies and a state hiring practices code.35 Despite the difficul-
ties Hays attempted to make the commission a legitimate agency. In 1973 
he recommended that the NCHRC include ministers on its council because 
of the shared concern for moral matters by them and the NCHRC. Six 
weeks after that suggestion, possibly because of lack of success in 
recruiting clergymen and undoubtedly because of his realism, Hays dis-
cussed the problem in the Executive Meeting of the NCHRC. The minutes 
read that "Mr. Hays expressed concern for the maturation of Churches in 
the area of human relations."36 The problems, according to the student 
body president at the University of North Carolina, Joe Stallings, were 
that the commission had no firm program and that its staff morale was 
poor. Furthermore, Stallings charged that Fred Cooper, director of the 
NCHRC, was incompetent and had excessive political ambitions.37 Hays 
was clearly failing in his attempt to create a moral basis for race 
relations in North Carolina. 
When Scott gave way to James Holshouser, the new governor proved 
even less cooperative than the old. Hays soon found himself in an unten-
able position and resigned from the irrelevancy which the NCHRC had 
become. In the summer of 1974, Hays wrote to Secretary of Administra-
tion David Flaharty that the Holshouser administration seemed to display 
a complete lack of interest in the commission. Further, Hays charged, 
230 
the administration was completely unresponsive to NCHRC attempts to 
reestablish lines of communication. That lack of response came despite 
the loyalty of the members of the commission to the governor and to a 
bipartisan approach to its work. The commissioners sent an open letter 
to the governor in which they sought an audience with Holshouser, noting 
that Hays' attempts to communicate had gone unanswered and unacknowl-
edged during the preceding s.everal months. The letter also sought to 
excuse Holshouser by suggesting that perhaps members of his staff had 
been intercepting the mail from Hays. The letter was conciliatory but 
futile. In December of 1.974, Hays submitted his resignation to 
Holshouser. The relevant part of the letter stated that "We have been 
unable to pierce the barriers that seemingly have been erected between 
you and our members."38 
The controversy lingered for a few months. Holshouser claimed he 
lacked time to see all persons in his government. His administrative 
assistant denied that Hays had made a major effort to see the governor. 
Finally, the governor fired the executive director and eighteen of the 
twenty members of the commission, replacing them with politically cor-
rect personnel.39 Human relations in North Carolina, once perceived as 
the most advanced in the South, achieved such a level that Communists 
and Klansmen waged a pitched battle in broad daylight only a few years 
later, and a compliant jury returned a verdict of self-defense for the 
Klansmen who slew Communists. Signs of a return to the "good old days' 
appeared. 
Seemingly, even in the 1970s, a Southerner who sought to make of 
his religion a more civilized and Christian place in which to live had 
no choice but to leave home. Hays continued to chide his Southern 
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Baptists, but his most effective work occurred when he served with 
American Baptists, Methodists, or the interdenominational organizations. 
While he was working to alleviate conditions for suffering blacks and 
old people, his Arkansas Baptists were fighting doctrinal disputes, and 
his Southern Baptists were preoccupied with the documentation rather 
than the content of the message offered by the Sunday School Board. 
Hays was unable to make them accept his beliefs in cooperation for the 
betterment of this world; they preferred to quibble about the rituals 
necessary to insure the next. More than half a century of crusading by 
Hays resulted in virtually nothing for those Southerners for whom he 
cared so deeply. 
Equally disappointing was his inablilty to create significant, 
lasting results in his efforts to form a more tolerant South in matters 
of race. From his conversion to the concept of racial equality after 
Little Rock until his disastrous experience with the NCHRC, Hays fought 
for moral justice, not just for gradual accommodation as he had during 
the long years prior to 1957. But his efforts were unavailing. How-
ever, the important matter was to fight, not necessarily to win, the 
battle for a just system. In the realm of religious and humane activ-
ity, Hays, if. not the region he represented, finally and fully realized 
his potential during the 1960s and 1970s. 
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CHAPTER X 
RETROSPECTIVE 
In December of 1964, while traveling through the country selling 
Lyndon Johnson's civil rights program, Hays stopped at the University of 
Rhode Island. Having made a standard speech, Hays asked for questions, 
and one of the more interesting queries came from a lady who asked Hays 
to explain what he meant by the American dream. Somewhat surprised that 
such a question could arise, Hays listed a dozen elements which com-
prised his dream. Reconstructed and put into writing the next day, Hays' 
reply was the most straightforward expression of his hopes and ideals 
which he ever made for the record. As such it provides a set of stand-
ards by which to measure the man inside the politician. By comparing 
each element of the dream with the relevant aspects of Hays' career, some 
determination can be made as to whether Hays truly merited the reputation 
he had as distinguished statesman and moral leader or whether his life 
was illusion and his retrospective on the American ideal a sham. 
Hays first described the dream as "the anticipation that sometime 
we will be able to say--Here is equality and freedomn; Here is brother-
hood and justice."! In a career which spanned nearly half a century, 
there were occasional lapses, as when Hays declined to exert himself to 
save the two black men condemned to death in the 1930s or when he signed 
the Southern Manifesto, the gesture of defiance to the forces of 
equality and justice. Prior to the crisis at Little Rock, Hays was 
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consistently aligned with the conservative forces or a leader of those 
who sought to buy time by means of such efforts as his Arkansas Plan. 
Even while he served the Kennedy administration his efforts in the 
direction of brotherhood, especially for blacks~ tended to be halting 
and paternalistic. However, as the civil rights revolution forced 
paternal moderates to choose one side or the other, as the middle ground 
disappeared, Hays increasingly moved with those fighting for change. 
By 1964 he was truly seeking equality, justice, and other elements of 
this first aspect of his American dream. His twenty years of advocacy 
helped to atone for his sixty years of neglect. 
Next in the dream was "compassion expressing itself in society's 
concern for those who fall by the way in a competitive system."2 In 
that respect there was no blemish on Hays' record. From his childhood 
experiences delivering Christmas baskets to the needy of Russellville, 
through his work in the Arkansas Tuberculosis Association and the Arkan-
sas Conference of Social Workers, and through his work in the New Deal, 
Hays consistently fought to help those who were unable to win against 
the system. Even in Congress Hays was consistently a supporter of laws 
to help ameliorate the struggle, unless the loser in the struggle proved 
to be black. And his work with the Methodist Church was the capstone of 
his consistent efforts, paternal though they might be, to aid the truly 
needy. 
On another topic Hays mentioned "imagination perfecting the mech-
anisms of government."3 When Hays found himself to be in favor with the 
machine in Yell County, Arkansas, in 1928, he avoided attacking that 
machine. He campaigned against the less powerful, temporary machine of 
the man he sought to unseat. But his early defeats came in part because 
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of the ability of his opponents to abuse the electoral system. Thus, he 
began working for reform of the primary system, the poll tax, and other 
flaws intruding on fair elections. From the New Deal period on, Hays 
was a reformer, and his efforts continued even when he was enduring his 
intermittent periods of non-political behavior, as when he created the 
Southern Committee on Political Ethics in 1968. 
Somewhat nebulous was Hays' next element, "sensitivity to the claim 
of righteousness in human affairs."4 Evidently Hays intended by that an 
acceptance that moral principles should not remain merely theoretical 
but must find legitimate application in human affairs. Hays expressed 
that principle more clearly when he addressed the National Conference of 
Christians and Jews in 1962. In that speech Hays said, "The political 
community, to be well orde~ed, must have the harmony and righteousness 
that religion alone can supply."5 The most visible, if not the most 
important, representation of that belief was the Congressional prayer 
room. Also, Hays was consistent as a national figure in advocating an 
involvement of religious people in the work of government. His numerous 
awards for Christian statesmanship were recognition of his ability to 
translate his belief into action, even if he was largely unable to con-
vince his Southern Baptists that their contributions were essential to 
make life more consistent with Christian ethics. 
Hays' American dream also incorporated the "hope that triumphs [in 
the United States] will strengthen values that are shared with other 
peoples around the world."6 Hays was aware that America had histori-
cally assumed the role of model for less fortunate nations. He recog-
nized as well that the United States had fallen short of its ideals on 
innumerable occasions. He had fallen short himself, especially when 
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the time came for Americans to fulfill the long unkept promise of equal-
ity for minorities. Nevertheless, especially during his later years 
when political considerations faded, Hays assumed for himself an active 
role as keeper of the American conscience. His speeches on behalf of 
civil rights and his defense of Vietnam-era draft evaders were spurs to 
the American people to return to the traditional path. The world was to 
be won if Americans proved that their system was consistent with its 
rhetoric. Hays was an active, missionary internationalist from the 
1920s, and he believed in his America. Thus, it followed that every-
thing which brought America closer to its ideals had of necessity to 
encourage similar aspirations in the rest of the world. 
Clearly a key element in the public life of Hays was his next wish, 
a hope for "human kindness so penetrating the nation that every man, no 
matter how incapacitated, will feel that he is wanted."7 Simply put, 
Brooks Hays was a nice man. For public consumption and personal ambi-
tion he worked for all of the right causes. However, merely doing the 
things for the Tuberculosis Association or any of his other causes was 
not in itself a valid indicator of human kindness. Practical consider-
ations and selfish motives intruded on public philanthropy. But Hays 
claimed, and it is impossible to disprove the contention, that he was 
unwilling to make an unkind remark, even in jest. In an environment in 
which many of his colleagues developed a sharp wit and practiced it at 
the expense of their peers, Hays always had a gentle humor which was 
never racial, never personal except when at his own expense, and never 
vicious.8 
Also,· the American dream included a "vision of opened doors of 
opportunity."9 Every element of Hays' career was consistent with that 
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vision. First on a personal level as when he aided his relatives in 
their struggle for survival or in his continual efforts to help worthy 
applicants to gain employment, then on an institutional level, Hays 
worked consistently to open doors. There was his charity work, his 
activity in the New Deal, and his role as advocate of civil rights and 
opportunity for blacks. Both in the church and in the government, Hays 
fought discrimination and it_s restriction on opportunity. Even when he 
was fighting a delaying action against civil rights, he was attempting 
to create opportunity for blacks within a paternalistic framework. 
Thus, Hays was consistent. with his dream of opportunity for all. 
Equally consistent was his action on behalf of "government ~ as 
well as.££ and for the people."10 Poll tax reform and modification of 
the of ten abused primary system of Arkansas were only the first ins-
tances in which he tried to give the people better access to and control 
of their representatives. Obviously, his work on behalf of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was consistent with 
the ideal. Even in his seventies, through his educational efforts with 
SCOPE and his testimony before the Watergate committee, Hays continued 
to advocate education of the voters to promote in them an impulse to 
establish more responsive and responsible government. Democracy was a 
driving force in the multi-faceted career of Brooks Hays. 
Dignity, at least the "hope of human dignity made secure,"ll was an 
unattainable goal. Nevertheless, Hays came gradually to accept that the 
attempt was valid. Political considerations kept Hays from the fight 
for dignity for 10 percent of American humanity during most of his 
career. Typical of his caution was his severing of ties with the 
Southern Conference for Human Welfare, because it was too controversial, 
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when he decided to run for Congress. Equally disappointing was his pre-
sentation of a plan for further delay, the Arkansas Plan, at a time when 
World War II had created the climate for progress toward the ideal. 
However, Hays never denied the search of others for human dignity except 
when it became a political matter. Although paternal, he was not 
racist, and he managed to reduce political considerations after his con-
stituents removed him from politics~ In the 1960s and 1970s the basic 
belief of Hays in the worth of all people came to dominate his public 
preoccupations. Even draft evaders were legitimate creatures of God and 
worthy of admission into the human community. Once he outlived his 
political ambitions, Hays became a statesman who was able to afford to 
work for those for whom society had made little room and for whom 
humanity had little regard. 
Hays also expressed a "longing for acknowledgement of the human 
family's oneness." 12 More than simply longing, Hays worked throughout 
his career to make the world accept its unity. When his part of the 
world rejected the r~st of mankind, Hays struggled, with others, to 
place the United States on the World Court. He failed. In another 
realm Hays fought constantly to reduce friction between his Baptists and 
members of the other religions of the world. The ecumenical approach 
included the easing of tensions with American Baptists and attempts to 
work with the National Baptists on a basis of equality. As president of 
the Southern Baptists, Hays fought the anti-Catholicism which later 
dominated that group. To set an example, he visited two popes and 
established the ecumenical institute. Finally, late in his life he 
symbolically united the denominations when he joined the American 
Baptist church which had strong ties to the National Baptists and moved 
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from there into service with the Methodists and their black counterpart. 
The final component of Hays' American dream was "the vision of a 
citizenry drawn together in mutual confidence, facing common evils and 
exalting a common faith in God."13 That statement neatly summarized all 
that Hays had done in his long career. It was a paraphrase of a state-
ment so often repeated as to be almost trite. In its older form it went 
"one nation, under God, indivisible· and with liberty and justice for 
all." Hays accepted the bases on which the United States theoretically 
rested. How could he do otherwise given his origins in the South, a 
region noted historically for its aggressive patriotism and religion? 
There was no need for Hays to reconcile politics and the dream. Had he 
failed to comply with the standards, even if mythical, of his region, 
his commitment to particular elements would have meant nothing. "One 
nation under God," the basis for American civilization, was so well 
inculcated, so much an unthought heritage for all who grew up in the 
early twentieth century that Hays undoubtedly had no awareness that his 
summarization of the American dream rested on it. Just as an American 
of the twentieth century South needed no affirmation of the existence of 
God, so that American tended not to question the role of his nation 
under that God. Possibly by 1964 there was some beginning of doubt 
about the assumption, but not for a man of Hays' generation and region. 
At the beginning of his ninth decade Brooks Hays remained the rep-
resentative man. Growing up in a small town near the mountains of 
northwest Arkansas, he developed the faith in democracy and concern for 
uplifting his fellow man which characterized the progressive elements of 
his region. Reinforcing those tendencies was his family's emphasis on 
religion as a positive fcrce in the world. By the time he left for 
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college, he was largely formed into the mold which determined his 
future. He was determined to use politics as the vehicle for his pro-
gressive and humane programs. But a major element was missing. Growing 
up in Russellville he had not had occasion to deal with the number one 
problem of the South, the role within it of its black citizens. 
When he first became aware of the plight of black Arkansans, he was 
already a political man; so, his first solution to the problem was in 
accordance with the Southern model for political success. Through the 
1940s he was consistently paternal in his behavior toward blacks, help-
ing them to the limits allowed by a Southern liberalism which dared not 
suggest equality. Even when the limits which blacks and a few whites 
regarded as possible began to reach beyond the invisible barriers of 
custom, political conside~ations encouraged Hays to remain an advocate 
of delay. Not until his section forced him to choose in 1958 did he 
become more than a typical Southern moderate politician on the issue of 
race. He remained impaled by the American dilemma of advocating equal-
ity for all while denying so much to so many and the political problem 
of satisfying both his constituents and his conscience. 
When Hays finally resolved the contradiction in the 1960s, he 
became at last a true representative of the liberal element of his 
nation. After committing himself to black equality, he never again sup-
ported the popular position on the issue unless he found that position 
to be consistent with American aspirations. He fJught the forces of 
reaction when they attempted to revive the narrow and bigoted South. He 
created SCOPE as a counter to the ideas represented by George Wallace, 
and he intruded his ecumenism on the religious controversy between his 
liberals and the people who sought to return the church to the early 
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years of the century. When finally he found no more justification for 
the Vietnam conflict, he accepted also that the earlier opponents of 
that war, including draft evaders, had valid arguments and a moral 
legitimacy to their position. Consistently throughout the 1960s and 
1970s Hays was among those who tried to make their nation more consis-
tent with its ideals. 
Hays was not unique as a Southerner who moved more quickly than his 
region. Others, and many of them, came to accept the inevitability of 
legal equality for all. His ecumenism attracted a sizeable following 
within the Southern Baptist Convention. But the South remains an area 
in which fundamentalism and only superficial acceptance of change are 
the norm, an area better typified by the career of Strom Thurmond. Hays 
was more than merely a representative Southerner. His importance lay in 
his role as a representative of the liberal edge of a basically conser-
vative region. 
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